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Abstract
Message authentication schemes built from universal hash functions are commonly
used for fast and secure message authentication. By studying universal hash func-
tions based on polynomial evaluation, we identify some properties which arise from
the underlying algebraic structure. As a result, we are able to describe a general
forgery attack against the related message authentication schemes, as well as pro-
viding a common description of all known attacks against such schemes, and greatly
expanding the number of known weak keys.
Iterated Even–Mansour ciphers are also popular and we initiate the theoretical study
of these ciphers’ security against related-key attacks. The simplest one-round Even–
Mansour cipher is shown to achieve a non-trivial level of related-key security. How-
ever, offsetting keys by constants is not included in this result; two rounds suffice to
reach that level of security under chosen-plaintext attacks and three rounds boosts
security to resist chosen-ciphertext attacks.
Tweakable block ciphers are a generalisation of block ciphers that take an additional
input (the tweak) in order to provide an efficient alternative to re-keying the cipher.
We analyse the security reduction given for CLRW2, a method for constructing
a tweakable block cipher from a (conventional) block cipher and a universal hash
function. Having identified an error in the proof, we provide a revised proof with a
new bound.
Finally, we study the security of two schemes that have been proposed for standardis-
ation. The first is a composition of Bernstein’s ChaCha20 and Poly1305, as proposed
for use in IETF protocols as an authenticated encryption scheme; the second is an
ultra-lightweight RFID authentication protocol proposed as part of ISO/IEC 29167.
We conclude that the first is a secure authenticated encryption scheme, while the
second is catastrophically broken by algebraic attacks.
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Introduction
Contents
1.1 Motivation and context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.2 Thesis structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
This chapter gives an overview of the thesis. We provide the motivation for our
research and give a broad overview of the wider context. In this chapter, we also
present the overall structure and main contributions of this thesis.
1.1 Motivation and context
The long-standing aim of cryptography is to facilitate secure communication be-
tween a number of parties. The definition of secure communication has broadened
over time: historically confidentiality was the prime concern (indeed this is still the
perception that many have of cryptography) whereas now data integrity, authenti-
cation, and non-repudiation are also recognised as important factors. Similarly, the
range of problems for which cryptographic solutions have been considered has in-
creased to include more exotic notions such as providing zero-knowledge proofs and
the public verification of calculations that have been outsourced to an untrusted
party. Symmetric cryptography aims to solve some of these problems, under the
assumption that users share some information (the key) not known to an adversary.
Prior to the 1970s, all cryptography was symmetric and most occurred in a mil-
itary context (typically via mechanical, rotor-based enciphering machines such as
10
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Scherbius’s Enigma [247]). Two developments changed this: the proposal of public-
key cryptography and the standardisation of the Data Encryption Standard (DES).
The first public descriptions of public-key cryptography came from Diffie and Hell-
man [95] and Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman [232]. Ellis and Cocks are now acknowl-
edged as the first to envisage this concept [114]; their research was not declassified
until 1997 as they both worked at the Government Communication Headquarters
(GCHQ). By separating the public and private keys, public-key cryptography of-
fers two main advantages over symmetric cryptography: simpler key exchange and
a greater flexibility within the schemes. Despite this, most data is still encrypted
symmetrically: public-key algorithms are more computationally taxing than sym-
metric algorithms of a comparable strength and the advantages of both systems can
be realised by using a public-key algorithm to exchange a symmetric key.
In the intervening decades, symmetric cryptography has found many practical ap-
plications. For example, it is used widely across the internet, automated teller ma-
chine (ATM) networks, and in mobile phones; it is set to become more ubiquitous as
the Internet of Things [156], SmartMeters [171], and radio frequency identification
(RFID) tags [153] become more widely used. The many different parties involved in
the specification and deployment of these systems and the desire for interoperability
necessitates some level of standardisation. Perhaps the best known example of stan-
dardised cryptography is the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES): a four-year
competition concluded with Rijndael being selected as the replacement for DES.
Since then AES has seen widespread use (e.g. [138, 181, 245, 229, 180, 265]). There
are many standardisation bodies, four particularly relevant examples for this thesis
are the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO), the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), and
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
The first main theme in this thesis is that the cryptography studied is practical: the
majority of the schemes studied are either deployed and used, or have been proposed
as alternatives for existing deployed schemes. The polynomial-based hash functions
studied in Chapter 3 are central to the AES–GCM and ChaCha20–Poly1305 cipher
suites in the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, which are used for approx-
imately 40% of TLS connections [179]. In Chapter 4, we study the iterated Even–
Mansour design for block ciphers, the principles of which are used in well-known
11
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block ciphers such as AES, Present, and LED. Tweakable block ciphers, which we
study in Chapter 5, have become a popular primitive from which to design modes
of operation and in particular for disk encryption applications; examples can be
found as submissions to the CAESAR competition [79], such as OCB [170] and Mi-
nalpher [246], and as standardised disk encryption modes, such as XTS [101]. The
final chapter of this thesis is dedicated to studying schemes that have been proposed
specifically for standardisation: ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for use within TLS [211],
and Crypto-xor as an RFID authentication protocol submitted to ISO/IEC [140].
The papers of Goldwasser and Micali (e.g. [127]) represent a significant milestone
in the development of modern theoretical cryptography, laying the foundations for
the reductionist security paradigm. In 1917, Vernam [268] described what has come
to be known as the one-time pad, which Shannon [249] showed in 1949 to provide
Perfect Secrecy—that is, even against adversaries with unlimited computing power,
the plaintext remains completely hidden. However, schemes providing perfect se-
crecy have severe limitations, such as infeasibly long keys. Goldwasser and Micali’s
idea [128] was to base the security of a scheme on an (assumed) intractable problem
and provide a proof that an adversary breaking the scheme could also solve the
problem. While schemes providing perfect secrecy give strong security guarantees,
this reductionist paradigm allows for the analysis of practical schemes.
Bellare and Rogaway [18, 234] extend this reductionist approach to ‘practice-oriented
provable security’. Recognising that the schemes typically constructed in the re-
ductionist approach were too inefficient to be widely used, Bellare and Rogaway
popularised the analysis of schemes constructed from finite pseudorandom function
families and block ciphers.
Practice-oriented provable security has also encouraged concrete security analyses.
In contrast to the methodology of Goldwasser and Micali (who considered asymp-
totic results and polynomial reducibility), concrete security gives more precise state-
ments of the security of a scheme: for example, an adversary attacking a particular
encryption scheme (who runs for a certain, bounded length of time) will have an
advantage bounded by some probability, which is expressed in terms of the number
of plaintext/ciphertext pairs that they observe and a measure of the security of the
underlying block cipher.
12
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The aim of this approach is a community working with precise definitions of security,
careful parametrisation of adversaries’ capabilities, and thorough exposition of the
assumptions made. These ideas have formalised the folklore techniques of building
more complex cryptographic schemes from simpler ones.
For an attack against a scheme with a security reduction, several possible inter-
pretations are observed throughout this thesis (noting security reductions’ contro-
versy [164] and limitations [37]). The attack may succeed with a lower probability
than is described by the security reduction; we will see an example of this in Chap-
ter 3. It may represent a failure of the adversarial model to accurately capture how
the scheme is being used; related-key attacks (which we study in Chapter 4) are an
example of a strengthened adversarial model, aiming to prevent this issue. There
may be an error in the security reduction; this is the case for the scheme studied in
Chapter 5. Finally, the attack might include an observation that invalidates the as-
sumption underlying the security of the scheme; in Chapter 6 we study the security
of the primitive underlying the Crypto-xor scheme [140].
1.2 Thesis structure
Chapter 2. In this chapter we introduce the notation, cryptographic primitives,
and security notions used throughout this thesis.
Chapter 3. Families of hash functions based on polynomial evaluation are often
used in the design of message authentication codes and authenticated encryption
schemes. Universal hash function families are an attractive choice for this applica-
tion, as they come with information-theoretic guarantees about their security.
In this chapter, we identify some properties of a universal hash function family that
arise from the underlying algebraic structure. We go on to describe a general forgery
attack and provide a common description of all known attacks against a related
message authentication scheme. We also greatly expand the number of known weak
keys for schemes built from this family of hash functions and provide some analysis
of schemes based on another family of hash functions.
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The work described in this chapter is joint work with Carlos Cid and is published
as [226] and [227]; it is also available at [225].
Chapter 4. Unless one wishes to gain information-theoretic security, via the use
of a scheme such as the one-time pad (along with its well known key-management
issues), the security of any scheme will be based on some computational assumption;
this assumption critically underpins the security of the scheme. Some uses of block
ciphers require security under related keys and if one wishes to instantiate such a
scheme with a particular block cipher, then some reasoning as to why that block
cipher provides this level of security is required. Almost all modern block cipher
proposals will include an initial security analysis, however a more attractive strategy
is to design a block cipher in such a way as to obtain theoretical guarantees about
its security.
In this chapter we discuss key-alternating ciphers and the theoretical security guar-
antees that they offer with respect to related-key attacks. We show that the simplest
one-round Even–Mansour cipher achieves a non-trivial level of related-key security.
Although this does not include the practically relevant case of offsetting keys by
constants, two rounds suffice to reach this level under chosen-plaintext attacks and
three rounds boosts security to resist chosen-ciphertext attacks.
The work is joint work with Pooya Farshim and is published as [109]; it is also
available at [108]. The publication that this chapter is based on also includes a
result on the relationship between indifferentiability and RKA security. This result
is Farshim’s and so is omitted here; all other contributions are joint.
Chapter 5. Tweakable block ciphers are a generalisation of block ciphers that take
an additional input (the ‘tweak’ ) in order to provide an efficient alternative to re-
keying the cipher. Using tweakable block ciphers to construct higher-level schemes
(such as symmetric encryption schemes or authenticated encryption schemes) has
become a popular design approach and it is possible to build a tweakable block
cipher from a conventional block cipher. Many such constructions come with a
security reduction, however the careful verification of such a proof is an essential
part of establishing their security.
14
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In this chapter we describe an error in the proof for the CLRW2 construction by
Landecker, Shrimpton, and Terashima [176] which uses a conventional block cipher
and a family of hash functions to realise a tweakable block cipher. We are able to
resolve the issue and give a new bound for the security of CLRW2. This work is
available at [223].
Chapter 6. It is desirable for standardised cryptography to use primitives and
schemes that are well established and have received considerable analysis, however
this is not always possible (for example, heavily constrained devices may not have the
processing power necessary). In this chapter, we study the security of two schemes
that have been proposed for standardisation. The first is a novel composition [211] of
Bernstein’s ChaCha20 [35] and Poly1305 [34], as proposed for use in IETF protocols
as an authenticated encryption scheme; the second is an ultra-lightweight RFID
authentication protocol proposed as part of ISO/IEC 29167 [140].
Our conclusions are that the first is a secure authenticated encryption scheme, while
the second is catastrophically broken by algebraic attacks. Algebraic attacks have
been successfully applied to a number of other ciphers and authentication protocols.
In these attacks the scheme is represented as a set of equations with variables cor-
responding to secret values (such as bits of the key) expressed in terms of known
values (such as observed ciphertext); solving this system of equations corresponds
to recovering the secret values.
The analysis of ChaCha20 and Poly1305 is available at [224]. The work on ISO/IEC
29167 is joint with Carlos Cid, Lo¨ıc Ferreira, and Matthew Robshaw; it is published
as [74].
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Chapter 2
Preliminaries
Contents
2.1 Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2 Cryptographic background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3 Security models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
This chapter introduces the notation used throughout this thesis and describes the
necessary theoretical foundations.
2.1 Notation
We write x ← y for the action of assigning the value y to the variable x. For a set
X , we write x ←$ X to represent an element x being uniformly sampled from X . If
A is a probabilistic algorithm we write y ←$ A(x1, . . . , xn) for the action of running
A on inputs x1, . . . , xn with randomly chosen coins and assigning the result to y.
For an arbitrary bitstring x ∈ {0, 1}∗ we use |x| to denote its length. The set of
bitstrings with length at most ` is denoted {0, 1}≤`. The truncation to n bits of a
string x will be represented by truncn(x). For a set S ⊆ {0, 1}n and an element
x ∈ {0, 1}n we define S ⊕ x = {s ⊕ x : s ∈ S}. For a bit string x, we denote
the bitwise complement of x by x. For a bitstring x ∈ {0, 1}mn, we parse this as
x1|| . . . ||xm where |xi| = n for each i. If x ∈ {0, 1}∗ with |x| = mn + s, then we
define a partial final block: xm+1 ∈ {0, 1}s. Throughout this thesis, we will assume
that all schemes operate on bitstrings.
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For an algorithm A, access to an oracle O (or a tuple of oracles O = (O1, . . . ,Ot))
will be denoted AO. The number of queries made by A to O will be denoted by q; if
A has access to more than one oracle, subscripts will be used to distinguish between
calls to each of the oracles. In games, all Boolean flags are initialised to false and
arrays are initially undefined at every point.
A finite field will be denoted by K unless the order of the field has particular rele-
vance, in which case it will be denoted by Fpr with |Fpr | = pr. The multiplicative
group of a field K will be denoted by K?. The set of integers will be denoted by Z
and the set of integers modulo p by Zp. The set of natural numbers will be denoted
by N. We use ξ(p) to represent a Bernoulli random variable that is 1 with probability
p and 0 with probability 1− p. We let [n] = {1, . . . , n}.
2.2 Cryptographic background
In this section, we describe the syntax and security of the cryptographic notions that
will be used throughout this thesis. Additionally, some background information on
the history and development of these concepts is given.
2.2.1 Pseudorandom functions
Background. A pseudorandom function (PRF) family is a set of functions with
the property that, when one is chosen at random, its input-output behaviour cannot
be distinguished from a truly random function (by some computationally restricted
adversary). This notion was first described by Goldwasser and Micali (under the
name ‘poly-random collections’ ) [126]; throughout this thesis we will focus on the
finite variant of this property described by Bellare, Killian, and Rogaway [25, 26],
as it is better aligned with concrete security analyses.
The idea of pseudorandom functions has been widely adopted as a method with
which to build and analyse symmetric-key primitives, particularly block ciphers,
encryption schemes, and message authentication codes (e.g. [125, 188, 24, 28, 157]).
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PRFF ,A :
b ←$ {0, 1}; k ←$ KF
urf ←$ Func({0, 1}na , {0, 1}nb)
b′ ←$ APRF
Return (b′ = b)
PRF(X):
If b = 0 Return urf(X)
Return prf(k,X)
Figure 2.1: Game defining the PRF security of a function family F .
Syntax. A pseudorandom function family between {0, 1}na and {0, 1}nb consists
of a set of keys KF and a set F = {prfk : {0, 1}na → {0, 1}nb | k ∈ KF}. When
referring to the set F , we will tacitly assume that the key space (KF ) is known.
Security. We follow Bellare et al. [25, 26] and formalise the PRF security of F
in Figure 2.1, where Func({0, 1}na , {0, 1}nb) denotes the set of all functions with
domain {0, 1}na and range {0, 1}nb . The PRF advantage of an adversary A against
F is defined as
AdvprfF (A) = 2 · Pr[PRFF ,A ]− 1 .
This definition accounts for the fact that an adversary can always guess and succeed
with probability 1/2 and normalises the advantage that an adversary’s strategy
provides (over the simple guessing strategy) to the interval [0, 1]. The expression
Pr[PRFF ,A ] denotes the probability that the PRF game given in Figure 2.1 returns 1
(which signals that the adversary correctly guessed b), when run with the adversary
A and set of functions F ; this probability is taken over the random choices of b, k,
urf, and any randomness used by the adversary.
2.2.2 Block ciphers
Background. A block cipher (BC) is a symmetric encryption algorithm that
operates on fixed-width blocks of plaintext and ciphertext; commonly, the blocks
consist of 64 or 128 bits. There is no particular need to presume that the block
cipher uses these common block sizes or that our plaintext and ciphertext are in
bits, however we will assume the latter throughout.
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⊕ prfiki
Li Ri
Li+1 R
i+1
Figure 2.2: The round function of a Feistel cipher. The input to each round is split
into two (possibly unevenly) and in the ith round a function prfi is used
with round key ki to compute the input to the next round.
P1 ⊕
k2
P2 ⊕
k3
. . . ⊕
kt
Pt ⊕
kt+1
y⊕
k1
x
Figure 2.3: A t-round key-alternating cipher, with permutations P1,. . . ,Pt and round
keys k1,. . . ,kt+1.
Two popular design strategies for block ciphers are Feistel networks (or Luby–
Rackoff ciphers) [45, 188] and key-alternating ciphers [91]. There are many other
strategies such as Lai–Massey ciphers [172] and various generalisations of Feistel
networks (e.g. [202, 136, 193]). These methods all result in iterated block ciphers,
where a round function is repeatedly applied to process the plaintext and more
rounds generally offers greater security. In a Feistel cipher, the plaintext is pro-
cessed in two halves; the round function of a Feistel cipher consists of applying a
keyed function to one half, xoring the output into the other half, and swapping
the halves, as illustrated in Figure 2.2. In a key-alternating cipher the plaintext is
processed by alternately xoring with a round key and applying a key-independent
permutation, as shown in Figure 2.3. Commonly, the functions prf1,. . . ,prft or per-
mutations P1,. . . ,Pt are closely related in order to simplify implementations. A more
detailed discussion of key-alternating ciphers is given in Section 4.
In the 1970s, the National Bureau of Standards standardised the Data Encryption
Standard (DES) based on Lucifer, a cipher developed by IBM [199]. Both Lucifer
and DES have a Feistel structure, although the round functions are not PRFs. As
it became clear that DES did not provide the level of security required, particularly
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with respect to its key size, variants of DES were proposed as ways to increase the
size of the keys. DES-X [161, 162] is one of the principal examples, where the extra
key material is used as pre- and post-whitening keys and is xored with the inputs
and outputs of DES; Triple DES [17, 32] is another example, where DES is applied
to the plaintext three times using using independent keys (a two-key variant is also
defined [17, p. 10]).
In 1997, the National Institute of Standards and Technology initiated the process of
standardising a replacement for DES [212]. This involved 15 submissions, and after
extensive analysis Rijndael was announced as the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) [208]; AES is an example of a key-alternating cipher that is widely used,
having been standardised for a range of applications as discussed in Chapter 1.
Since the standardisation of Rijndael, a popular theme in symmetric cryptography
research has been the topic of lightweight cryptography. Here the motivation is to
design and study primitives and schemes that are well suited to pervasive devices
and are able to provide security despite scarce resources (e.g. small implementa-
tion footprint or low energy consumption). A number of lightweight block ciphers
have been proposed, including HIGHT [137], Present [59], KATAN [67], LED [131],
KLEIN [129], PRINCE [61], and Zorro [118].
From a block cipher, it is possible to build a wide range of primitives and schemes in-
cluding symmetric encryption schemes (e.g. [23, 239]), message authentication codes
(e.g. [199, Sect. 9.5.1] and [207]), authenticated encryption schemes (e.g. [272, 100])
and (universal) hash functions (e.g. [24]). Indeed, many commonly used symmetric
algorithms are constructed from block ciphers—even if it is not immediately clear
where they feature in the design, as is the case for the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)
hash functions which are built from the SHA-CAL block cipher [134].
Syntax. A block cipher consists of a set of keys K and a pair of functions E,D : K×
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n such that for every k ∈ K the map E(k, ·) is a permutation on
{0, 1}n. Such an E uniquely defines its inverse map D(k, ·) for each key k. We write
BC = (E,D) to denote a block cipher, which also implicitly defines the block cipher’s
key space K and the message space or domain {0, 1}n. We will often denote E(k, ·)
by Ek(·) and the inverse of this permutation by Dk(·).
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SPRPBC,A :
b ←$ {0, 1}; k ←$ K
(iE, iD) ←$ Block(K, {0, 1}n)
b′ ←$ ABC-Enc,BC-Dec
Return (b′ = b)
BC-Enc(X):
If b = 0 Return iE(k,X)
Return E(k,X)
BC-Dec(X):
If b = 0 Return iD(k,X)
Return D(k, x)
Figure 2.4: Game defining the SPRP security of a block cipher BC = (E,D). In the
PRP game the adversary cannot query the BC-Dec oracle.
Security. We follow Luby and Rackoff [188] and formalise the strong pseudo-
random permutation (SPRP) security of BC in Figure 2.4; we let Block(K, {0, 1}n)
denote the set of all block ciphers with key space K and domain {0, 1}n. The SPRP
advantage of an adversary A against BC is defined as
AdvsprpBC (A) = 2 · Pr[SPRPBC,A ]− 1 .
The pseudorandom permutation (PRP) advantage is defined similarly, for adver-
saries that make no queries to BC-Dec. An adversary playing the SPRP game is
said to be carrying out a chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA), while adveraries against
the PRP security of a scheme are carrying out chosen-plaintext attacks (CPA).
There is an extensive literature showing that, with sufficiently many rounds, key-
alternating and Feistel ciphers can meet this security requirement (e.g. [98, 73, 188]).
2.2.3 Cryptographic permutations
Public permutations have become a popular basis from which to build other sym-
metric primitives. In this setting, it is assumed that all parties have access to some
specified permutations. Although several submissions to the SHA-3 competition
have popularised this idea (including the eventual winner, Keccak [40, 210]), it can
be dated back to at least Even and Mansour [106, 107]. A number of other hash
function proposals explicitly use a public permutation, such as Quark [14], Spon-
gent [58], and Photon [130]. Typically these instantiate the sponge framework [39]
with a particular choice of public permutation.
Part of the motivation behind the recent interest in building primitives from pub-
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lic permutations has been the flexibility offered by the sponge construction and
the ability to have several primitives instantiated with schemes that share much of
their implementation, which is particularly attractive for lightweight applications.
However, public permutations occur (less transparently) in other schemes; for exam-
ple, in a key-alternating cipher [91] the key-independent permutations are publicly
known. In this thesis, a block cipher constructed from ideal permutations that are
accessed via an oracle pi is denoted BCpi = (Epi,Dpi).
One disadvantage of this paradigm is that, historically, it has not been clear how
best to analyse the security of the scheme from a theoretical perspective. A common
approach taken has been to analyse the scheme in the random-permutation model.
In this model, the public permutation is replaced by a uniform, random permutation
and it is assumed that an adversary only gains information about the value P(a)
by explicitly evaluating P at the point a (beyond knowing that P(a1) 6= P(a2) for
a1 6= a2). The random-permutation model is closely related to the random-oracle
model [81], in which all parties have access to a public random function, as formalised
by Bellare and Rogaway [31]. The ideal cipher model gives all parties access to a
family of random permutations and dates back to Shannon [249, p. 691]. It has
been used to reason about the security of many schemes (e.g. [56, 162]) and the
random-permutation model simply gives access to an ideal cipher consisting of a
single random permutation.
While analysis within these ideal models perhaps gives some indication of a scheme’s
security, it is possible to give constructions that are provably secure in these models
but insecure regardless of how the ideal component is instantiated (e.g. [65, 194, 19,
51]). This has led to some discussion about the merits of such a model [164, 165].
2.2.4 Symmetric encryption schemes
Background. Symmetric encryption schemes (SES) were perhaps the first crypto-
graphic scheme to be used: the Caesar, Vigene`re, and Playfair ciphers are examples
of schemes intended to allow two parties, sharing a private key, to communicate
with confidentially; Kahn [155] gives a detailed discussion of historical encryption
schemes. In 1917, Vernam [268] described what has become known as the one-time
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pad, which Shannon [249] showed in 1948 to provide perfect secrecy. Even against
adversaries with unlimited computational resources, symmetric encryption schemes
providing perfect secrecy completely hide the plaintext; more formally, the probabil-
ity distribution of plaintexts is identical to the distribution of plaintexts conditioned
on the observed ciphertexts. The period between World War 1 and World War 2
saw a rapid development of mechanical, rotor-based enciphering machines, including
Scherbius’s Enigma [247].
Around the time that DES was standardised, attention turned to constructing sym-
metric encryption schemes from block ciphers. As block ciphers only describe how
to encrypt fixed-width blocks, it is necessary to specify how to use a block cipher
to encrypt longer or shorter messages. Additionally, block ciphers are determinis-
tic whereas Goldwasser and Micali [127] describe the need for a secure encryption
scheme to be probabilistic (so that sending the same plaintext twice is highly likely
to result in different ciphertexts).
Modes of operation provide a solution to these two issues: notable examples include
output feedback (OFB), cipher feedback (CFB), counter (CTR), and cipher block
chaining (CBC) mode. In some cases (e.g. CBC mode) an appropriate padding
scheme is needed in order to deal with partial final blocks. These modes of operation
are analysed by Bellare et al. [23] in the concrete security framework.
Rogaway et al. [241] introduce the concept of nonce-based symmetric encryption,
phrased in terms of authenticated encryption (AE) schemes; Rogaway [237, 239]
formally describes nonce-based symmetric encryption and nonce-based schemes pro-
viding authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD).
Previous work had recognised the need for probabilistic encryption and these works
examine what level of security is achievable if the only assumption about the initiali-
sation vector (IV) is that it is non-repeating (a nonce). As an example, with Counter
mode it is sufficient to choose the IVs such that no counter value is repeated, whereas
(textbook) CBC mode requires an unpredictable IV. This nonce-based method pro-
poses that by clarifying and reducing the assumptions about the IV, schemes that
are used in practice are less likely to be misused.
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IND$-CPASES,A :
b ←$ {0, 1}; k ←$ K
b′ ←$ ASym-Enc
Return (b′ = b)
Sym-Enc(N,M):
If b = 0 Return $(k,N,M)
Return Enc(k,N,M)
Figure 2.5: Game defining the IND$-CPA security of a symmetric encryption scheme
SES = (Enc,Dec).
Syntax. Following Rogaway et al. [239], a nonce-based symmetric encryption
scheme consists of two functions: Enc,Dec : K ×N × {0, 1}≤LP → {0, 1}≤LC , where
LP is a bound on the length of messages that may be encrypted using the scheme
and LC is a corresponding bound on the length of the ciphertext. Additionally,
for every k, N and P we require that Dec(k,N,Enc(k,N, P)) = P. We denote a
symmetric encryption scheme by SES = (Enc,Dec), which implicitly defines the sets
K and N and the message-length bounds, LP and LC . The function Enc(k, ·, ·)
will often be denoted Enck(·, ·), and similarly for Dec. We additionally assume that
Enc is length-preserving, in that |Ek(N,P)| = |P| (excluding the transmission of the
nonce); this is not the most general description that one could imagine, however all
of the schemes considered in this thesis have this property.
Security. The IND$-CPA game (indistinguishability from random, under a chosen-
plaintext attack) is formalised in Figure 2.5, where we assume that the length of
the ciphertext, |Enck(N,M)|, depends only on |M| and define $ to be an oracle
returning |Ek(N,M)| uniformly random bits. Throughout, we will only consider
nonce-respecting adversaries, so that no adversary queries their oracle with pairs
(N,M) and (N,M ′). The adversary’s IND$-CPA advantage [241, 240] is defined as
Advind$-cpaSES (A) = 2 · Pr[IND$-CPASES,A ]− 1 .
Initially, semantic security [127] was introduced as the objective of secure encryption
(first for public-key schemes, then modified for symmetric schemes). This can be
shown to be equivalent to ciphertext indistinguishability [128] and Bellare et al. [23]
describe several indistinguishability notions, such as Find-then-Guess, Left-or-Right,
and Real-or-Random; all are stronger (and easier to work with) than semantic se-
curity. IND$ security trivially implies each of these notions, is easier to understand
and motivate, and is often achieved by the schemes that we wish to reason about.
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It is possible to strengthen each of these notions by permitting adversaries access
to a decryption oracle (which returns the decryption of a ciphertext chosen by the
adversary). In this thesis we will not consider chosen-ciphertext attacks against
symmetric encryption schemes not described as authenticated encryption schemes
and so the reader is referred to standard references (such as [157]) for further details.
2.2.5 Tweakable block ciphers
Background. A tweakable block cipher (TBC) is a block cipher that admits an
additional public input (the ‘tweak’ ) to introduce extra variability at the message-
block level, in the same way that a nonce or IV introduces variability at the message
level. Tweakable block ciphers are formalised by Liskov, Rivest, and Wagner [186].
The motivation for redrawing the abstraction boundary in this way is that, in many
situations, independent instances of a block cipher are desirable. For example, in
Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode, if a repeated ciphertext block is observed then
an adversary can conclude that the corresponding plaintext blocks are identical;
however if an independent instance of the block cipher were to be used for each block,
then this would not be the case. One potential solution to this particular issue with
ECB mode would be to re-key the block cipher with fresh, pseudorandom, nonce-
dependent keys for each block processed. Most block ciphers incur a cost associated
with changing the key, so a major motivation of Liskov, Rivest, and Wagner was to
realise independent instances of a block cipher more efficiently than rekeying.
The Hasty Pudding Cipher [248] and Mercy [87] are early examples of ciphers that
natively support a tweak (in the case of the Hasty Pudding Cipher, this was called
Spice); Threefish [112] is a more recent example. It is also possible to build tweak-
able block ciphers from conventional block ciphers, as in Rogaway’s XE and XEX
modes [238], or by modifying existing block cipher designs, as in Goldenberg et al.’s
work on tweaking Luby–Rackoff ciphers [124]. Tweakable block ciphers can be used
to construct other cryptographic functions, such as symmetric and authenticated
encryption schemes (e.g. OCB [238, 170]), hash functions (e.g. Skein [112]), and
message authentication codes (MACs, e.g. PMAC [55]).
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TSPRPTBC,A :
b ←$ {0, 1}; k ←$ K
(iTE, iTD) ←$ Block(K × T , {0, 1}n)
b′ ←$ ATBC-Enc,TBC-Dec
Return (b′ = b)
TBC-Enc(T,X):
If b = 0 Return iTE(k, T,X)
Return TE(k, T,X)
TBC-Dec(T,X):
If b = 0 Return iTD(k, T,X)
Return TD(k, T,X)
Figure 2.6: Game defining the TSPRP security of a tweakable block cipher TBC =
(TE,TD). In the TPRP game the adversary cannot query the TBC-Dec
oracle.
Syntax. A tweakable block cipher is a pair of functions TE,TD : K×T ×{0, 1}n →
{0, 1}n, where K is the key space, T is the tweak space, and {0, 1}n is the message
space. We require that, for every k ∈ K and T ∈ T , TE(k, T, ·) is a permutation
on {0, 1}n and we denote the inverse of this permutation by TD(k, T, ·). We write
TBC = (TE,TD) to denote a tweakable block cipher, which also implicitly defines
the key space K, tweak space T , and the message space {0, 1}n. We will often denote
E(k, T, ·) by Ek(T, ·) and the inverse of this permutation by Dk(T, ·). The set of all
tweakable block ciphers with key space K, tweak space T , and domain {0, 1}n can
be canonically mapped to Block(K × T , {0, 1}n).
Security. We use the definition of (strong) tweakable block cipher security given by
Liskov et al. [186, 187]. Consider an adversary A and define their tweakable-SPRP
(TSPRP) advantage against TBC as
AdvtsprpTBC (A) = 2 · Pr[TSPRPTBC,A ]− 1 ,
where the TSPRP game is as formalised in Figure 2.6.
The tweaked-PRP (TPRP) advantage is defined similarly, for adversaries that make
no queries to TBC-Dec. Note that, in the definition of both tweakable block ciphers
and strong tweakable block ciphers, the adversary is able to choose both the input
and the tweak for each query.
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2.2.6 Message authentication codes
Background. Message authentication is a somewhat orthogonal aim to that of con-
fidentiality: the objectives of message authentication are to derive some guarantees
about the sender’s identity and the integrity of the message. Historically, message
authentication was obtained by the decryption of a ciphertext to a ‘meaningful’
plaintext—this was perhaps in part due to the perceived unlikelihood of attack-
ers injecting fake messages and the error propagation properties of the encryption
schemes in use at the time.
Around the time that DES was standardised, the recognition that encryption does
not provide message authentication and the importance of message authentication
(particularly to the banking industry) led to the development of dedicated mes-
sage authentication codes (MACs). Early examples of MACs include the Message
Authentication Algorithm [92] and CBC-MAC, which is specified by the Ameri-
can National Standards Institute (ANSI) in ANSI X9.9 and X9.19 [199], and by
the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) in Federal Information
Processing Standard (FIPS) 113 [207].
These two algorithms follow the (now) common pattern of gaining assurance about
the origin of a message via a short ‘tag’ appended to the message. Informally this
tag is a secure MAC if it is not feasible, without the key, to find a message and tag
that appear to have been created by a legitimate sender. The first formal treatment
of message authentication codes (and in particular CBC-MAC) dates from 1994 [25];
it is well known that any PRF is a good MAC [25, 126, 125].
There are four common types of message authentication code: those based on block
ciphers, cryptographic hash functions, permutations, or universal hash functions. In
the first category, CBC-MAC and its variants [54, 147] appear in many introductory
courses on cryptography [192] and are widely used and standardised [142, 272]; XOR
MACs are an alternative method to build a MAC from a block cipher [24]. Cryp-
tographic hash functions are perhaps the most common building block for MACs;
the hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) [167, 20] is a mode of op-
eration for a hash function which realises a secure MAC and it is very widely
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used [273, 158, 159, 209]. The documentation for Keccak (SHA-3) and sponge func-
tions describe a wide variety of modes of operation for building primitives from a
public permutation; one such mode results in a MAC [39, Sect. 3.2]. Universal hash
functions have been studied extensively and an early suggested application was that
of information-theoretic message authentication; see Section 2.2.7 for more details.
It is worth remarking that this informal classification does not uniquely map MAC
schemes to a category: for example, XOR MACs are fundamentally a block-cipher-
based universal hash function that is then transformed into a MAC [24] and many
hash-function-based MACs are instantiated with a hash function constructed from
a block cipher.
Syntax. We will follow Black et al. [53] for a description of the syntax of nonce-
based message authentication schemes. Message authentication schemes are not
typically nonce-based, as it is straightforward to construct a nonce-based MAC
from a MAC that does not require nonces by simply including the nonce with the
message (and ensuring that the nonce can be distinguished from the message). How-
ever, nonces are required for some universal-hash-based schemes; in particular, the
schemes that we study in Chapter 3 are all nonce-based.
A nonce-based message authentication scheme is a function MAC : K×N×{0, 1}? →
{0, 1}|τ |, where K is the key space, N the nonce space, {0, 1}? the message space,
and {0, 1}|τ | the set of possible authentication tags. The authenticity of a tuple
(N,M, τ) is verified by computing MAC(k,N,M): if τ = MAC(k,N,M) then the
tag is valid, otherwise it is invalid.
Security. An adversary attacking a message authentication scheme MAC is given
access to a tagging oracle MAC-Tag and a verification oracle MAC-Ver. At
the beginning of the experiment a key k is chosen uniformly at random, then
MAC-Tag takes queries (N,M) and returns MAC(k,N,M). The verification or-
acle takes queries (N,M, τ) and returns 1 if τ = MAC(k,N,M) or 0 otherwise. An
adversary is said to successfully forge an authentication tag if they can produce
a verification query (N,M, τ) so that MAC-Ver returns 1 when (N,M) was not
previously queried to MAC-Tag.
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FORGEMAC,A :
k ←$ K
(N,M, τ) ←$ AMAC-Tag,MAC-Ver
If (N,M) not queried to MAC-Tag:
Return MAC-Ver(N,M, τ)
Else Return 0
MAC-Tag(N,M):
Return MAC(k,N,M)
MAC-Ver(N,M, τ):
Return (MAC(k,N,M) = τ)
Figure 2.7: Game defining the unforgeability of a message authentication scheme
MAC.
We define the adversary’s advantage as
AdvforgeMAC,A = Pr[FORGEMAC,A ] ,
where the game FORGE is defined in Figure 2.7.
A common restriction of this security notion is to nonce-respecting adversaries where,
although the adversary can control the nonce, they never query MAC-Tag for
(N,M ′) if they have previously queried MAC-Tag for (N,M).
One can distinguish between strong unforgeability and weak unforgeability [7]; typi-
cally this distinction is not made in the nonce-based setting that we focus on through-
out this thesis. The notion we describe is analogous to the strong unforgeability
game: an adversary wins if they can create a pair (M?, τ?) 6= (M, τ) for any (M, τ)
queried to MAC-Tag; weak unforgeability additionally requires that M? 6= M.
2.2.7 Universal hash functions
Background. In contrast to the common formulation of a cryptographic hash
function as a single, publicly known function, a universal hash function family con-
tains a number of different hash functions. Carter and Wegman [69, 70] introduce
universal hash function families; their motivating problem is hashing for storage
and retrieval on keys with an important performance consideration to minimise the
number of collisions.
Prior to the definition of universal hash function families, Gilbert, MacWilliams, and
Sloan [119] initiated the study of information-theoretic message authentication (from
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a coding theory perspective); they credit Simmons with identifying the problem.
Here, the objective is to convince a receiver that a particular message was indeed
sent by the sender, rather than a (possibly) computationally-unlimited adversary;
this is the analogue of an encryption scheme providing perfect secrecy [249].
In their 1979 paper, Wegman and Carter [270] apply universal hash function families
to information-theoretic message authentication. They introduce strongly universal
hash function families (of which, they observe, polynomials with bounded degree
are an example) and describe how a member of such a family can be used to au-
thenticate a single message. Additionally, multiple messages can be authenticated
if the output of the universal hash function is encrypted with a one-time pad; Bras-
sard [63] observes that using a stream cipher as a pseudo-one-time pad reduces the
security of an unconditional authenticator to the (computational) security of the
stream cipher, whilst dramatically reducing the amount of key material used.
Simmons and Stinson have both made significant contributions to this area: Sim-
mons [253] gives a survey on the general theory of unconditional authentication,
which includes an overview of several of his papers (such as [254, 255, 256]); and
Stinson has comprehensibly studied the combinatorics of codes providing uncondi-
tional authentication [259, 260, 261, 262, 262, 263].
Krawcyzk [168] introduces the notion of a family of hash functions being ε–otp–
secure, which is to say that an adversary succeeds with probability at most ε when
attempting to forge an authentication tag that is constructed using the one-time pad
encryption of hash value of the message. A necessary and sufficient condition for a
hash function family to be ε-otp-secure is identified, which is now commonly known
as ε-almost XOR universalilty (ε-AXU), following Rogaway [235, 236]. A more
general condition, ε-almost ∆ universal was introduced by Stinson; this recognises
the fact that any commutative group operation (∆) could be used in place of xor.
In this thesis we will generally refer to ε-AXU hash function families; however any
remark made that requires an ε-AXU hash function family in characteristic 2 will
also hold for an ε-almost strongly universal [263] or ε-almost ∆ universal [262] hash
function family (in a finite field with group operation ∆).
Krawcyzk [168] also gives two constructions of ε-almost XOR universal hash function
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families; both of these constructions require relatively short keys to specify a mem-
ber of the hash function family. The first is a cryptographic cyclic redundancy code
(CRC) which closely resembles Rabin’s fingerprinting codes [228]; the second con-
structs a Toeplitz matrix (in which each diagonal is constant) from a linear feedback
shift register, building on proposals from Carter and Wegman [70] and Mansour,
Nisan, and Tiwari [191]. Shoup [251] describes several methods for realising univer-
sal hash function families that are related to polynomials. These proposals include
the evaluation hash [42, 94, 264] and the division hash or cryptographic CRC of
Krawczyk [168], plus a generalised form that includes both as a special case; the
main example of interest to this thesis is the evaluation hash and a more thorough
discussion of this construction is given in Chapter 3.
More recently, several universal hash function families have been proposed, including
Rogaway’s Bucket Hash [235, 236], XOR MAC [24] and some constructions that
follow the design principles of MMH [132] (e.g. [53, 57]).
Syntax. A family of hash functions will be denoted
H = {hH : {0, 1}? → {0, 1}n | H ∈ KH} ,
with each hash function hH indexed by a key H ∈ KH.
Security. A family of hash functions H = {hH : {0, 1}? → {0, 1}n|H ∈ KH} is said
to be a universal2 hash function family [69, 70] if for every M,M
′ ∈ {0, 1}? with
M 6= M ′
Pr
H∈KH
[
hH(M) = hH(M
′)
] ≤ 1
2n
.
A family of hash functions H = {hH : {0, 1}? → {0, 1}n|H ∈ KH} is said to be a
strongly universals hash function family [270, 271] if for every sequence M1, . . . ,Ms
of distinct elements of {0, 1}? and for every sequence y1, . . . ,ys of elements of {0, 1}n,
Pr
H∈KH
[∀i, hH(Mi) = yi] ≤ 1
2ns
.
These two definitions can be slightly relaxed: if the relevant probability is bounded
by ε instead of by 12n or
1
2ns , then the hash function family are said to be ε-almost
universal or ε-almost strongly universal respectively.
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A family of hash functions is said to be ε-almost XOR universal [168, 235] if for
every M,M ′ ∈ {0, 1}? with M 6= M ′ and for every c ∈ {0, 1}n,
Pr
H∈KH
[
hH(M)⊕ hH(M ′) = c
] ≤ ε .
We abbreviate ε-almost XOR universal to ε-AXU and generically refer to hash func-
tion families satisfying conditions similar to the above as universal hash functions.
2.2.8 Authenticated encryption
Background. As noted earlier, the aims of confidentiality and authenticity are
distinct. The one-time pad provides perfect secrecy, but offers absolutely no authen-
ticity: an adversary can flip specific bits in the plaintext by flipping the same bits
in the ciphertext. Similarly, universal-hash-based MACs can provide information-
theoretically secure authentication, as can a universal-hash-based MAC concate-
nated with the plaintext, which trivially offers no confidentiality.
It has become increasingly clear that the security properties users expect from sym-
metric cryptography are better described in terms of authenticated encryption (AE)
schemes [29], where the plaintext is both encrypted and authenticated. Authenti-
cated encryption with associated data (AEAD) schemes [237] additionally protect
data that should be authenticated but not encrypted, such as addresses or rout-
ing information. For the vast majority of applications this provides the required
functionality and reduces the risk that the intended security is compromised when
schemes providing confidentiality and authenticity are combined. This choice of ab-
straction boundary has become a common interface in cryptographic libraries, with
TLS 1.3 currently planned to only support AEAD ciphers [230, Sect. 6.2.2] and the
NaCl ‘crypto box’ construction realising this model [38].
Bellare and Namprempre [29] formally analyse the idea of generic composition, where
the security of the combination depends only on the security properties of the un-
derlying schemes; a similar approach is adopted by Krawczyk [169] and Krawczyk
and Cannetti [66]. Part of the motivation for these works was that three major
internet security protocols all constructed AEAD schemes in a different way: Se-
cure Shell (SSH) encrypted and authenticated the plaintext independently [273],
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Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) first encrypted the plaintext then authenticated
the resulting ciphertext [160], and Secure Socket Layer/Transport Layer Security
(SSL/TLS) authenticated the plaintext then encrypted both the plaintext and the
MAC [116]. Bellare and Namprempre’s analysis supports the approach of IPsec;
several attacks have arisen from the poor choices made when constructing AEAD
schemes in SSL/TLS and SSH (e.g. [267, 6]). This question has recently received
renewed attention from Namprempre, Rogaway, and Shrimpton [205], where they
consider the same question in the nonce-based setting and describe a more diverse
set of secure constructions.
These results on generic composition enable the construction of a secure AEAD
mode from any IND-CPA secure encryption scheme and any message authentica-
tion scheme that guarantees the integrity of ciphertexts (INT-CTXT) [29]. However
dedicated constructions may offer advantages such as greater efficiency (with re-
spect to speed, implementation area, or energy consumption) or alternative security
properties (such as nonce-misuse or side-channel-attack resilience).
Perhaps the most widely used dedicated AEAD scheme is Galois/Counter Mode
(GCM), which was specified by McGrew and Viega [197]; more details on the speci-
fication of GCM are given in Chapter 3. In addition to GCM, several other dedicated
AE and AEAD schemes have been proposed such as OCB [238, 170] and several sub-
missions to the eSTREAM competition [233]. In 2013, the CAESAR competition
was launched [79], supported by NIST, aiming to ‘identify a portfolio of authen-
ticated ciphers that (1) offer advantages over AES–GCM and (2) are suitable for
widespread adoption’ ; it has received over 50 submissions.
Syntax. Following Rogaway [237], an authenticated encryption with associated
data (AEAD) scheme is an authenticated encryption (AE) scheme [29] that also
authenticates some unencrypted data (the associated data). More formally, an
AEAD scheme consists of two functions: Enc : K × N × {0, 1}≤LA × {0, 1}≤LP →
{0, 1}≤LC and Dec : K × N × {0, 1}≤LA × {0, 1}≤LC → {0, 1}≤LP ∪ {⊥}. As be-
fore LA , LP , and LC are bounds on the length of associated data, plaintext, and
ciphertext (respectively) that can be processed by the scheme. We require that
for every k ∈ K, N ∈ N , A ∈ {0, 1}≤LA , and P ∈ {0, 1}≤LP we have that
Dec(k,N,A,Enc(k,N,A, P)) = P.
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AEADAEAD,A :
b ←$ {0, 1}; k ←$ K
b′ ←$ AAE-Enc,AE-Dec
Return (b′ = b)
AE-Enc(N,A, P):
If b = 0 Return $(k,N,A, P)
Return Enc(k,N,A, P)
AE-Dec(N,A,C):
If b = 0 Return ⊥
Return Dec(k,N,A,C)
Figure 2.8: Game defining the AEAD security of an AEAD scheme AEAD =
(Enc,Dec).
Additionally, we assume that Enc is length-preserving, in that |Ek(N,A, P)| =
|P| + |τ| where |τ| is fixed by the scheme; this is not the most general description
imaginable, however all of the schemes considered in this thesis have this property.
Security. There are two aspects to the security objective for an AEAD scheme: it
should provide privacy of the plaintexts and integrity of the whole message (nonce,
associated data and ciphertext).
The advantage of an adversary against an AEAD scheme will be measured by
AdvaeadAEAD(A) = 2 · Pr[AEADAEAD,A ]− 1 ,
where the AEAD game is as formalised in Figure 2.8, where as before, $ is an oracle
that outputs |E(k,N,A, P)|-many random bits. This all-in-one notion of AEAD
security is similar to that described by Rogaway and Shrimpton [242].
This definition is a slight strengthening of earlier definitions, as we insist that the
scheme meets the definition of IND$-CPA security (described in Section 2.2.2); Bel-
lare and Namprempre consider generic composition with IND-CPA secure encryption
schemes [29]. A common restriction of this security definition is to only consider
nonce-respecting adversaries, so no adversary queries the AE-Enc oracle with pairs
(N,M) and (N,M ′).
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The indistinguishability and unforgeability notions described above have been widely
adopted within the community as representations of the expected security properties
for various primitives and schemes. However, there are applications and use cases for
which it is desirable (or necessary) for the security model to be expanded in order to
encompass other patterns of adversarial behaviour. In this section, we will describe
some of the alternative security models that are used throughout this thesis.
2.3.1 Weak keys
Background. For any cryptographic algorithm, a relevant question for its security
assessment is whether it contains weak keys. Informally, a weak-key class is a set of
keys that cause some undesirable behaviour in the algorithm when they are used.
The overall security implications of weak keys on an algorithm depends on the
number of weak keys, the ease with which their use can be detected, and how
undesirable the algorithm’s behaviour is when a weak key is used.
A common design goal for block and stream ciphers is that the algorithm has no
weak keys (a ‘flat’ key space); there are several examples of ciphers that do not meet
this requirement, such as IDEA [89], Blowfish [266], RC4 [113] and DES [206, 201].
The most well known weak-key class is arguably that of DES; this class consists of
keys k such that Ek(Ek(M)) = M. In this case the membership test is very simple
however the weak-key class consists of only four keys.
In general, small weak-key classes do not significantly detract from an algorithm’s
security, however in some modes (such as if the algorithm is used to construct a
hash function in the Davies-Meyer construction [221]) the adversary has control
over which key is used and could cause a weak key to be used repeatedly.
Definitions. The Encyclopedia of Cryptography and Security [46] gives the fol-
lowing definition:
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The strength of an encryption function Ek(P) may differ significantly for
different keys k. If for some set WK of keys, the encryption function is
much weaker than for others, this set is called a class of weak keys. The
attack technique that succeeds against the keys in the class WK is called
a membership test for the class.
Throughout this thesis, we use Handschuh and Preneel’s definition [135, Sect. 3.1]:
In symmetric cryptology, a class of keys D is called a weak key class if for
the members of that class the algorithm behaves in an unexpected way
and if it is easy to detect whether a particular unknown key belongs to
this class. For a MAC algorithm, the unexpected behavior can be that
the forgery probability for this key is substantially larger than average.
Moreover, if a weak key class D is of size C, one requires that identifying
that a key belongs to this class requires testing fewer than C keys by
exhaustive search and fewer than C verification queries.
2.3.2 Related-key attacks
Background. Formal analyses of cryptographic protocols often assume that cryp-
tosystems are run on keys that are independently generated and bear no relation
to each other. Implicit in this assumption is the premise that user keys are stored
in protected areas that are hard to tamper with. Security under related-key at-
tacks (RKAs), first identified by Biham and Knudsen [44, 43, 163], considers a
setting where an adversary might be able to disturb user keys (perhaps by injecting
faults [8]), and consequently run a cryptosystem on related keys. Resilience against
RKAs has become a desirable security goal, particularly for block ciphers.
The need for RKA security is further highlighted by the fact that through (im-
proper) design, a higher-level protocol might run a lower-level one on related keys.
Prominent examples are the key derivation procedures in standardised protocols
such as EMV [102] and the 3GPP integrity and confidentiality algorithms [146],
where efficiency considerations have led the designers to use a block cipher under
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related keys. Similar considerations can arise in the construction of tweakable block
ciphers, if a block cipher is called on keys that are offset by xoring tweak values [186].
An RKA-secure primitive can offer security safeguards against such protocol misuse.
Bellare and Kohno [27] initiate the theoretical treatment of security under related-
key attacks and propose definitions for RKA-secure pseudorandom functions and
pseudorandom permutations. This model was subsequently extended by Albrecht
et al. [5] to idealised models of computation, accounting for the possibility that
keys may be derived in ways that depend on the ideal primitive. Both works prove
that the ideal cipher is RKA secure against wide sets of related-key deriving (RKD)
functions. Bellare and Cash [21] present an RKA-secure pseudorandom function
from standard intractability assumptions and Bellare, Cash, and Miller [22] give
a comprehensive treatment of RKA security for various cryptographic primitives,
leveraging the RKA resilience of PRGs to construct RKA-secure instances of several
other primitives. In Chapter 4 we consider the RKA security of block ciphers.
RKD functions. A related-key deriving (RKD) function maps keys to keys in
some key space K; we view RKD functions as circuits that may contain special
oracles gates pi. An RKD set Φ is a set of RKD functions φpi : K −→ K, where pi is
an oracle; we assume that membership in RKD sets can be efficiently decided.
RKA security. Following Bellare and Kohno [27] and Albrecht et al. [5], we
formalise the RKA security of a block cipher BCpi = (Epi,Dpi) in the (multiple) ideal-
permutation model via the game shown in Figure 2.9. Note that this game includes
a procedure for oracle pi defined above.
Access to multiple ideal permutations is equivalent to providing access to a block
cipher P with key space [t], where Pi(x) = P(i, x). In order to ease notation, we
define a single oracle pi, which provides access to all t ideal permutations in both
directions. This oracle takes as input (i, x, σ), where i ∈ [t], x ∈ {0, 1}n, and
σ ∈ {+,−} and returns Pi(x) if σ = + and P−1i (x) if σ = −. Slightly abusing
notation, we define Pσi (x) = P
σ(i, x) = pi(i, x, σ), and assume σ = + whenever it is
omitted from the superscript.
Bellare and Kohno [27] show that it is not possible for any scheme to provide security
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RKCCABCpi ,A,Φ,t:
b ←$ {0, 1}; k ←$ K
(P,P−1) ←$ Block([t], {0, 1}n)
(iE, iD) ←$ Block(K, {0, 1}n)
b′ ←$ ARK-Enc,RK-Dec,pi
Return (b′ = b)
pi(i, x, σ):
Return Pσ(i, x)
RK-Enc(φpi, x):
k′ ← φpi(k)
If b = 0 Return iE(k′, x)
Return Epi(k′, x)
RK-Dec(φpi, x):
k′ ← φpi(k)
If b = 0 Return iD(k′, x)
Return Dpi(k′, x)
Figure 2.9: Game defining the Φ-RKCCA security of a block cipher BCpi = (Epi,Dpi)
with access to t ideal permutations. An adversary can query the
RK-Enc and RK-Dec oracles with a φpi ∈ Φ only. In the RKCPA
game the adversary cannot query the RK-Dec oracle.
against an adversary that can request encryptions under arbitrary functions of the
key. As a result of this, the RKA game is parametrised by an RKD set Φ which
specifies the RKD functions that an adversary is permitted to query during its
attack. We define the advantage of an adversary A carrying out a related-key
chosen-ciphertext attack (RKCCA) against a block cipher BC via
AdvrkccaBCpi ,Φ,t(A) = 2 · Pr
[
RKCCABCpi ,A,Φ,t
]− 1 .
The game and advantage for related-key chosen-plaintext attacks (RKCPA) are de-
fined similarly by considering adversaries that do not make any RK-Dec queries
(backwards queries to the permutations are still permitted). Denoting these games
by RKCPA and RKCCA is a slight abuse of notation: we only consider these at-
tacks against the PRP or SPRP security of a block cipher, whereas one could also
consider (for example) related-key attacks against the TPRP or TSPRP security of
a tweakable block cipher.
2.3.3 Indifferentiability
Background. Maurer, Renner, and Holenstein [194] introduce a framework which
formalises what it means for a non-monolithic object to be able to replace a (pos-
sibly idealised) component in arbitrary cryptosystems. This framework, known as
indifferentiability, has been used to validate the design principle behind many cryp-
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tographic constructions (e.g. [41, 10, 9]).
The motivation for this notion is to better model the situation in which components
of a system depend on each other and an adversary may learn partial information
about the randomness or state of these components. As an example, AES can be
considered to call the AES round functions as subroutines and, as these functions
are publicly known, it is possible for an adversary to evaluate these functions at
points of their choosing and hence learn some information about them.
Similar examples can be taken from iterated hash functions: the Merkle-Damg˚ard
construction [80] calls a compression function; sponges [41] call the sponge permu-
tation; and block-cipher-based compression functions may call a block cipher with
a known key (see [222] for a thorough exposition of possible constructions).
Similarly to the random-permutation model, as discussed in Section 2.2.3, the cor-
rect interpretation of an indifferentiability proof is not clear. Ristenpart, Shacham,
and Shrimpton [231] demonstrate that although indifferentiability implies indistin-
guishability, it does not necessarily guarantee composition in multi-stage settings.
They emphasise that indifferentiability is still a worthwhile design objective (there
are many practically important security notions covered by single-stage games), but
it does not necessarily exclude ‘structure-abusing attacks’, as had been suggested.
Informally, a multi-stage setting is one in which the adversary can be decomposed
into a number of ‘smaller’ algorithms passing limited state between each other; this
should be compared with the single, stateful adversary present in the indistinguisha-
bility and unforgeability notions described above. Ristenpart et al. go on to explain
that multi-staged security notions includes deterministic or searchable public-key
encryption, as well as security in the presence of key-dependent messages. Related-
key security is also a two-stage game if the RKD functions can depend on public
oracles; in this case the RKD functions take the role of the other adversarial stage.
Security Model. The approach taken by Maurer et al. [194] considers the general
situation of a system with many interacting components. In this thesis it is sufficient
to consider just two components: a ‘construction’ built from a ‘primitive’.
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C
A
SP iC
Figure 2.10: The indifferentiability framework. An adversary A interacts with ei-
ther: an ideal primitive P and the real construction C, which can call
the ideal primitive; or an ideal construction iC and a simulator S, which
can query the ideal construction.
INDIFFC,A :
b ←$ {0, 1}; k ←$ K
iC ←$ I
b′ ←$ AConst,Prim
Return (b′ = b)
Const(X):
If b = 0 Return iC(k,X)
Return CP(k,X)
Prim(X):
If b = 0 Return SiC(X)
Return P(X)
Figure 2.11: Game defining the indifferentiablity of a construction C. The idealised
primitive is denoted by P, the idealised construction by iC and the
simulator by S. The set I denotes all possible idealised constructions
with the required syntax.
The indifferentiability framework permits an adversary to interact with either the
real construction and an idealised primitive, or an idealised scheme and a simulated
primitive. That is, in the case that an adversary is interacting with the idealised
scheme (in place of the construction), a simulator responds to the adversary’s queries
with ‘how the primitive should respond, given how the ideal construction is behav-
ing’. The fundamental difference between these two settings is that in one case the
construction calls the primitive as a subroutine, while in the other the simulator
(playing the role of the primitive) calls the idealised construction.
We define the indifferentiability advantage of an adversary A via
AdvindiffC (A) = 2 · Pr [INDIFFC,A ]− 1 .
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2.3.4 Algebraic cryptanalysis
The ideas underpinning algebraic cryptanalysis date back at least as far as Shan-
non [249], who describes how an adversary could perhaps solve a system of equations
in order to recover the key. Algebraic attacks are powerful cryptanalytic techniques
that have been used to attack a wide range of schemes: several stream ciphers have
been broken (e.g. [84, 82]), while the technique has also been applied (generally
unsuccessfully) to block ciphers [76, 77]. Perhaps the best known algebraic attacks
are those against AES [85], although the practicality of using the XSL algorithm to
attack AES has since been questioned [75].
Algebraic cryptanalysis consists of two relatively distinct phases. The first is to
write the entire cryptographic operation as a large set of multivariate polynomial
equations, relating unknown values (such as parts of the key, intermediate values, or
a target plaintext) to known, observed values (such as parts of plaintext/ciphertext
pairs). The second phase is to solve this system of equations; common techniques
include Gro¨bner Basis algorithms [110], linearisation [83], mixed-integer linear pro-
gramming [62], and Boolean satisfiability (SAT) solvers [16]. A major strength of
this cryptanalytic technique is that it is not statistical (as linear and differential
cryptanalysis are) and often very few plaintext/ciphertext pairs are required. Un-
fortunately, the running time of algebraic attacks is often not well understood; the
performance of these algorithms heavily depends on how the cryptosystem is repre-
sented and the particular structure of the derived equations [204, 76].
In Chapter 6 we will use Gro¨bner Basis algorithms as part of an algebraic attack;
we refer the reader to standard texts (such as [86]) for further details on the imple-
mentation of these algorithms.
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Polynomial-based hash functions
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In this chapter, we study universal hash functions that are constructed via the eval-
uation of a polynomial in a finite field. These are commonly used in schemes for
message authentication and are popular due to their information-theoretic security
guarantees, as well as their speed and simplicity. We describe a forgery attack that
generalises all existing attacks on these schemes and identify a large number of weak
keys. The particular relevance of these observations to GCM/ 2+ is discussed and
finally we describe many, large weak-key classes for MACs based on Square Hash,
another universal hash function.
The work described in this chapter is joint work with Carlos Cid, appearing as [226]
and [227]; it is available at [225].
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3.1 Introduction
Universal hash functions can be used to build message authentication codes and
related constructions feature as components in AE and AEAD schemes. Commonly,
the universal hash functions are based on polynomial evaluation: such schemes
are widely standardised (e.g. [99, 166, 138, 181, 245]). McGrew and Viega’s Ga-
lois/Counter Mode (GCM) [197] is the most widely deployed example, Bernstein’s
Poly1305 [34] is also widely used.
This approach is well studied and generally believed to be secure, as described in
Section 2.2.7: Wegman and Carter [270] first proposed the use of universal hash
functions (combined with the one-time pad) for message authentication in 1979;
Brassard [63] describes using a stream cipher in place of the one-time pad, making
the construction more efficient for multiple messages; and Krawczyk [168] describes
a necessary and sufficient condition for a universal hash function family to provide
security when used in this setting, giving several examples of constructions that
meet this condition.
Previous works have focused on GCM due to its popularity, although their results
often apply equally to many hash functions based on polynomial evaluation. There
are a small number of papers attacking GCM via the universal hash component:
Ferguson’s attack against truncated tags [111] demonstrates that the security of short
tags is significantly lower than would be expected; Joux’s ‘forbidden attack’ [152]
illustrates GCM’s brittleness under nonce reuse; Handschuh and Preneel describe
methods to extend Joux’s attack [135]; and Saarinen’s cycling attacks [244] highlight
a weakness due to the underlying algebraic structure of the hash function. Both
Handschuh and Preneel [135] and Saarinen [244] describe classes of weak keys for
polynomial-evaluation-based universal hash functions.
The main motivation for this work was the observation that these attacks against
GCM are algebraic in nature, and seem to exploit a fundamental underlying algebraic
structure of the polynomial-based hash function which we discuss in this chapter.
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Contributions
The contributions of this chapter are to identify and study some of the properties
of hash functions based on polynomial evaluation that arise from this underlying
algebraic structure. As a result, we are able to describe a general forgery attack
against related message authentication schemes which removes several limitations
of previous works: our attack can be used with short messages, does not require
nonce-reuse or truncated tags, applies regardless of the field in which the hash is
evaluated, and additionally facilitates length extension attacks. Furthermore, we
provide a common description of all published attacks against these schemes by
showing that the existing attacks are the result of these algebraic properties of the
polynomial-based hash function. We also greatly expand the number of known weak
keys and show that almost every subset of the key space is a weak-key class. The
attacks presented and described in this chapter do not in any way contradict known
security bounds (e.g. for GCM, as given by McGrew and Viega [196]). However,
the algebraic properties (and related attacks) discussed in this chapter appear to be
an inherent feature of polynomial-based authentication schemes and therefore need
to be considered in a scheme’s security assessment. This is demonstrated by the
impact that these properties and attacks have on GCM/2+ [11], a variant of GCM
that we also discuss. Finally, we consider the consequences of a related property on
Square Hash [105], another family of polynomial-based universal hash functions.
3.2 Prior work
This section gives an overview of existing proposals for polynomial-based hash func-
tions and message authentication schemes, as well as prior security analyses for these
schemes.
3.2.1 Polynomial-evaluation-based hash functions
The most well known and widely used universal hash function family is the polyno-
mial evaluation hash, in which an ε-almost strongly universal hash function family
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is constructed using polynomial evaluation in a finite field. This construction is
described independently by Bierbrauer et al. [42], Taylor [264], and den Boer [94];
Shoup [251] identifies several variants and generalisations.
The polynomial evaluation hash uses the message M to determine a polynomial
gM(x) ∈ K[x] with constant term equal to zero; the hash key is a random element
H ∈ K and the output of the hash function is hH(M) = gM(H). The canonical (and
most common) method to realise this scheme is to associate a message in {0, 1}?
with a polynomial in K[x] by gM(x) =
∑m
i=1Mix
i ∈ K[x], where M is parsed as
M1|| . . . ||Mm with each Mi ∈ K and Mm possibly padded. We remark that some
care may be needed to ensure that the family of hash functions chosen is indeed
universal when the message space contains messages of variable length; for example,
the polynomial-evaluation hash used within GCM depends on the length-encoding
(discussed below) to ensure its universality.
Below, we briefly describe some authentication schemes based on polynomial evalu-
ation hash functions that are relevant to our work. Throughout this chapter we will
focus on GCM for concreteness however the majority of the comments apply equally
to any other hash function based on polynomial evaluation. Most of the results in
this chapter apply equally to both common constructions of MACs from universal
hash functions, either τ = Ek(N) + hH(M) or τ = Ek(hH(M)), as our results are
based on collisions in the hash function. Where necessary it will be made clear that
a remark is dependent on one of these general constructions or the specific structure
of GCM. We will also discuss Square Hash [105] in this chapter: Square Hash is
another family of universal hash functions based on a different set of polynomials
and we defer further details to Section 3.7.
3.2.1.1 Galois/Counter Mode
Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) is an AEAD scheme submitted to NIST by McGrew
and Viega in 2004, with the specification slightly revised in 2005 [197] (although
the revision contained ‘no normative changes [from the 2004 specification]’ ). GCM
combines counter mode encryption with a polynomial-evaluation-based MAC follow-
ing the Encrypt–then–MAC paradigm, although the hash key is derived from the
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block cipher key. GCM is intended to be used with 128-bit block ciphers, although
an option exists to use a 64-bit block cipher. The most common instantiation is
AES–GCM; we now briefly described GCM as used with a 128-bit block cipher.
Galois/Counter Mode encryption takes as input: a block cipher key k, an initialisa-
tion vector N, plaintext P = P1|| . . . ||Pp and additional data A = A1|| . . . ||Aa. The
IV should preferably be 96-bits long although any length is supported (see [148]); it
is critical to the security of GCM that the IV is non-repeating (i.e. is a nonce) [152].
For each i, |Pi| = |Ai| = 128, except for perhaps partial final blocks. With this input,
GCM returns a ciphertext C = C1|| . . . ||Cp (the same length as the plaintext) and
an authentication tag τ which is up to 128-bits long (specific choices of tag length
may be standardised, e.g. [99, p. 9]).
The plaintext is encrypted using the block cipher in counter mode, under key k with
counter value starting at ctr1. If the IV is 96 bits long the initial counter value
(ctr0) is N||0311, otherwise it is a polynomial-evaluation-based hash of N after zero
padding (using the hash key described below). For each i, ctr i = inc(ctr i−1), where
inc(·) increments the last 32 bits of its argument (modulo 232).
The authentication tag is computed from a polynomial evaluation hash (in F2128).
The message M is parsed as 128-bit blocks (with partial final blocks zero padded)
and each block is interpreted as an element of F2128 . The first block M1 encodes the
length of the (unpadded) plaintext and additional data; this block will be referred
to as the ‘length field’ throughout this chapter. This is followed by blocks of cipher-
text M2, . . . ,Mp+1 = Cp, . . . ,C1 and then the associated data Mp+2, . . . ,Ma+p+1 =
Aa, . . . ,A1. Note that in this description the labelling of the blocks Mi are reversed
from those given in the original GCM specification as this gives a neater description
of the polynomial used in evaluating the hash function. The hash key H is derived
from the block cipher key: H = Ek(0
128). The hash function is then computed as
hH(M) =
∑a+p+1
i=1 MiH
i (where all operations are in F2128). The authentication tag
is given by:
τ = Ek(ctr0)⊕ hH(M) .
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3.2.1.2 Sophie Germain Counter Mode
In 2012, Saarinen [244] observed cycling attacks against GCM and other polynomial
MACs and hashes. Following this Saarinen proposed Sophie Germain Counter Mode
(SGCM) [243] as a variant of GCM. SGCM differs from GCM only by the choice of
field in which the hash is computed: SGCM uses Fq, where q = 2128 + 12451, rather
than F2128 , as F?q has significantly fewer subgroups than F?2128 . It was claimed that
SGCM offers increased resistance to cycling attacks as a result of this change.
3.2.1.3 GCM with short multiplications
Aoki and Yasuda [11] propose GCM/2+, a variant of GCM designed to increase the
efficiency in software. GCM/2+ makes several changes to the GCM specification,
which we discuss in greater detail in Section 3.6.1. The most significant of these
changes is to evaluate the hash function using ‘short multiplications’ in F264 rather
than multiplications in F2128 . However, this severely impacts the security of the
scheme, as we discuss in Section 3.6.2.
3.2.1.4 Poly1305
Poly1305–AES was specified by Bernstein in 2005 [34], although a preliminary ver-
sion appears on his website1 from from 2004. The inputs to Poly1305–AES are two
128-bit keys, one for AES (k) and one for the hash (r) which has some specific bits
set to zero; a 128-bit nonce (N); and a message (a byte string). The output of
Poly1305–AES is a 128-bit authentication tag. The hash of a message is computed
by evaluating a polynomial at the secret key (in F2130−5) and encrypting this by
adding (modulo 2128) the output of AESk(N).
The original paper describes ‘cipher replaceability’ as an advantage of Poly1305 [34,
p. 33]: ‘If anything does go wrong with AES, users can switch from Poly1305–
AES to Poly1305–AnotherFunction, with an identical security guarantee.’ Indeed,
a recent proposal to the IETF for a new AEAD mode aims, in part, to provide
1http://cr.yp.to/mac.html
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resilience against advances in AES cryptanalysis and uses Poly1305–ChaCha20 [211];
ChaCha20 is a stream cipher also designed by Bernstein [35]. We study this proposal
in greater detail in Section 6.2.
3.2.2 Security analyses
For a polynomial-based MAC, it is well established that the probability of creating
a valid (non-truncated) tag having seen a single valid (message, tag) pair is approxi-
mately m/|K| where the polynomial is evaluated in K and m is the length of message
that the construction operates on (see, for example, [251, 196, 111, 135]). However,
it is worth emphasising that in this context m is the maximum permissible message
length. This is included in the original analysis of GCM [196] but is not made ex-
plicitly clear in the later papers [111, 135]. In Section 3.3.3 we will demonstrate the
importance of this distinction by describing one method for forging GCM tags using
a longer message than the one that was given in the valid (message, tag) pair from
the tag generation oracle.
In this section, we briefly describe the main existing results on the security of
polynomial-based MACs. Because GCM is the most prominent example of a mes-
sage authentication scheme based on polynomial evaluation, many of these results
were originally described in terms of GCM, however they can also be applied to more
general polynomial-based schemes. We will show in Section 3.4 that the attacks de-
scribed in this section can be realised as special cases of the properties discussed in
Section 3.3. Additionally, we discuss and extend the weak-key classes identified by
Handschuh and Preneel [135] and Saarinen [244] in Section 3.5.
3.2.2.1 Ferguson’s short tag attack
Ferguson’s attack against GCM when short tags are used [111] begins by observing
that, for truncated tags, a full collision in the hash function is not required for a
collision in the authentication tag. This is because the output of the hash function
is encrypted additively and only the leading bits of the hash function affect the
authentication tag.
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The second observation is that, because the polynomial hash is evaluated in a field of
characteristic 2, squaring is a linear operation. So, if message blocks M2i (for some
i) are altered by an adversary, this only affects the coefficient of H2
i
and hence the
effect on the authentication tag is a linear function of H. In particular, it is possible
for the adversary to alter these message blocks in a way that guarantees particular
bits of the authentication tag will not change. This means that the effective length
of the authentication tag is reduced and forgeries become more likely.
Ferguson also notes that once a forgery has been observed, the adversary gains
information about H. With each successive forgery, more information about H is
derived and the adversary is able to use this information when manipulating the
M2i and increase the number of bits of the authentication tag that are guaranteed
not to change. Eventually the adversary will recover the entire hash key.
3.2.2.2 Joux’s forbidden attack
Joux’s ‘forbidden attack’ against GCM [152] requires two messages, M and M ′, that
are authenticated with the same (key, IV) pair. Reusing the (key, IV) pair in GCM
has the effect of reusing H, k and N. This allows the adversary to conclude that
the xor of the authentication tags is the hash of the xor of the messages:
τM ⊕ τM ′ = (hH(M)⊕ Ek(N))⊕ (hH(M ′)⊕ Ek(N))
= hH(M)⊕ hH(M ′)
= hH(M ⊕M ′) .
As the hash is a known polynomial evaluated at H and the adversary knows τM , τM ′ ,
and both messages, they are able to derive a polynomial that is known to have a root
at H (using the notation introduced in Section 3.3, this is gM⊕M ′ ⊕ τM ⊕ τM ′). Joux
suggests that by collecting pairs of messages authenticated with the same IV, an
adversary could compute the greatest common divisor (GCD) of these polynomials
and eventually recover the key. This attack is prevented if we only consider nonce-
respecting adversaries.
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3.2.2.3 Handschuh and Preneel’s attacks
Handschuh and Preneel [135] describe two attacks: one allows an adversary to verify
a guess for the hash key, and the second recovers the hash key.
To verify a guess for the hash key, they require an authentication tag on a message of
at least two blocks, so suppose that a valid authentication tag is known for M1||M2.
Picking any M ′2 and computing M ′1 = M1 + (M2−M ′2)H?, where H? is the guessed
hash key, gives a forged message M ′1||M ′2. If the guess for the key is correct then the
authentication tag for M1||M2 is also valid for M ′1||M ′2.
Their key recovery attack extends the one described by Joux, as it does not re-
quire nonce reuse. Given a valid authentication tag on a message M, the adversary
performs a verification query using the same tag but a different message M ′; this
message is chosen so that the polynomial defined by M−M ′ has many distinct roots.
A successful forgery implies that the hash key is one of the roots of this polynomial
and so a binary search can be conducted on those roots in order to recover the hash
key. The key recovery method was initially identified by Black and Cochran [52]
but extended and generalised by Handschuh and Preneel. This attack is described
as infeasible by Handschuh and Preneel in the case of GCM, due to the blocksize of
128 bits, however we will show that it is precisely as feasible as Saarinen’s cycling
attacks, which are described in the following section.
3.2.2.4 Saarinen’s cycling attacks
In 2012, Saarinen [244] proposed cycling attacks against GCM and other polynomial-
based MACs and hashes. The key observation is that if a hash key H lies in a
subgroup of order t, then Ht = 1 ∈ K and (for any i, j) message blocks Mi and
Mi+jt can be swapped without changing the value of the hash.
For example (ignoring GCM’s length encoding), if H4 = H then blocks M1 and M4
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can be swapped without changing the value of the hash:
hH(M1||M2||M3||M4) = M1 ·H ⊕M2 ·H2 ⊕M3 ·H3 ⊕M4 ·H4
= (M1 ⊕M4) ·H ⊕M2 ·H2 ⊕M3 ·H3
= M4 ·H ⊕M2 ·H2 ⊕M3 ·H3 ⊕M1 ·H4
= hH(M4||M2||M3||M1) .
The attack is carried out by obtaining a valid tag for a message and performing a
verification query using the same tag with the message formed by simply swapping
the position of two message blocks. Saarinen observes that any t dividing 2128 − 1
can be used and that swapping Mi and Mi+t will give a successful forgery with
probability at least t+1
2128
, as the forgery is succeeds if H is any one of the t elements
in the chosen subgroup or if H is zero.
Saarinen [244] also describes ‘targeted multiple bit forgeries’ in which, instead of
whole blocks, only some bits are swapped (subject to the condition that Mi ⊕
Mi+t remains constant). This method permits the adversary more control over
the forged message and the corresponding plaintext; we discuss this idea further in
Section 3.3.2.
Saarinen’s main motivation for proposing SGCM [243] (described in Section 3.2.1.2)
was to prevent attacks utilising this algebraic structure.
3.2.2.5 Weak keys
Handschuh and Preneel [135] identify a large number of weak-key classes for a variety
of constructions. In particular, they observe that H = 0 is a weak hash key for GCM
and other similar constructions because h0(M) = 0 for every message M.
Saarinen [244] demonstrates that there are many more weak keys than are described
by Handschuh and Preneel, showing that small-order subgroups of K? are weak-
key classes. The forgery technique described in the previous section is successful
if the hash key is an element of a small-order subgroup with order dividing the
distance between the swapped message blocks. This gives a method for identifying
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whether the hash key is in that class using one valid (message, tag) pair and a
single verification query; these classes of weak keys meet Handschuh and Preneel’s
definition of weak keys (given in Section 2.3.1).
3.3 Algebraic structure and its implications
This section describes the main observation that allows us to give a general forgery
attack against polynomial-based MAC schemes. In particular, we observe that by
working with polynomials in particular ideals it is straightforward to produce forg-
eries for these schemes. We go on to describe a malleability property of polynomial-
based MAC schemes, use this to identify a length-extension attack against GCM,
and give a general method for recovering the hash key from such a scheme. Finally,
we discuss possible methods to generate polynomials with the required properties.
3.3.1 A generalised forgery attack
For a family of hash functions H = {hH : {0, 1}? → {0, 1}n | H ∈ KH} based on
polynomial evaluation with M an input string, write hH(M) = gM(H), where
gM(x) =
∑m
i=1Mix
i ∈ K[x] and Mi, H ∈ K. Now let q(x) =
∑r
i=1 qix
i ∈ K[x]
be a polynomial with constant term zero, such that q(H) = 0. Then it follows that
hH(M) = gM(H) = gM(H) + q(H) = gM+Q(H) = hH(M +Q) ,
where Q = q1||q2|| . . . ||qr and the addition M + Q is done block-wise (the shorter
message is zero-padded if required). Thus, given a polynomial q(x) with these
properties, it is straightforward to construct collisions for the hash function. In
particular, the elements of the ideal 〈x2−Hx〉 are precisely the polynomials satisfying
this requirement: an element of K[x] is in this ideal if and only if it has roots at
both zero and H. (Recall that the ideal generated by f(x) is defined as 〈f(x)〉 =
{r(x) · f(x)|r(x) ∈ K[x]} ⊆ K[x].)
Collisions in the hash function correspond to MAC forgeries by substituting the
original message for the one that yields a collision in the hash function. These
forgeries arise from collisions in the hash function and hence the messages can be
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substituted without any dependence on the method or key used to encrypt the
output of the hash function. This method allows an adversary to create forgeries by
only modifying the message, after observing a single tuple (nonce, message, tag).
The technique described above constructs forgeries via a hash collision. For this
reason, the polynomial q(x) that is used to forge will always have x as a factor. This
is necessary because gM(x) is defined to have a zero constant term: if the constant
term in gM(x) was non-zero and the hash of a message was encrypted additively (i.e.
τ = Ek(N) + hH(M)), then flipping the same bits in the first message block and the
authentication tag would create a valid forgery.
A related observation permits us to extend the set of polynomials that are suitable
for use as a forgery polynomial in the case where the authentication tag is created
by additively encrypting the output of the hash function. A similar result has been
described independently and concurrently by Zhu, Tan, and Gong [274], who refer
to an earlier version of the paper introducing these results [226].
If it is possible to predict an additive relation between the output of the hash function
on two different messages then this difference is preserved by the additive encryption
and an adversary can manipulate the value of the authentication tag accordingly. If
the output of the hash function is encrypted using a block cipher then these relations
are not preserved and so a full collision is required, as described above.
In this more general setting, we set I = 〈x −H〉 and consider the canonical homo-
morphism into the quotient ring:
φ :K[x]→ K[x]/I
f(x) 7→ f¯(x) = f(x) + I .
We observe that it is possible to pick a canonical representative of each coset; by
the remainder theorem f¯(x) = f(H) + I. This homomorphism partitions K[x] into
|K| equivalence classes, with f(x) ∼ f ′(x) precisely when f(H) = f ′(H).
Now, let q(x) = q0 + q1x+ . . . qrx
r ∈ K[x] and Q˜ = q1|| . . . ||qr, so Q˜ is the concate-
nation of non-constant coefficients of q(x).
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Note that
φ
(
q0 + gM+Q˜(x)
)
= φ
(
q0 +
r∑
i=1
(Mi + qi)x
i
)
= φ
(
r∑
i=1
Mix
i
)
+ φ
(
q0 +
r∑
i=1
qix
i
)
= φ (gM(x)) + φ (q(x)) ,
and also that
φ
(
q0 + gM+Q˜(x)
)
= φ (q0 + (M1 + q1)x+ · · ·+ (Mr + qr)xr)
= φ (q0) + φ
(
r∑
i=1
(Mi + qi)x
i
)
.
Therefore
φ(gM(x)) + φ(q(x)) = φ(q0) + φ
(
r∑
i=1
(Mi + qi)x
i
)
,
which is equivalent to the following statements:
gM(x) + q(x) + I = q0 +
r∑
i=1
(Mi + qi)x
i + I ,
∃p(x) ∈ I s.t. gM(x) + q(x) = q0 +
r∑
i=1
(Mi + qi)x
i + p(x) ,
gM(H) + q(H) = q0 +
r∑
i=1
(Mi + qi)H
i + p(H)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
,
hH(M) + q(H)− q0 = hH(M + Q˜) .
This means that if H is a root of q(x) then forging with Q˜ creates a predictable dif-
ference between the hash outputs. Because τM = Ek(N) +hH(M), these predictable
differences between the hash outputs will also be present as differences between the
authentication tags.
The description given at the beginning of this section is a specific case of this ob-
servation in which we require that q(H) = q0 = 0.
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3.3.2 Malleability
Saarinen [244] also describes ‘targeted multiple bit forgeries’ against GCM where,
rather than swapping the full blocks Mi and Mi+jt, corresponding bits in each
ciphertext block are flipped. This is a special case of the general attack, this time
using a multiple of q(x).
If q(H) = 0, then α · q(H) = 0 for any α ∈ K and
τM = Ek(N) + hH(M)
= Ek(N) +M1 ·H + · · ·+Mm ·Hm
= Ek(N) + (M1 + αq1) ·H + · · ·+ (Mm + αqm) ·Hm
= τM+αQ ,
where τM+αQ is the authentication tag for the message M1⊕α · q1|| . . . ||Mm⊕α · qm
(recall that M contains associated data, ciphertext, and the length of both).
If the plaintext is encrypted using a stream cipher (or a block cipher in counter
mode) flipping bits in the ciphertext flips the same bits in the plaintext. This allows
us to predict relations between the original plaintext and the forged plaintext (as
Ci ⊕ αqi decrypts to Pi ⊕ αqi). Because α can be chosen so as to set Ci ⊕ αqi equal
to any value chosen by the adversary (for a single i), an adversary can choose a
differential between the original message and the forged message (in a single block).
If further control over the underlying plaintext is required, several forgery poly-
nomials could be used. For example, using two forgery polynomials q1 and q2 an
adversary can choose constants α1 and α2 and create the forgery M ⊕ α1q1 ⊕ α2q2.
In the best case, using t polynomials permits the adversary control over t message
blocks. The cost of this extra malleability is that the forgery is only successful if the
hash key is a root of the greatest common divisor of the two polynomials. This can
be extended to give as much control over the plaintext as required, but for every
extra malleable block the success probability is reduced by at least 1|KH| .
If the plaintext was encrypted using a block cipher not in counter mode then an
adversary would not have this fine control over the plaintext, but would still be able
to manipulate the ciphertext in this way.
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This property also permits an adversary to create as many forgeries as there are non-
zero elements in the field. Black and Cochran [52] and McGrew and Fluhrer [195]
discuss multiple forgeries further.
3.3.3 Length extension
In the GCM specification, the last block input to the hash function (corresponding
to the term M1 · H in the MAC calculation) describes the length of the plaintext
and additional data. The malleability property described in Section 3.3.2 allows an
adversary to manipulate the length field (even though it does not explicitly appear
in the sent message). If an adversary is given a valid tag for a message then the
content of the length field is known, as it correctly encodes the length of the plaintext
and additional data. It is therefore possible to choose a difference in the length field
so that it corresponds to the length of the new message. In particular, forgeries can
be created using high degree polynomial q(x) regardless of the size of the message
in the initial (message,tag) pair.
This is an important remark as it removes one significant limitation on the effec-
tiveness of cycling attacks against GCM [244], which is the length of the message
necessary to launch an attack. For a cycling attack to be attempted, an adversary
requires as many blocks of correctly authenticated data as there are elements in the
subgroup with which he wishes to forge, in order to swap the first and last blocks.
By manipulating the length field any forgery probability can be realised starting
with a valid authentication tag on a single message block.
A common criticism of GCM is that the maximum message length may be restrictive
in the future as data rates increase [111]. However, it follows from our work (and
the original security proofs [196]) that increasing the maximum permissible length
would significantly decrease the security of the scheme.
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3.3.4 Key recovery
Saarinen suggests that once a successful cycling attack has been carried out, the ad-
versary would create many forgeries by further cycling attacks [244, Sect. 9]. Trans-
lating this to the more general polynomial root description: once a successful forgery
occurs, the hash key is known to be one of the roots of the ‘forgery polynomial’ q(x).
Therefore rather than making repeated ‘cycling forgeries’ with guaranteed success
but limited control of the plaintext, the adversary can aim to recover the hash key
and forge authentication tags for arbitrary messages. By attempting to forge using
a subset of the roots of the forgery polynomial (and reducing the number of roots
in the subset after each successful attempt), an adversary can gradually recover the
hash key using a method that is independent of encryption method or key used,
provided that they are willing to accept a forgery probability less that 1 at each
stage. Handschuh and Preneel [135] describe choosing the subsets to realise a bi-
nary search of the key space (with a 50% forgery probability at each stage), however
the adversary can choose any trade-off between the forgery probability and the speed
of recovering the hash key. Additionally, as described by Joux [152], if the adversary
can create many forgeries then computing the GCD of the forgery polynomials may
significantly reduce the number of possible hash keys.
By testing for membership of subsets of the key space, it is plausible that an
adversary could recover one bit of the hash key with each forgery attempt. If
q(x) =
∏
H∈Y (x−H), where Y is the set of hash keys for which the first bit is
zero, then a successful forgery confirms that the first bit of the hash key is zero and
a failure confirms that the first bit is one. Repeating this for each bit of the hash
key, the whole key could be recovered using 128 verification queries.
This would require infeasibly large messages to be used in the forgery attempts if
the hash keys correspond to elements of a field with |K| ≈ 2128, but it is a strong
argument against using a hash function based on polynomial evaluation in a field
with |K|  2128. This may be a direction taken by variants of GCM designed to
improve performance (see [11] for one such example and Section 3.6 for an analysis
of this scheme). In the case of GCM the size of the subsets that can be tested is
limited to around 256 as the maximum message length is limited.
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One advantage of being able to test for membership of arbitrary subsets is that it
allows the adversary to use any partial knowledge of the hash key that they may
have. Note that in the case of GCM, recovery of the hash key H does not lead to
the recovery of the encryption key k as H = Ek(0).
3.3.5 Choosing polynomials
For any attack utilising this algebraic structure, a critical component is the method
used to select ‘good’ forgery polynomials. To maximise the probability of a successful
forgery it is important that the polynomial used to attempt a forgery has many
distinct roots, as a root with multiplicities increases the degree of the polynomial
(and hence the length of the attempted forgery) without increasing the probability
of success. The na¨ıve way to achieve this is to compute q(x) =
∏
i (x−Hi) for as
many Hi as is required to give the desired forgery probability.
Alternatively, if the polynomial defined by the hash function is evaluated in Fpr and
the irreducible factorisation of xp
r − x is computed in a subfield Fpd , a subset of
these factors can be multiplied together (in Fpd). By choosing distinct irreducible
factors, the roots of the product polynomial will be distinct. Cycling attacks [244]
employ a variation on this method. The factorisation
22
n − 1 =
n∏
i=1
22
i−1
+ 1 ,
allows Saarinen to find factors of x2
128 − x in F2[x] which can be used in a cycling
attack (although they are not necessarily irreducible):
x2
128 − x = x(x− 1)(x
3 − 1)
x− 1
(x5 − 1)
x− 1
(x17 − 1)
x− 1 · · ·
= x(x− 1)(1 + x+ x2)(1 + x+ · · ·+ x4)(1 + x+ · · ·+ x16) . . . .
To carry out the attack using a subgroup of order t, the factors x, (x − 1) and
(1 + x+ · · ·+ xt−1) are multiplied together to obtain the polynomial xt+1 − x. In
general there is no requirement to select (x − 1) or to use only three factors, for
example the polynomial x(1+x+x2)(1+x+ . . . x16) could be used to give a forgery
probability of 19
2128
. This is not a cycling attack, as the polynomial used contains
more than two terms so the forgery does not involve simply swapping two message
blocks, however it does rely on the same underlying algebraic structure.
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A third option is to use a randomly selected polynomial in Fpr [x]. One potential
issue with this method is the presence of repeated factors; if a factor appears more
than once in the factorisation of the forgery polynomial then the degree of the
forgery polynomial (and hence the length of the forged message) is increased, without
improving the success probability. Square-free factorisation has been extensively
studied as it is a common first step in many polynomial factorisation algorithms
(e.g. [269, Ch. 14]). It may be feasible to sample polynomials from Fpr [x] randomly
and process this polynomial to make it more desirable by removing repeated factors.
However, the presence of repeated factors is only a fairly small problem as the
fraction of polynomials in Fpr with a repeated factor is approximately 1pr [68, 216].
A larger issue is that a random polynomial in Fpr [x] does not necessarily split in
Fpr [x]. Irreducible factors in Fpr [x] do not have roots at possible hash keys and
so will never evaluate to zero and hence do not increase the success probability.
It is well known that the fraction of degree d polynomials that is irreducible is
approximately 1d [68, 185, 216], so this is not a significant problem as the forgery
polynomial will probably be chosen to have a high degree in order to realise a larger
success probability. However, a forgery polynomial consisting of only a few linear
factors and a several high degree irreducible factors will give a low success probability
and there are many polynomials in Fpr [x] with this form. Irreducible polynomials
in Fp that are known to have a root in Fpr would be good candidates for attempting
forgeries as the normality of Fpr/Fp guarantees that these polynomials will split into
linear factors. Unfortunately this does not appear to be a well-studied area.
The main disadvantage of choosing random polynomials is that, although the roots
of a polynomial in K[x] can be identified efficiently (see [33] for example), it would be
unlikely that a non-intersecting subset of the key space would be used for a second
forgery attempt if the first was unsuccessful. This rules out utilising the key space
search described in Section 3.3.4.
Bogdanov et al. [2] discuss an alternative approach for generating forgery poly-
nomials. Their proposal resolves several limitations of the approaches discussed
above: both the na¨ıve approach and the factorisation approach require extensive
pre-processing, while random polynomials are likely to have repeated roots (either
within one forgery polynomial, or between several choices of forgery polynomial).
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Using twisted polynomials in Ore rings, Bogdanov et al. are able to describe sparse
forgery polynomials which partition the key space of the hash function and exist
regardless of the field in which the polynomial is evaluated.
3.4 Algebraic structure of previous attacks
In this section, we explain the relationship between the properties described in Sec-
tion 3.3 and the known results against GCM and polynomial-evaluation-hash-based
MACs, which were described in Section 3.2.
3.4.1 Ferguson’s short tag attack
Ferguson’s attack against GCM when short tags are used [111] begins by the adver-
sary manipulating the message in blocks M2i (for some i). This is equivalent to at-
tempting to forge using a linearised polynomial, that is, a polynomial q(x) =
∑
i qix
i
for which qi = 0 unless i = 2
j for some j. Linearised polynomials have the prop-
erty that their roots form a linear subspace of the splitting field of the polynomial
(see [185, Ch 3.4] for an overview). Ferguson uses polynomials in F2[x] that split
over F2128 , so the roots correspond to possible hash keys and this guarantees that
the each root of the polynomial is distinct.
If the forgery is not successful then the adversary can choose a different (and distinct)
subspace of the key space; if the forgery is successful, the adversary can choose
a subspace that is contained within the original subspace. This corresponds to
choosing a second forgery polynomial with either a distinct set of roots or a subset of
the roots of the original forgery polynomial. Because of the structure of the roots of
linearised polynomials, it is possible to describe the roots of a linearised polynomial
using a matrix over F2. Multiple successful forgeries reduce the dimension of the
subspace of the key space containing the hash key, which is equivalent to reducing the
number of roots of the forgery polynomial; eventually an adversary will recover the
key by reducing the dimension of the subspace to zero, or equivalently by reducing
the degree of the forgery polynomial to one.
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3.4.2 Joux’s forbidden attack
Joux’s ‘forbidden attack’ against GCM [152] is also a specific case of the properties
discussed in this chapter. Joux observes that if an adversary obtains two messages
that are authenticated using the same IV then they are able to derive a polynomial
that is known to be satisfied by H, by finding the xor of the authentication tags and
recalling the definition of the polynomial hash. The suggestion in Joux’s paper is
that once one polynomial has been computed, the adversary may ‘hesitate between
a large number of possible H’. The proposed solution to this issue is to compute
more forgery polynomials using more pairs of messages that have been authenticated
with the same IVs and then to compute the GCD of all of these. We note that
the techniques described in Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.4 can also be applied once one
successful forgery polynomial has been identified.
3.4.3 Handschuh and Preneel’s attacks
Handschuh and Preneel [135] describe a method to verify a guess for a key and a
key-recovery attack.
The method for verifying a key guess H? corresponds precisely with attempting
to forge using the polynomial x2 − H?x. A successful forgery confirms that either
H = H? or H = 0.
The key-recovery attack consists of attempting to create a forgery and then conduct-
ing a binary search through the roots of the polynomial defined by the difference
between the original message and the forged message. As with Joux’s forbidden
attack, there is no reason why the techniques described in Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.4
cannot be applied once one successful forgery polynomial has been identified. It is
also possible to use the length-extension attack described in Section 3.3.3 to increase
the forgery probability.
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3.4.4 Saarinen’s cycling attacks
Saarinen observed that, if a hash key H lies in a subgroup of order t, then Ht = 1 ∈ K
and (for any i, j) message blocks Mi and Mi+jt can be swapped without changing
the value of the hash.
We suggest that it is more natural and general to consider the hash keys that fall in
low order subgroups as roots of a low degree polynomial. Noting that Ht+1 = H is
equivalent to Ht+1 −H = 0, we can describe cycling attacks in terms of the more
general attack introduced in this chapter using the polynomial
q(x) = (Mi −Mi+jt)(xt+1 − x) ,
noting that in fields of characteristic 2 subtraction is the same as ⊕.
This observation rephrases the example given in Section 3.2.2.4 as:
hH(M1||M2||M3||M4) =M1 ·H ⊕M2 ·H2 ⊕M3 ·H3 ⊕M4 ·H4
=M1 ·H ⊕M2 ·H2 ⊕M3 ·H3 ⊕M4 ·H4
⊕ (M1 ⊕M4) ·H ⊕ (M1 ⊕M4) ·H4
=M4 ·H ⊕M2 ·H2 ⊕M3 ·H3 ⊕M1 ·H4
=hH(M4||M2||M3||M1) .
Using the more general ‘polynomial roots’ description it is possible to forge using
any subset of the key space, however if the hash keys that we wish to attempt to
forge with are the elements of a low order subgroup then the polynomial that is
created corresponds precisely to Saarinen’s cycling attack.
For example, the order three subgroup of F?2128 plus the all zero key corresponds to
the polynomial (x−H0)(x−H1)(x−H2)(x−H3) = x4−x, with the Hi as identified
by Saarinen [244, Sect. 4.1]:
H0 = 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
H1 = 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
H2 = 10 D0 4D 25 F9 35 56 E6 9F 58 CE 2F 8D 03 5A 94
H3 = 90 D0 4D 25 F9 35 56 E6 9F 58 CE 2F 8D 03 5A 94 .
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3.5 Weak keys
In this section we discuss the existing results on weak keys for polynomial-based
authentication schemes and expand the known weak-key classes.
3.5.1 Handschuh and Preneel’s weak key
Handschuh and Preneel [135] identify H = 0 as a weak authentication key for GCM
and other similar constructions because h0(M) = 0 for every message M.
Following the definition given in Section 2.3.1 and because |D| = 1, an adversary is
not allowed to test any key by exhaustive search, nor are they allowed any verification
queries. Therefore for a single element subset of the key space D = {H?} to be a
weak-key class, a nonce-respecting adversary must be able to identify whether or
not H = H? when they are given only (message, tag) pairs of their choosing, each
created using a different IV.
We note that it is possible for a nonce-respecting adversary to detect whether D =
{0} if |N| 6= 96: in this case all values of N hash to give the same initial counter value
and h0(M) = 0 for every message M so all messages have the same authentication
tag (as identified in [196, Sect. 5]). However, if |N| = 96 a different initial counter
value is used to encrypt the output of the hash function for each tag and so, although
the output of the hash function does not change, this cannot be detected given only
the output of the MAC algorithm. Therefore, 0 is a weak key for GCM only if
|N| 6= 96 and is not, in general, a weak key for polynomial-evaluation-based message
authentication schemes.
However, the behaviour of the zero key is highly undesirable; the value of the au-
thentication tag depends only on the IV and not on the message. This means that,
given a valid (message, tag) pair, an adversary would be able to substitute any mes-
sage and still have a valid pair. This is not captured by Handshuh and Preneel’s
notion of weak keys, due to fact that the adversary is not permitted any verification
queries. The zero key is a ‘weaker key’ than other keys: for any key guess it is
possible to construct a forgery so that it is successful if the key guess is correct (see
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Section 3.3 and the discussion regarding cosets), but if the guess is the zero key then
any forgery will be succesful if the key guess is correct.
3.5.2 Saarinen’s weak keys
Saarinen [244] demonstrates that the situation is much worse than described by
Handschuh and Preneel, describing classes of weak keys where the authentication
key either falls in a low order subgroup of K? or is zero. It is then possible to create a
valid forgery by swapping two message blocks of a valid (message, tag) pair without
changing the authentication tag if the authentication key lies in a subgroup with
order dividing the distance between the swapped message blocks.
This forgery will be successful if and only if either the key is an element of such
a subgroup or is zero. Hence, this provides a simple method for identifying weak
keys which requires one valid (message, tag) pair and one verification query. These
classes of weak keys therefore meet Handschuh and Preneel’s definition of weak keys
(given in Section 2.3.1).
For example, the set of authentication keys corresponding to zero and the elements
of the subgroup of order 3 in F2128 is a weak-key class. Membership of this class can
be confirmed by a successful forgery if Mi and Mj are swapped and i ≡ j mod 3.
This is equivalent to a successful forgery using (a multiple of) the polynomial x4−x.
3.5.3 New weak-key classes
For each subset of the key space it is possible to construct several polynomials that
will evaluate to zero on any element of that set and to a non-zero field element
otherwise. A successful forgery using one of these polynomials confirms that H was
in the subset of the key space used to define the polynomial and a failed forgery
attempt confirms that the H was not in that subset. This polynomial may not
have ‘nice’ binary coefficients like the polynomials for Saarinen’s cycling attacks but
instead will, in general, be an element of F2128 [x]; this is not problematic.
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It follows that almost every subset of the key space for a polynomial-evaluation-based
MAC is weak, regardless of the method of encryption used to form the authenti-
cation tag from the output of the hash function. Using the properties discussed in
Section 3.3 with the observation above it is possible to test for membership of any
subset of the key space using at most two verification queries. Membership of a
subset D that includes the zero key can be tested by setting q(x) = ∏H∈D (x−H).
This therefore requires one verification query, independent of the size of D. To
test for membership of a subset D that does not include zero, first test whether
H ∈ D ∪ {0} and then rule out H = 0 using the method described below. This
therefore requires two verification queries, but again is independent of the size of
D. As before, the size of the subset that can be tested is limited by the maximum
message length permitted by the scheme.
The distinction between subsets including zero or not including zero is a consequence
of the constant term of gM(x) being zero to avoid predictable changes in the output
of the hash from flipping low order bits. Therefore, using Handschuh and Preneel’s
definition, a set D of hash keys for a universal-hash-based authentication scheme is
a weak-key class if either: |D| ≥ 3, or |D| ≥ 2 and 0 ∈ D, regardless of how hH(M)
is encrypted to form τ.
If the encryption is performed additively (as it is in GCM), then it is possible to
extend this result to include every subset D with |D| ≥ 2, using the observation
in Section 3.3 regarding the quotient ring K[x]/〈x −H〉. This has also been noted
independently by Zhu et al. [274].
Given one valid (message, tag) pair for a single block message and one verification
query it is easy to determine whether or not H = 0. If the adversary attempts to
forge using any other single block message and the same tag, then the forgery is
successful if and only if H = 0 as seen below.
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If no length encoding is used:
τ = E(ctr0) + (M ·H)
= E(ctr0) + (M
′ ·H)
⇔ (M −M ′) ·H = 0
⇔M = M ′ or H = 0 .
If a GCM style length encoding is used:
τ = E(ctr0) + (length ·H) + (M ·H2)
= E(ctr0) + (length ·H) + (M ′ ·H2)
⇔ (M −M ′) ·H2 = 0
⇔M = M ′ or H = 0 .
3.6 GCM with short multiplications
3.6.1 Introduction
In 2012, Yasuda and Aoki [11] proposed GCM/2+, a variant of GCM that evaluates
the hash function using ‘short multiplications’ in F264 rather than multiplications
in F2128 . The motivation for this change is to increase the efficiency in software,
where F2128 multiplications are significantly more expensive than F264 multiplica-
tions. However this change to the specification makes the attacks in Section 3.3
much more efficient and greatly increases the number of weak keys.
The most significant difference from the GCM specification relates to the polynomial
g that is used to define the hash function h in GCM/2+. The hash key H is split into
two ‘half keys’ H = L||R, where |L| = |R| = n2 and each message block is considered
as two ‘half blocks’ Mi = M
(L)
i ||M (R)i . We will use M (L) to denote M (L)1 || . . . ||M (L)m
and similarly for M (R). The length of the additional authenticated data is encoded
in M
(L)
1 and the length of the ciphertext is encoded in M
(R)
1 . This is identical to the
GCM specification but is noteworthy because GCM/2+ carries out all operations on
half blocks.
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The hash function is evaluated in two halves, hH = hL||hR, and
hH(M) = gM(H)
= hL(M
(L))||hR(M (R))
= gM(L)(L)||gM(R)(R) ,
where gM(·)(·) is evaluated in F2n/2 . The key remark at this point is that hH is simply
the concatenation of the evaluation of two polynomials, gM(L) and gM(R) .
GCM/2+ also makes the following changes to the GCM specification:
Block size: GCM/2+ supports the use of a block cipher with any even block size
(denoted by n).
Tag Encryption: An extra block cipher call is added to the end of the GCM
authentication tag generation algorithm. The authentication tag is computed
as τ = Ek(hH(M)⊕ Ek(ctr0)).
Final Multiplication: There is no final multiplication by the hash key in the
evaluation of the hash function. The hash function polynomial is gM(H) =
MmH
m−1+. . .+M2H+M1, rather than gM(H) = MmHm+. . .+M2H2+M1H.
The requirement for the constant term of gM(x) to be zero (in order to prevent
the predictable bit flipping, as described in Section 3.3) can be relaxed due to
the introduction of the tag encryption.
We will consider the half-sized multiplications and the removal of the final multipli-
cation below. The support for other block sizes need not be considered as all of the
results in this chapter are independent of the block size of the block cipher. The
introduction of an extra block cipher call slightly affects our results. We also note
that the specification of GCM/2+ makes no recommendations regarding maximum
message length.
3.6.2 Attacks
As the hash function consists of the concatenation of two polynomial hash functions
(each evaluated in F2n/2), there is no interaction between the two sides of the compu-
67
3.6 GCM with short multiplications
tation until the output is encrypted with the block cipher. Therefore we can consider
forgery polynomials q(L)(x) and q(R)(x) for the two polynomial hash functions, as
described in Section 3.3. Because of the tag encryption introduced in GCM/2+, we
require a full collision and hence forgery polynomials with q0 = 0; we are unable
to use the general technique described in Section 3.3 that allows us to utilise any
polynomial. The forgery will be successful if q(L)(L) = q(R)(R) = 0. However, as
there is no interaction between the two sides of the gM(H), we can choose (without
loss of generality) q(R) ≡ 0. In this case, we have reduced finding a collision for hH
to finding hash collisions for hL.
If we set q(R) ≡ 0 then we are unable to alter the right half of any message block
(in particular M
(R)
1 ) so we cannot change the length of the ciphertext. Provided
that q(L) 6≡ 0, the adversary would still have total control over the length of the
additional authenticated data. Similarly, we could choose q(L) ≡ 0 and lose the
ability to increase the length of the additional authenticated data, while retaining
control of the ciphertext length. In the GCM specification the maximum length of
the additional authenticated data is significantly larger than the maximum length
of the ciphertext and so, if this is mimicked in the specification of GCM/2+, setting
q(R) ≡ 0 does not significantly reduce the potential for a length extension attack.
We note that it is possible to attack both L and R simultaneously, by choosing
both q(R) 6≡ 0 and q(L) 6≡ 0. However, this forgery will only be successful if
q(L)(L) = q(R)(R) = 0. As the left and right components of the hash function
behave independently, the overall success probability is simply the product of the
success probability for the components. Choosing q(R) ≡ 0 results in a success prob-
ability of 1 for the right component, which allows the adversary to identify a subset
containing L, without any chance of the forgery failing due to the right half key.
This leads to a faster key recovery than attacking both halves simultaneously; if an
adversary can try every half key by using t queries, then they can cover the entire
key space with 2t queries by attacking the two halves separately whereas t2 queries
are required to cover the key space if both halves are attacked together.
If the maximum length of the message is close to 264 blocks then we can achieve a
significant success probability. Every half key is a root of x2
64 − x and therefore if
messages of at least 264 blocks are permitted a forgery can be made with probability
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1− 1
264
given a single valid (message, tag) pair. This probability is not quite one, as
we may need to manipulate the length field (the constant term in each polynomial).
It is not possible to do this using q(x) = x2
64 − x, so we will use x264−1 − 1. This
forgery will fail only if the half key is zero. Alternatively, an adversary could recover
a half key with one valid (message, tag) pair and 65 verification queries by utilising
a binary search (as described in Section 3.3.4 and [135]), with an additional query
at the end to decide whether or not H = 0.
Not permitting 264-block messages prevents this highly efficient attack, but similar
attacks are still possible. If m-block messages are permitted, it is possible to recover
the key with at most 264−logm + logm+ 1 verification queries. In this case, m keys
can be tested with each verification query, so we will partition the key space into
264−logm subsets of size m. The attack begins by using up to 264−logm verification
queries to establish which subset contains the hash key. We then conduct a binary
search of the appropriate partition, requiring logm queries and finally use one more
query to establish whether or not the half key is zero. This demonstrates that the
attack remains feasible if logm is not much smaller than 64.
For example, if 256-block messages are permitted (as is the case for GCM) then 256
keys can be tested with a single verification query. By partitioning the key space
into 28 sets and using a binary search of the relevant set, at most 28 + 56 + 1 ≈ 315
verification queries are required to recover a half key.
We also remark that the original GCM proposal [197] includes an appendix de-
scribing GCM with a 64-bit block cipher. In this case the polynomial evaluation is
computed in F264 . This leads to exactly the same problem as described above and
the (full) hash key can be recovered using approximately 315 verification queries.
The attacks in this section highlight the relationship between the field size, maximum
message length, and the forgery probability or speed of key recovery. We recommend
against the use of GCM/2+ as, even if the maximum message length is a single block,
it offers a worse security guarantee than GCM.
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3.7 Square Hash
3.7.1 Introduction
Square Hash was proposed by Etzel, Patel, and Ramzan in 1999 [105]. It is a
universal hash function family based on MMH [132] and follows a slightly different
structure than those considered so far in this chapter. We will assume that Square
Hash is being used in a MAC algorithm (as described in Sections 2.2.7 and 3.2.1)
and identify classes of weak keys for the hash component of the MAC algorithm.
Square Hash consists of functions hk : Zmp → Zp where p is prime. For each k,M ∈
Zmp , hk is defined by
hk(M) =
m∑
i=1
(Mi + ki)
2 mod p .
Handschuh and Preneel [135] have identified a number of weak keys for Square Hash,
in particular those keys with ki = kj for some i and j, which can be identified by a
successful forgery when Mi and Mj are swapped.
We demonstrate that every Square Hash key is an element of several weak-key
classes of the form Di,λj,µ = {k ∈ Zmp |λki = µkj}, where λ, µ ∈ Zp. We assume that an
adversary can ask for a message of their choice to be authenticated and then aims to
forge using a different message but the same authentication tag. All of the queries
that our adversary will ask consist of just two message blocks. We will use M1||M2 to
represent the message sent to the MAC generation oracle, and M ′1||M ′2 to represent
the message sent to the verification oracle (with the authentication tag that is valid
for M1||M2). The results can be trivially extended to messages consisting of several
blocks provided that Mr = M
′
r for all r 6= i, j and analogous methods can be applied
to identify Di,λj,µ for any i 6= j with i, j ≤ m.
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3.7.2 Weak-key classes
The key observation is that
hk(M) =
m∑
i=1
(Mi + ki)
2 mod p
=
m∑
i=1
M2i + 2
m∑
i=1
(Mi · ki) +
m∑
i=1
k2i mod p .
So, for a fixed key it is possible to find a hash collision (and hence a MAC forgery) if
it is possible to find two messages M and M ′ that meet the following two conditions:
Condition 1:
∑m
i=1M
′
i
2 =
∑m
i=1M
′
i
2 mod p
Condition 2:
∑m
i=1 (Mi · ki) =
∑m
i=1 (M
′
i · ki) mod p
It is possible to identify whether or not a particular relationship holds between two
key blocks (e.g. λki = µkj for some λ, µ ∈ Zp) using one MAC generation and one
MAC verification query. As |Di,λj,µ| > 1 for every i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, λ, µ ∈ Zp, these
are weak-key classes for Square Hash. We now describe two methods for identifying
the two messages required to determine whether k ∈ D1,λ2,µ in the case where the
message consists of only two blocks.
3.7.2.1 Method 1
Condition 1 described above can be satisfied by choosing pairs of messages (M1,M2),
(0,M ′2) such that M21 + M22 = M ′2
2. We will test for the class of weak keys D1,λ2,µ
where λ, µ 6= 0 using a well-known formula of Euclid.
Setting
M1 = 2λµ M
′
1 = 0
M2 = λ
2 − µ2 M ′2 = λ2 + µ2 ,
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we observe that
M21 +M
2
2 = (4λ
2µ2) + (λ4 − 2λ2µ2 + µ4)
= λ4 + 2λ2µ4 + µ4
= (λ2 + µ2)2
= M ′2
2
,
and also that
k1M1 + k2M2 = k1(2λµ) + k2(λ
2 − µ2)
= 2k1λµ+
λk1
µ
(λ2 − µ2)
= k1(
λ3
µ
+ λµ)
=
k1λ
µ
(λ2 + µ2)
= k2M
′
2 .
Therefore the hash of (M1,M2) is equal to the hash of (M
′
1,M
′
2) and the MAC
forgery is successful if k ∈ D1,λ2,µ. It can easily be seen that a successful MAC forgery
is in fact both necessary and sufficient for k ∈ D1,λ2,µ. Using this technique it is
possible to recover the relationship between any ki and kj using no more than 1
valid (message, tag) pair and p verification queries.
3.7.2.2 Method 2
Alternatively, we can test for membership of D1,λ2,µ (where λ 6= 0 6= µ) following
MacKay and Mahajan’s preprint [190]. The two messages will be found by consid-
ering alternative factorisations of an element of Z and mapping these into Zp.
As we wish to test whether λk1 = µk2, take ω, ω˜ so that ωk1 = ω˜k2 and ω ≡ ω˜
(mod 2). One possible method to do this is ω = λ if λ ≡ µ (mod 2) and ω = 2λ if
λ 6≡ µ (mod 2), with similar definitions for ω˜.
Now choose x, x˜ so that xω = x˜ω˜ with x ≡ x˜ (mod 2) and ω ≡ x (mod 2).
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Setting
M1 =
x+ ω
2
M ′1 =
x− ω
2
M2 =
x˜− ω˜
2
M ′2 =
x˜+ ω˜
2
,
it can be seen that Condition 1 is satisfied, as k2ω˜ = k1ω and
M21 +M
2
2 =
(
x+ ω
2
)2
+
(
x˜− ω˜
2
)2
=
1
4
[
x2 + 2xω + ω2 + x˜2 − 2x˜ω˜ + ω˜2]
=
1
4
[
x2 + ω2 + x˜2 + ω˜2
]
=
1
4
[
x2 − 2xω + ω2 + x˜2 + 2x˜ω˜ + ω˜2]
=
(
x− ω
2
)2
+
(
x˜+ ω˜
2
)2
= M ′1
2
+M ′2
2
.
Also, Condition 2 is satisfied: xω = x˜ω˜ and
k1M1 + k2M2 = k1
(
x+ ω
2
)
+ k2
(
x˜− ω˜
2
)
=
1
2
[k1x+ k1ω + k2x˜− k2ω˜]
=
1
2
[k1x+ k1ω + k2x˜− k2ω˜ + 2(k2ω˜ − k1ω)]
=
1
2
[k1x− k1ω + k2x˜+ k2ω˜]
= k1
(
x− ω
2
)
+ k2
(
x˜+ ω˜
2
)
= k1M
′
1 + k2M
′
2 .
Therefore the hash of (M1,M2) is equal to the hash of (M
′
1,M
′
2) and the MAC
forgery is successful if k ∈ D1,λ2,µ.
3.8 Discussion
In this section, we discuss our results and some related factors that affect the security
of polynomial-based MACs.
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3.8.1 Choice of fields
It is true that the security against cycling attacks, as presented by Saarinen, can be
increased by evaluating a hash function in a field with a multiplicative group, the
order of which does not have many factors. However the attack described in this
chapter (of which cycling attacks are a special case) applies equally well in any finite
field, so the claim that ‘The security of polynomial-evaluation MACs against attacks
of this type of attack can be determined from the factorization of the group size in a
straightforward manner’ [244, Sect. 8] is somewhat misleading.
Saarinen’s claim is valid in the sense that the factorisation of |K|− 1 determines the
extent to which the process of computing irreducible factors will succeed; however
an attack using
∏
H∈D (x−H) will work equally well in every field. In particular,
it follows from our work that the SGCM variant of GCM has the same inherent
weaknesses regarding polynomial-based forgery attacks.
The size of the field has another important implication to the security of a scheme,
as demonstrated in Section 3.6. It is therefore important to choose an appropriately
large field in which to evaluate the polynomial, or to employ some other mechanism
to ensure that multiple copies of a small field do not behave independently (as in
GCM/2+ [11]).
3.8.2 Length extension
It is unfortunate that including the length of the additional authenticated data and
plaintext in the input to the hash function is not sufficient to prevent the length
extension attack presented in this chapter.
In schemes that use a GCM-like length encoding, if the value of the length field were
encrypted using a block cipher before being input to the hash function, it would
not be possible to alter the message length as described in Section 3.3.3. However,
one of the design goals of GCM was to take advantage of AES pipelining, which
precludes the use of the block cipher in finalising the authentication tag.
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3.8.3 Malleability
Part of the reason that the algebraic structure of polynomial hashing is particularly
problematic for GCM is that it gives an adversary control over the changes made
to the plaintext in a forged message because addition in a field of characteristic 2 is
used for both counter mode encryption and the hash function evaluation.
One way to avoid this issue is to use different operations during encryption and MAC
generation. This is one possible advantage of using AES–CTR and Poly1305–AES:
in this scheme the MAC is computed using addition in a prime order field while the
message is encrypted using addition in a field of characteristic 2.
An alternative method to increase the difficulty for an adversary attempting to
make meaningful manipulations of message is to use a mode of operation other than
CTR as this may prevent the ‘targeted multiple bit forgeries’ [244, Sect. 6] and the
analogous forgeries in this chapter affecting the plaintext quite so directly.
GCM roughly follows the Encrypt–then–MAC paradigm, as is generally perceived
to be best practice (although MAC–then–Encrypt has also been proved secure in the
nonce-based AEAD setting [237]). Despite going against the perceived best practice,
using a MAC–then–Encrypt approach (in addition to the changes described above)
may make it harder for an adversary to create ciphertexts that correctly decrypt to a
plaintext known to be related to a (plaintext,ciphertext) pair obtained from a query.
We note that we have not analysed this construction and that the introduction of
other weaknesses caused by making these changes has not been ruled out.
3.8.4 Weak keys
The weak-key classes identified in Section 3.5 cause the forgery probability to be
higher than expected because an adversary can detect whether the authentication
key is a member of that class and, if it is, forge with probability one.
The broader issue with polynomial-evaluation-based hash functions is that it is pos-
sible to test for membership of large subsets of the key space with only one or two
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verification queries and once an adversary has successfully confirmed membership of
a subset they can either continue to forge messages or conduct a search of a much
reduced key space. This is an unusual and undesirable property of a cryptosystem.
It is interesting that the two-element subsets of the key space containing zero are
always weak-key classes, whereas two-element subsets not containing zero may be
weak depending on how the output of the hash function is encrypted. This perhaps
suggests a problem with the definition of a weak-key class.
In our opinion the observations made in this chapter are unavoidable properties
of hash functions based on polynomial evaluation that result from the algebraic
structure of the construction. The distinction between the two methods to encrypt
the output of the hash function arises from the use of the same algebraic structure
to encrypt additively and the fact that the application of a block cipher removes this
structure so requires a full collision. These results are therefore not best described
in terms of the number of weak keys.
The most important discussion around this issue is whether an algorithm in which
almost every subset of the key space is a weak-key class is a weak algorithm or
whether this is a property of the construction that, although highly undesirable, is
not considered to reduce the security of the scheme to an unacceptable level. We
suggest that, in the case of GCM, it is the latter; in other polynomial-based MAC
schemes with different parameters it may be the former and this property must be
considered carefully when designing and evaluating schemes.
Recently, Abdelraheem, Bogdanov, and Tischhauser [3] have shown that the weak-
key classes identified in this chapter have severe security implications for POET [4],
a submission to the CAESAR competition [79]). When POET is instantiated using
the polynomial-based universal hash functions studied in this chapter, the specifica-
tion requires that tests for weak-key classes are carried out (referencing Saarinen’s
cycling attacks). However, Abdelraheem et al. reiterate our statement that all sets
of keys are weak-key classes (so testing for weak keys is meaningless) and addition-
ally identify classes that are not covered by the proposed testing strategy, exploiting
these weak keys to realise forgery attacks against POET.
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The related-key security
of iterated Even–Mansour ciphers
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In this chapter, we initiate the study of iterated Even–Mansour ciphers under related-
key attacks (RKAs). These ciphers have been studied extensively and they are widely
used due to their simplicity and security, however their RKA security has so far
received little attention. We show that the simplest one-round EM cipher is strong
enough to achieve non-trivial levels of RKA security even under chosen-ciphertext
attacks; unfortunately this class does not include the practically relevant case of
offsetting keys by constants. Two rounds reach this level under chosen-plaintext
attacks and three rounds boost security to resist chosen-ciphertext attacks.
The work described in this chapter is joint work with Pooya Farshim and appears
as [109]; it is available at [108]. The publication that this chapter is based on also
includes a result on the relationship between indifferentiablity and RKA security.
This result is Farshim’s and so is omitted here; all other contributions are joint.
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4.1 Introduction
Security analyses that consider related-key attacks aim to provide guarantees about
the behaviour of some cryptosystem when it is used with multiple keys that are
not chosen independently of each other. As discussed in Section 2.3.2, these attacks
might arise through tampering with the memory in which keys are held, or via
higher-level protocol design. These attacks give the adversary much more power
than the conventional single-key model; indeed, some of the earliest attacks against
full AES were related-key attacks [47, 48].
Bellare and Kohno [27] initiate the theoretical study of related-key attack secu-
rity. Bellare and Cash [21] describe an RKA-secure PRF and Bellare, Cash, and
Miller [22] use an RKA-secure PRF to generate RKA-secure variants of several cryp-
tographic primitives. Lucks [189] continues this approach and also discusses the idea
of increasing resistance against related-key attacks by processing the key with a hash
function (modelled as a random oracle).
Barbosa and Farshim [15] adopt a different approach. They study the RKA security
of Feistel constructions and show that by simply reusing keys across the rounds, the
3- and 4-round Feistel constructions achieve RKA security under chosen-plaintext
and chosen-ciphertext attacks respectively. Barbosa and Farshim also formalise the
random-oracle transformation discussed by Lucks [189].
Since key-alternating ciphers were introduced by Daemen and Rijmen [91], they
have become a popular paradigm for block cipher design. Notable examples of pro-
posed schemes following this design include AES [90, 208], Present [59], LED [131],
PRINCE [61], KLEIN [129], and Zorro [118]. Although the term ‘key-alternating ci-
pher’ was first used with the aim of facilitating a theoretical discussion of the design
of AES, the idea originates in the work of Even and Mansour [106, 107] and builds
on principles dating back to Shannon [249, p. 713]. Even and Mansour sought to
design the simplest block cipher possible: their proposal was a single round of the
scheme shown in Figure 4.1, simply xoring a key either side of some public permu-
tation. Rivest’s DES-X construction (proposed as a means to protect DES against
brute-force attacks [161]) is also closely related to this design. In this chapter, we
use the terms ‘key-alternating’ and ‘iterated Even–Mansour’ interchangeably.
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P1 ⊕
k2
P2 ⊕
k3
. . . ⊕
kt
Pt ⊕
kt+1
y⊕
k1
x
Figure 4.1: The iterated Even–Mansour scheme, where encryption is defined via
E((k1, . . . , kt+1), x) = Pt(· · ·P2(P1(x⊕ k1)⊕ k2) · · · )⊕ kt+1.
Contributions
Despite extensive literature on the provable security of the iterated Even–Mansour
(EM) ciphers and cryptanalysis of constructions following this design strategy (in-
cluding under related-key attacks), little attention has been given to the formal
analysis of their related-key security. In this work we initiate the provable RKA
security analysis of such ciphers. We show that the one-round EM cipher achieves
a non-trivial level of RKA security under chosen-ciphertext attacks (Theorem 4.1).
However, this result does not include the practically relevant case of offsetting keys
by constants: we go on to show that two rounds suffice to reach this level under
chosen-plaintext attacks (Theorem 4.2) and that three rounds increases security to
resist chosen-ciphertext attacks (Theorem 4.6).
Our results are similar to those of Barbosa and Farshim: we show that key reuse
is also a viable strategy to protect against related-key attacks in iterated Even–
Mansour ciphers and use techniques similar to those used in their formalisation of
the random-oracle model transform described by Lucks [189]
Starting with the simplest of the key-alternating ciphers, namely the (one-round) EM
cipher, it is well known that this construction does not provide xor-RKA security (i.e.
security against an adversary that can xor keys with a constant of their choosing) [61,
60, 174, 9]. We note that a similar attack prevents this construction with key-reuse
from achieving xor-RKA security and describe this in greater detail in Section 4.3.1.
Despite this negative result, we are able to derive conditions under which the minimal
EM cipher (with key-reuse) enjoys a non-trivial level of RKA security, even in the
chosen-ciphertext setting.
The search for xor-RKA security leads us to consider the two-round EM construc-
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tions. An offset-switching attack still applies and so again we consider key reuse.
(The two permutations are still independent.) We start with chosen-plaintext at-
tacks, formulate three new conditions (analogous to those used for the basic scheme),
and prove security under them. We then show that this new set of restrictions are
weak enough to follow from the standard output-unpredictability and claw-freeness
properties. Since xoring with constants is output unpredictable and claw-free [27],
the xor-RKA security of the single-key, two-round EM construction follows.
However, under chosen-ciphertext attacks this construction falls prey to an attack of
Andreeva et al. [9] on the indifferentiability of the two-round EM cipher (adapted to
the RKA setting). For CCA security, we turn to three-round constructions, where
we show of the 14 possible ways to reuse keys, all but one fall prey to Andreeva et
al.’s attack [9]. On the other hand, the three-round construction which uses a single
key meets the desired xor-RKA security in the CCA setting.
Independently and concurrently, Cogliati and Seurin [78] also study the related-key
security of iterated EM ciphers. Their Theorem 2 is very similar to our Corol-
lary 4.7; they analyse more general key schedules and obtain tighter bounds, while
our approach deals with a wider range of RKD functions.
4.2 Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly introduce some new notation, describe Even–Mansour
ciphers, and summarise prior work analysing their security.
4.2.1 Notation
We briefly recall the Φ-RKA games from Section 2.3.2. The definition of RKA
security is parameterised by a set Φ, containing functions φ : K → K. Of particular
relevance to this work is the set Φ⊕ = {k 7→ k⊕∆ : ∆ ∈ {0, 1}n}. In the Φ-RKCPA
game, an adversary A has access to an RK-Enc oracle. This oracle takes a pair
(φ, x), where φ ∈ Φ and x is a point in the domain of the block cipher, returning
the encryption of x under the key φ(k), where k is chosen uniformly at random at
80
4.2 Preliminaries
the beginning of the experiment and fixed throughout. The Φ-RKCCA game adds
an RK-Dec oracle which, on the same input, returns the decryption of x using the
key φ(k). The adversary’s aim is to determine whether the values that it receives
from the oracles are being returned by an ideal cipher (an independent random
permutation for each key) or the construction that is being reasoned about.
The adversary, construction, and RKD functions can all place queries to pi; we
denote the number of queries made by each of these as follows: the number of
distinct queries to pi with index i made by an adversary is denoted by qi; the total
number of queries placed to pi by an adversary is denoted qpi =
∑
i qi; the number of
distinct queries to the RK-Enc and (if present) RK-Dec oracles is denoted by qem;
and the number of distinct queries to pi with index i made by the RKD function
φpi is denoted by qφi . Note that throughout this chapter, b may refer to a single bit
(the challenge bit in the Φ-RKA games from Section 2.3.2) or to a bitstring that is
queried to, or returned from, an oracle; this should cause no confusion.
We call an RKA adversary repeat-free if it does not query its RK-Enc or RK-Dec
oracle on a pair (φ, x) twice. We call an RKA adversary redundancy-free if it does
not query RK-Enc on (φ, x) to get y and then RK-Dec on (φ, y) to get x, or vice
versa. Without loss of generality, all adversaries in this chapter are assumed to be
both repeat-free and redundancy-free.
4.2.2 The Even–Mansour ciphers
The t-round Even–Mansour cipher EMpi = (Epi,Dpi) is defined with respect to t
permutations P1,. . . ,Pt. We require that each permutation has domain {0, 1}n; the
resulting cipher has key space K = {0, 1}n(t+1) and domain {0, 1}n, as illustrated in
Figure 4.1. It is defined via
Epi((k1, . . . , kt+1), x) = Pt(· · ·P2(P1(x⊕ k1)⊕ k2) · · · )⊕ kt+1 ,
Dpi((k1, . . . , kt+1), x) = P
−1
1 (· · ·P−1t−1(P−1t (x⊕ kt+1)⊕ kt) · · · )⊕ k1 .
In this work we are interested in EM ciphers where keys are reused in various rounds.
Following notation adopted by Barbosa and Farshim [15], we denote the EM con-
struction where key kij is used before round j by EM
pi[i1, i2, . . . , it+1]. We call such
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key schedules simple. Note that K = {0, 1}n·|{i1,i2,...,it+1}| in these constructions. Of
particular interest to us are EMpi[1, 1], EMpi[1, 1, 1], and EMpi[1, 1, 1, 1] where a single
key is used in all rounds. We emphasise that the round permutations in all these
constructions are independently chosen, unless stated otherwise.
4.2.3 Security Analyses
Even and Mansour’s original analysis [106, 107] considers ‘cracking’ and ‘forging’
attacks in the random-permutation model and shows that no adversary can suc-
ceed in predicting x given E(k, x), or in predicting E(k, x) given x, without making
q1 queries to the permutation and qem to the encryption/decryption oracle, where
q1qem ≈ 2n.
The indistinguishability of the Even–Mansour scheme from a random permutation
is shown by Kilian and Rogaway [161, 162, Theorem 3.1 with κ = 0] and Lampe,
Patarin and Seurin [173, App. B of the full version]. Both works show that an ad-
versary making qem and q1 queries to the encryption/decryption oracles and the per-
mutation oracle respectively, has a success probability of approximately q1qem/2
n−1.
Gentry and Ramzan [117] show that the permutation oracle can be instantiated by
a Feistel network using a random oracle without loss of security.
At Eurocrypt 2012, Dunkelman et al. [98] showed that the Even–Mansour scheme
retains the same level of security using only a single key, that is E(k, x) = P(x⊕k)⊕k.
Bogdanov et al. [60] show that the t-round Even–Mansour cipher with at least two
rounds (t ≥ 2) provides security up to approximately 22n/3 queries and can be broken
in t · 2tn/(t+1) queries. Following this work, several papers have moved towards
proving a bound that meets this attack [258, 173], with Chen and Steinberger [73]
able to prove optimal bounds using Patarin’s H-coefficient technique [217].
Chen et al. [72] consider two variants of the two-round Even–Mansour scheme: one
with independent permutations and identical round keys, the other with identical
permutations but a more complex key schedule. In both cases (with certain require-
ments on the key schedule), security is maintained up to roughly 22n/3 queries.
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Additionally, Lampe and Seurin [174] show that the 12-round Even–Mansour cipher
using a single key is indifferentiable from the ideal cipher. Andreeva et al. [9] show
that a modification of the single-key, 5-round Even–Mansour cipher, where the key
is first processed through a random oracle, is indifferentiable from the ideal cipher.
4.2.4 Cryptanalysis
Daemen [88] describes a chosen-plaintext attack that recovers the key of Even–
Mansour in approximately q1 ≈ qem ≈ 2n/2 queries. Biryukov and Wagner [50]
are able to give a known-plaintext attack against the Even–Mansour scheme with
the same complexity as Daemen’s chosen-plaintext attack. Dunkelman et al. [98]
introduce the slidex attack that uses only known plaintexts and can be carried out
with any number of queries provided that q1qem ≈ 2n.
Mendel et al. [198] describe how to extend Daemen’s attack [88] to a related-key
version, and are able to recover the keys when all round keys are independent. Bog-
danov et al. [60] remark that related-key distinguishing attacks against the iterated
Even–Mansour scheme with independent round keys ‘exist trivially’ and describe
a key-recovery attack, requiring roughly 2n/2 queries against the two-round Even–
Mansour scheme with identical round keys, assuming that an adversary can xor
constants into the round key.
Many key-alternating ciphers have been analysed in the related-key model, such as
AES [47, 48], Present [215], LED [198], and Prince [150]. One of the security claims
of the LED block cipher [131] is a high resistance to related-key attacks, which is
justified by giving a lower bound on the number of active S-boxes.
4.3 The RKA security of EMpi[1, 1]
In this section we study RKD sets Φ for which the single-key Even–Mansour con-
struction provides Φ-RKCCA security. Our results are similar to those of Bellare
and Kohno [27], Albrecht et al. [5], and Barbosa and Farshim [15] in that we identify
a set of restrictions on the RKD set Φ that allow us to establish a security proof.
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For the one-round Even–Mansour construction there are two simple key schedules
(up to relabelling): EMpi[1, 1] and EMpi[1, 2]. Neither of these constructions can
provide Φ⊕-RKCPA security due to ‘offset-switching’ attacks which we describe in
greater detail below. Despite this, we show that the simplest EM construction,
EMpi[1, 1], provides a non-trivial level of RKA security. The results of this section
will also serve as a warm up to the end goal of achieving the stronger forms of RKA
security discussed in later sections.
4.3.1 Restricting RKD sets
We now identify and motivate conditions on a set of allowed related-key queries Φ
that allow us to argue that E(φ(k), ·) and E(φ′(k), ·) for φ, φ′ ∈ Φ look random and
independent from an adversary’s point of view. A formal theorem statement and
proof are deferred to Section 4.3.2.
As usual, our conditions impose that the RKD functions have unpredictable out-
puts; otherwise, RKA security is trivially unachievable as observed by Bellare and
Kohno [27]. Bellare and Kohno also observe that the presence of claws in the RKD
may prevent natural approaches to security proofs; our second condition excludes
such RKD functions from Φ. Our third condition is a strengthening of the claw-
freeness property, motivated by preventing offset-switching attacks, which requires
that it is hard to find ‘offset claws’ in Φ for a random choice of k. (An offset claw
is a pair of functions (φ1, φ2) and a value ∆ such that φ1(k) ⊕ φ2(k) = ∆ with
randomly chosen k.) Finally, we also consider RKD functions that depend on the
underlying permutations by placing queries to them; this is particularly relevant for
the Even–Mansour ciphers as they inherently operate in the random-permutation
model. Our final condition places adequate restrictions on oracle queries from RKD
functions to facilitate a security proof.
4.3.1.1 Output unpredictability (OUP)
Bellare and Kohno [27] observe that if an adversary is able to choose φ ∈ Φ that
has predictable outputs on a randomly chosen key then Φ-RKCCA security is not
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achievable. To see this, let φ be the constant zero (or any predictable) function. An
adversary can simply test whether it is interacting with the real or the ideal cipher
by enciphering x under the zero key and comparing it to the value it receives from its
RK-Enc oracle on (φ, x). This motivates the following definition of unpredictability,
adapted to the ideal-permutation model.
The advantage of an adversary A against the output unpredictability (OUP) of an
RKD set Φ with access to t ideal permutations is defined via
AdvoupΦ,t (A) = Pr [∃ (φpi, c) ∈ List : φpi(k) = c : List ←$ Api] .
Here List contains pairs of the form (φpi, c) for φpi ∈ Φ and c ∈ K, and pi is the oracle
containing t ideal permutations. The probability is taken over random choices of
k ←$ K, the t random permutations implicit in pi, and the coins of the adversary.
Note that via a simple guessing argument, this definition can be shown to be equiv-
alent to one where the adversary is required to output a single pair, with a loss of
1/|List| in the reduction.
4.3.1.2 Claw-freeness (CF)
Bellare and Kohno [27] also introduce claw-freeness (CF). Roughly speaking, a set
Φ has claws if there are two distinct φ1, φ2 ∈ Φ such that φ1(k) = φ2(k). Although
this condition is not in general necessary—given an arbitrary claw there may not be
an attack—the existence of claws prevents natural approaches to proofs of security.
We lift claw-freeness to the ideal-permutation model.
The advantage of an adversary A against the claw-freeness of an RKD set Φ with
access to t ideal permutations is defined via
AdvcfΦ,t(A) = Pr [∃ (φpi1 , φpi2 ) ∈ List : φpi1 (k) = φpi2 (k) ∧ φpi1 6= φpi2 : List ←$ Api] .
Here List contains pairs of RKD functions, pi is as before, and the probability space
is defined similarly to that for output unpredictability. Once again this definition is
equivalent to one where List is restricted to be of size one.
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4.3.1.3 Xor claw-freeness (XCF)
Claw-freeness is not a strong enough condition for the one-round EM construction
to be RKA secure. Recall that for xor related-key attacks this construction does not
provide RKA security due to the presence of offset-switching attacks. It is easy to
check that E((k1, k2), x) = E((k1⊕∆, k2), x⊕∆) holds with probability 1 for EM[1, 2]
but only with negligible probability for the ideal cipher. One idea to thwart the above
attack here would be to enforce key reuse in the construction. Although the above
equality no longer holds, a close variant still applies: E(k, x) = E(k⊕∆, x⊕∆)⊕∆.
This observation motivates a strengthening of the claw-freeness property requiring
that it is hard to find a pair of functions (φ1, φ2) and a value ∆ such that, over a
random choice of k, we have φ1(k)⊕ φ2(k) = ∆.
The advantage of an adversary A against the xor claw-freeness (XCF) of an RKD
set Φ with access to t ideal permutations is defined via
AdvxcfΦ,t(A) = Pr [∃ (φpi1 , φpi2 , c) ∈ List : φpi1 (k)⊕ φpi2 (k) = c ∧ φpi1 6= φpi2 : List ←$ Api] .
Here List contains tuples consisting of two RKD functions and an offset c ∈ {0, 1}n.
The probability space and pi are defined as for claw-freeness.
Xor claw-freeness implies claw-freeness as the latter is a special case with c = 0. The
fact that claw-freeness is weaker than xor claw-freeness can be seen by considering
the set Φ⊕ corresponding to xoring with constants. This set can be easily shown to
be output unpredictable and claw-free [27], but is not xor claw-free as
φ∆1(k)⊕ φ∆2(k) = ∆1 ⊕∆2 where φ∆(k) = k ⊕∆ .
We remark that the xor claw-freeness of Φ implies at most one φ ∈ Φ is predictable:
any two predictable RKD functions can be used to break xor claw-freeness.
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4.3.1.4 Xor query independence (XQI)
Let us now examine oracle access by the RKD functions. Following the attacks
identified in [5, 15], we take the oracle-dependent RKD set
Φ =
{
id : k 7→ k, φP : k 7→ P(k)
}
,
and consider the following Φ-RKCPA adversary against EMpi[1, 1]: query (id, 0) and
get y = P(k) ⊕ k; query (φP, y) and get z; return (z = 0). When interacting with
EMpi[1, 1] we have that
z = EP(P(k),P(k)⊕ k) = P(P(k)⊕ k ⊕ P(k))⊕ P(k) = P(k)⊕ P(k) = 0 .
On the other hand, this identity is true with probability at most 1/(2n − 1) with
respect to the ideal cipher. This attack stems from the fact that when answering
an RK-Enc query, pi is evaluated at a point already queried by an RKD function;
this motivates our final restriction. Informally, this condition requires that the set
of values queried by RKD functions has empty intersection with the set of outputs
from the RKD functions, even with offsets specified by the adversary.
The advantage of an adversary A against the xor query independence (XQI) of an
RKD set Φ with access to t ideal permutations is defined via
AdvxqiΦ,t(A) = Pr[∃ (i, σ, φpi1 , φpi2 , c) ∈ List :
(i, φpi1 (k)⊕ c, σ) ∈ Qry[φpi2 (k)] : List ←$ Api] ,
where
Qry[φpi(k)] = {(i, x, σ) : (i, x, σ) queried to pi by φpi(k)} ,
Qry[φpi(k)] = Qry[φpi(k)] ∪ {(i, pi(i, x, σ),−σ) : (i, x, σ) ∈ Qry[φpi(k)]} .
Note that for the EM[1, 1], restricting the above definition to i = 1 suffices. We also
define query independence (QI) [5] as above but demand that c = 0n.
4.3.1.5 Examples
The OUP, XCF, and XQI conditions introduced above do not lead to vacuous RKD
sets. As an example of an RKD set which is independent of the permutations
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consider
Φxu = {k 7→ H(k, x) : x ∈ K′} ,
where H is an xor universal hash function from K to K with key space K′. As a
simple instantiation, let K′ = {0, 1}k \0k and for k ∈ K′ define H(k, x) = k ·x, where
{0, 1}k is interpreted as GF(2k) with respect to a fixed irreducible polynomial and
multiplication is defined over GF(2k).
As an example of an oracle-dependent RKD set, one can take
Φ = {k 7→ P(k ⊕∆) : ∆ ∈ K} .
4.3.2 Sufficiency of the conditions
We now show that if an RKD set Φ meets the output unpredictability, xor claw-
freeness and xor query independence properties defined above, then EMpi[1, 1] pro-
vides Φ-RKCCA security.
Theorem 4.1 (Φ-RKCCA security of EMpi[1, 1]). Let Φ be an RKD set. Then for
any adversary A against the Φ-RKCCA security of EMpi[1, 1] with parameters as
defined above, there are adversaries B1, B2, B3 and B4 such that
AdvrkccaEMpi [1,1],Φ,1(A) ≤AdvoupΦ,1 (B1) + AdvxqiΦ,1(B2)
+ AdvxcfΦ,1(B3) + AdvcfΦ,1(B4)
+
qem(q1 +
∑
φ q
φ
1 )
2n − (q1 +
∑
φ q
φ
1 )
+
2q2em
2n
,
where B1, B2, B3 and B4 output lists of sizes 2q1qem, 2q2em, q2em, and q2em respectively
and all make q1 queries to pi.
4.3.2.1 Sketch proof for Theorem 4.1
We give the intuition behind the proof here, deferring the full details to the following
section. The adversary A in the Φ-RKCCA game is run with respect to the oracles
P(x), P−1(x), P(x⊕ φpi(k))⊕ φpi(k), P−1(x⊕ φpi(k))⊕ φpi(k) .
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Our goal is to make a transition to an environment with the oracles
P(x), P−1(x), iE(φpi(k), x), iD(φpi(k), x) ,
where (iE, iD) denotes the ideal cipher. To this end, we consider two intermediate
environments where the last two oracles (corresponding to RK-Enc and RK-Dec)
are handled via a forgetful oracle $ that returns uniform strings on each invocation,
irrespectively of its inputs. Making this change to the first environment above gives
P(x), P−1(x), $(x⊕ φpi(k))⊕ φpi(k), $(x⊕ φpi(k))⊕ φpi(k) ,
while the second gives
P(x), P−1(x), $(φpi(k), x), $(φpi(k), x) ,
both of which are identical to the environment (P(x),P−1(x), $(), $()). We will now
argue that the above changes alter A’s winning probabilities negligibly, down to the
conditions on Φ that we introduced in the previous section.
Let us first look at the change where we replace iE(φpi(k), x) and iD(φpi(k), x) with
$(φpi(k), x). We introduce another game and replace the random keyed permutations
iE and iD by random keyed functions iF and iC:
P(x), P−1(x), iF(φpi(k), x), iC(φpi(k), x) .
Via (a keyed extension of) the random function/random permutation (RF/RP)
switching lemma [32], the environments containing (iF, iC) and (iE, iD) can be shown
to be indistinguishable up to the birthday bound q2em/2
n. The environments con-
taining iF(φpi(k), x) and iC(φpi(k), x) and two copies of $(φpi(k), x) and can be shown
to be identical down to the CF property. Indeed, an inconsistency could arise when-
ever (φpi1 , x1) 6= (φpi2 , x2) but (φpi1 (k), x1) = (φpi2 (k), x2). This means x1 = x2 and
hence we must have that φpi1 6= φpi2 . But φpi1 (k) = φpi2 (k) and this leads to a break of
the claw-freeness of Φ.
Let us now look at the changes made when we replace P±(x⊕ φpi(k))⊕ φpi(k) with
$(x ⊕ φpi(k)) ⊕ φpi(k). We need to consider the points where a forgetful simulation
of P or P−1 via $ in the last two oracles leads to inconsistencies. Let us define the
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following six lists:
List+P = [(a,P(a)) : A queries a to P],
List−P = [(P
−1(b), b) : A queries b to P−1] ,
List+φ = [(a,P(a)) : φ
pi(k) queries a to P],
List−φ = [(P
−1(b), b) : φpi(k) queries b to P−1] ,
List+$ = [(x⊕ φpi(k), $(x⊕ φpi(k))) : A queries (φpi, x) to RK-Enc] ,
List−$ = [($(φ
pi(k)⊕ y), φpi(k)⊕ y) : A queries (φpi, y) to RK-Dec] .
Let List? be the union of the above lists over all φ queried to RK-Enc or RK-Dec.
This list encodes the trace of the attack, as in the forgetful environment no queries
to P or P−1 are made while handling RK-Enc and RK-Dec queries.
This trace is consistent with one coming from a permutation unless List? does not
respect the permutivity properties, i.e., there are two entries (a, b), (a′, b′) ∈ List?
such that it is not the case that (a = a′ ⇐⇒ b = b′). Note that one of these pairs
must be in List$ = List
+
$ ∪ List−$ as the other oracles are faithfully implemented.
There is an inconsistency on List? if and only if there is an inconsistency among two
lists (one of which is either List+$ or List
−
$ ). There are 20 possibilities to consider,
including the order that queries are made. We consider first query of a pair being
on List+$ ; the other cases are dealt with symmetrically. In each case, inconsistencies
can arise in two ways.
List+$ and List
+
P : (1) The first component of a pair on List
+
$ —we call this a first
entry on List+$ —matches a first entry a on List
+
P . This means that for some
query (φpi, x) to RK-Enc we have that a = φpi(k) ⊕ x. This leads to a break
of output unpredictability. (2) The second entry on these lists match. More
explicitly, we are looking at the probability that P(a) = R, for R the output of
$ on a forward query. Here we can assume that R is known and this addresses
the adaptivity of the choice of a. But even in this case the probability of this
event is small as P is a random permutation.
List+$ and List
−
P : (1) A second entry on List
+
$ matches a second entry b
′ on List−P .
This means that for some query (φpi, x) to RK-Enc with output y we have
that b′ = φpi(k)⊕ y. This leads to a break of output unpredictability. (2) The
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first entries match on these lists. The argument is similar to case (2) above,
but now for P−1.
List+$ and List
+
φ : (1) A first entry on List
+
$ matches a first entry on List
+
φ . This
means that for some query (φpi1 , x) to RK-Enc we have that a = φ
pi
1 (k)⊕x for
a query a of some other φpi2 . This leads to a break of xor query independence.
(2) The second entries match on these lists. The argument is as in case (2) of
the first pair of lists.
List+$ and List
−
φ : (1) A second entry on List
+
$ matches a second entry b
′ on List−φ .
This means that for some query (φpi1 , x) to RK-Enc with output y we have
that b′ = φpi1 (k)⊕y for a query b′ of some other φpi2 . This leads to a break of xor
query independence. (2) The first entries match on these lists. The argument
is as in case (2) of the second pair of lists.
List+$ and List
+
$ : Two first entries on List
+
$ match. This means that for two queries
(φpi1 , x1) and (φ
pi
2 , x2) to RK-Enc we have that φ
pi
1 (k) ⊕ x1 = φpi2 (k) ⊕ x2.
Repeat-freeness ensures that φ1 6= φ2 as otherwise x1 = x2 as well. This leads
to a break of xor claw-freeness. (2) The second entries match on these lists.
Since the oracle returns independent random values, this probability can be
bounded by the birthday bound.
List+$ and List
−
$ : A second entry on List
+
$ matches a second entry on List
−
$ . This
means that for a queries (φpi1 , x1) to RK-Enc with outputs y1 and (φ
pi
2 , x2) to
RK-Dec, we have that φpi1 (k)⊕y1 = φpi2 (k)⊕x2. Redundancy-freeness ensures
that φ1 6= φ2 as otherwise x2 would be an encryption of x1. This leads to
a break of xor claw-freeness. (2) The first entries match on these lists. The
probability of this event can be also bounded by the birthday bound.
Hence inconsistencies among any two pairs of lists happen with small probability,
and this shows that List? is also inconsistent with small probability.
4.3.2.2 Full details for the proof of Theorem 4.1
In this section, we give the details omitted in the proof overview of the previous
section. The proof proceeds through four stages. In the first, A interacts with a
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public permutation and its inverse, plus the forward and backward directions of the
Even–Mansour scheme instantiated with the same permutation:
P(x), P−1(x), P(φpi(k)⊕ x)⊕ φpi(k), P−1(φpi(k)⊕ x)⊕ φpi(k) .
We then consider two environments in which P is replaced by $, a forgetful random
oracle, for queries made to the Even–Mansour scheme:
P(x), P−1(x), $(φpi(k)⊕ x)⊕ φpi(k), $(φpi(k)⊕ x)⊕ φpi(k)
and from here we consider a keyed random function:
P(x), P−1(x), iF(φpi(k), x), iC(φpi(k), x) .
Finally, we transition to a game in which $ is replaced by an ideal cipher (iE, iD):
P(x), P−1(x), iE(φpi(k), x), iD(φpi(k), x) .
We will now argue that the above changes alter A’s winning probabilities negligibly
and bound A’s winning probability in terms of the conditions on Φ introduced in
Section 4.3.
The first transition is analysed via a series of games which are given in Figures 4.2,
4.3, and 4.4 and described below.
These games include two intermediate transitions: in the first, P is replaced with
Q (a random permutation, chosen independently of P) for queries arising through
Game i:
k ←$ K
b′ ←$ ARK-Enc,RK-Dec,pi
Return b′
pi(1, a,+):
Return DS1(a)
RK-Enc(φpi, x):
k′ ← φpi(k)
Return k′ ⊕ IS1(k′ ⊕ x)
RK-Dec(φpi, y):
k′ ← φpi(k)
Return k′ ⊕ IS1−1(k′ ⊕ y)
Figure 4.2: Procedures common to all games in the proof of Theorem 4.1. Ora-
cles pi(1, ·,−), DS1−1, and IS1−1 are defined in a similar way to their
corresponding forward oracles.
92
4.3 The RKA security of EMpi[1, 1]
Game 1:
DS1(a)
If D1[a] 6=⊥
Return D1[a]
If I1[a] 6=⊥
Return I1[a]
b ←$ {0, 1}n \ Rng(DS1, IS1)
D1[a]← b; D1−1[b]← a
Rng(DS1)← Rng(DS1) ∪ {b}
Dom(DS1)← Dom(DS1) ∪ {a}
Return D1[a]
IS1(a):
If I1[a] 6=⊥
Return I1[a]
If D1[a] 6=⊥
Return D1[a]
b ←$ {0, 1}n \ Rng(DS1, IS1)
I1[a]← b; I1−1[b]← a
Rng(IS1)← Rng(IS1) ∪ {b}
Dom(IS1)← Dom(IS1) ∪ {a}
Return I1[a]
Game 1a:
DS1(a):
If D1[a] 6=⊥
Return D1[a]
If I1[a] 6=⊥
Return I1[a]
b ←$ {0, 1}n \ Rng(DS1)
If b ∈ Rng(IS1)
b ←$ {0, 1}n \ Rng(DS1, IS1)
D1[a]← b; D1−1[b]← a
Rng(DS1)← Rng(DS1) ∪ {b}
Dom(DS1)← Dom(DS1) ∪ {a}
Return D1[a]
IS1(a):
If I1[a] 6=⊥
Return I1[a]
If D1[a] 6=⊥
Return D1[a]
b ←$ {0, 1}n
If b ∈ Rng(IS1)
b ←$ {0, 1}n \ Rng(IS1)
If b ∈ Rng(DS1)
b ←$ {0, 1}n \ Rng(DS1, IS1)
I1[a]← b; I1−1[b]← a
Rng(IS1)← Rng(IS1) ∪ {b}
Dom(IS1)← Dom(IS1) ∪ {a}
Return I1[a]
Figure 4.3: Games 1 and 1a in the proof of Theorem 4.1. Oracles pi(1, ·,−), DS1−1,
and IS1
−1 are defined in a similar way to their corresponding forward
oracles.
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Game 2 Game 3:
DS1(a):
If D1[a] 6=⊥
Return D1[a]
If I1[a] 6=⊥
bad1 ← true
Return I1[a]
b ←$ {0, 1}n \ Rng(DS1)
If b ∈ Rng(IS1)
bad2 ← true
b ←$ {0, 1}n \ Rng(DS1, IS1)
D1[a]← b; D1−1[b]← a
Rng(DS1)← Rng(DS1) ∪ {b}
Dom(DS1)← Dom(DS1) ∪ {a}
Return D1[a]
IS1(a):
If I1[a] 6=⊥
Return I1[a]
If D1[a] 6=⊥
bad1 ← true
Return D1[a]
b ←$ {0, 1}n
If b ∈ Rng(IS1)
b ←$ {0, 1}n \ Rng(IS1)
If b ∈ Rng(DS1)
bad2 ← true
b ←$ {0, 1}n \ Rng(DS1, IS1)
I1[a]← b; I1−1[b]← a
Rng(IS1)← Rng(IS1) ∪ {b}
Dom(IS1)← Dom(IS1) ∪ {a}
Return I1[a]
Game 4 Game 5:
DS1(a):
If D1[a] 6=⊥
Return D1[a]
If I1[a] 6=⊥
bad1 ← true
b ←$ {0, 1}n \ Rng(DS1)
If b ∈ Rng(IS1)
bad2 ← true
D1[a]← b; D1−1[b]← a
Rng(DS1)← Rng(DS1) ∪ {b}
Dom(DS1)← Dom(DS1) ∪ {a}
Return D1[a]
IS1(a):
If I1[a] 6=⊥
bad3 ← true
Return I1[a]
If D1[a] 6=⊥
bad1 ← true
b ←$ {0, 1}n
If b ∈ Rng(IS1)
bad4 ← true
b ←$ {0, 1}n \ Rng(IS1)
If b ∈ Rng(DS1)
bad2 ← true
I1[a]← b; I1−1[b]← a
Rng(IS1)← Rng(IS1) ∪ {b}
Dom(IS1)← Dom(IS1) ∪ {a}
Return I1[a]
Figure 4.4: Games 2 to 5 in the proof of Theorem 4.1. Oracles pi(1, ·,−), DS1−1, and
IS1
−1 are defined in a similar way to their corresponding forward oracles.
Boxed statements are included in Games 2 and 4, and are omitted from
Games 3 and 5.
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RK-Enc or RK-Dec; in the second, Q is replaced with $ (a forgetful random
oracle). We identify the points at which these two intermediate transitions lead to
inconsistencies, by setting bad flags. In contrast to how the intuition behind this
proof is described in Section 4.3, we push forward the bounding of the probability
bad events occurring during the first intermediate transition until after the second
intermediate transition.
The specifications of DS1
−1, IS1−1, and pi(·, ·,−) are omitted for conciseness; they
are defined analogously to their respective forward oracles. Let Si denote the event
where the adversary outputs 1 in game i.
Game 0 is the RKA game augmented with a public permutation oracle (as described
in Section 2.3.2), conditioned on b = 1. In this game, the adversary interacts
with an oracle realising the public permutation P and the Even–Mansour con-
struction instantiated with P.
Game 1 is only syntactically different from Game 0. The queries to pi are split into
two groups: those made directly to pi, either by the adversary or by an RKD
function, which are answered by the sampling algorithm DS1; and those made
indirectly, through queries made to RK-Enc, which are answered by IS1. The
oracles DS1 and IS1 maintain consistent lists D1 and I1. The lists used by
inverse oracles are identical to the lists used by the corresponding forward
oracles. As this is a purely syntactic change, Pr[S0] = Pr[S1].
Game 1a introduces syntactic changes to DS1 and IS1 in order for the code in the
games that follow to be identical until specified bad events occur. Introducing
this step allows us to remove the statement b ←$ {0, 1}n \ Rng(DS1, IS1); this
is necessary as we wish to completely decouple responses from DS1 and IS1.
Game 2 sets bad1 either if DS1 is queried on a point already defined in I1 or if IS1 is
queried on a point already defined in D1 (and similarly for the inverse oracles).
This occurs either because A queries pi directly at a point that is also queried
to pi through an indirect RK-Enc query, or because an RKD function queries
pi at a point that is also queried to pi through an RK-Enc query. We will later
bound the probability of this event in terms of the output unpredictability and
xor query independence of Φ. Game 2 sets bad2 if the value chosen at random
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for DS1(a) is already defined in range of IS1, or vice versa (and similarly for
the inverse queries and the domain of IS1 or DS1). This is necessary because
in Game 1, for both DS1 and IS1, b is sampled from {0, 1}n \ Rng(DS1, IS1)
whereas our objective in Game 3 is to ensure that DS1 is independent of IS1.
The outputs of DS1 and IS1 remain consistent and Pr[S1] = Pr[S2].
Game 3 omits the boxed statements in Game 2 and so is identical to Game 2 unless
one of bad1 or bad2 is set. In this game, the oracles DS1 and IS1 check consis-
tency with their own lists, but may become inconsistent with each other. It
is possible for bad1 to be set in two different ways: event E1 is the event an
adversary directly queries DS1 at a point coinciding with a point queried to
IS1 from a query to RK-Enc (or comparable conditions resulting from queries
to DS1
−1 or RK-Dec); event E2 is the event an RKD function queries DS1
at a point coinciding with a point queried to IS1 from a query to RK-Enc (or
comparable conditions resulting from queries to DS1
−1 or RK-Dec). We will
analyse each of the ways that bad1 can be set below. Similarly, bad2 can be
set either because of a query to DS1 from A, a query to DS1 from φpi, or from
a query to IS1 due to a query to RK-Enc (or similarly for the corresponding
inverse oracles); we consider all cases simultaneously below. In Game 3, the
responses to RK-Enc queries are completely decoupled from the responses to
pi queries, so we can consider that RK-Enc uses Q to respond to queries and
pi uses P. We have that Pr[S2] ≤ Pr[S3] + Pr[E1 ∨ E2 ∨ bad2].
Game 4 sets bad3 if A queries IS1 or its inverse twice on the same point. Game 4
chooses the response to IS1 uniformly from {0, 1}n and sets bad4 if this value
is already in Rng(IS1). The flag bad4 can be set in four ways (as a result of
two queries to either of IS1 and IS1
−1, plus two ‘mixed cases’ with one query
to each of IS1 and IS1
−1); we consider each of these cases when we analyse the
probability of setting bad events below. Game 4 is equivalent to Game 3 and,
in particular, Pr[S3] = Pr[S4].
Game 5 omits the boxed statements from Game 4 and so is identical to Game 4 unless
bad3 or bad4 is set. Let E
′
1, E
′
2, bad
′
2 represent events in Game 5 corresponding
to events E1, E2, bad2 in Game 4, then Pr[E1 ∨ E2 ∨ bad2] ≤ Pr[E′1 ∨ E′2 ∨
bad′2] + 2 Pr[bad3 ∨ bad4]. In this game, calls to pi(1, ·,+) through RK-Enc
(which are answered by IS1) are answered by a forgetful random oracle and so
the ciphertexts are uniform and independent of the key and the plaintext; the
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same is true for calls to inverse oracles. Redundancy freeness guarantees that
no inconsistencies arise from decrypting the result of an encryption query, or
vice versa.
In Game 5, the adversary interacts with
P(x), P−1(x), $(φpi(k)⊕ x)⊕ φpi(k), $(φpi(k)⊕ x)⊕ φpi(k) .
During the next transition to
P(x), P−1(x), iF(φpi(k), x), iC(φpi(k), x) ,
inconsistencies only arise if the adversary makes queries (φpi1 , x1) 6= (φpi2 , x2), but
where (φpi1 (k), x1) = (φ
pi
2 (k), x2). If an adversary A makes such a query, we can
construct an adversary B4 which wins the CF game with a list of length at most q
2
em
2
as follows: B4 runs A and outputs List = {(φpii , φpij ) : 1 ≤ i < j ≤ qem}.
Considering the final transition, we switch from a random function to a random
permutation (for each φpi); the probability of an inconsistency arising in this step is
bounded by q
2
em
2n [32].
Therefore we have that
AdvrkccaEMpi [1,1],Φ,t(A) ≤Pr[E′1 ∨ E′2 ∨ bad′2] + 2 Pr[bad3 ∨ bad4] + AdvcfΦ,t(B4) +
q2em
2n
,
and it remains to bound the probability that bad events occur in Game 5.
Event E′1 occurs when the adversary directly queries pi at a point that is also
queried as a result of a query to RK-Enc. This situation is described in
Section 4.3 as an inconsistency between ListP and List$. We will use A to
create an adversary B1 against the OUP game with a list of length 2q1qem.
The adversary B1 runs A and then outputs List = {(φpii , xi ⊕ aj) : 1 ≤ i ≤
qem, 1 ≤ j ≤ q1} ∪ {(φpii , yi ⊕ bj) : 1 ≤ i ≤ qem, 1 ≤ j ≤ q1}, where xi is the
input to RK-Enc resulting in output yi on the i
th query (reversed for a query
to RK-Dec) and aj is the input to pi(1, ·,+) resulting in output bj on the
jth query (similarly reversed for a query to pi(1, ·,−)). If A sets bad1 with an
RK-Enc or DS1 query, then B1 wins the OUP game with a tuple of the form
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(φpii , xi ⊕ aj) and if A sets bad1 with a query to DS1−1 or IS1−1then B wins
the OUP game with a tuple of the form (φpii , yi ⊕ bj). We therefore conclude
that Pr[E′1] ≤ AdvoupΦ,t (B1), where B1 outputs a list of length 2q1qem.
Event E′2 occurs when an RKD function queries pi at a point that is also queried
as a result of a query to RK-Enc. This situation is described in Section 4.3 as
an inconsistency between Listφ and List$. We will use A to create an adversary
B2 against the XQI game with a list of length 2q2em. The adversary B2 runs
A and outputs List = {(1,+, φpii , φpij , xi) : 1 ≤ i, j ≤ qem} ∪ {(1,−, φpii , φpij , yi) :
1 ≤ i, j ≤ qem}. If A sets bad1 with a query to IS1 or an RKD function
that queries pi(1, ·,+), then B1 wins the XQI game with a tuple of the form
(1,+, φpii , φ
pi
j , xi) and if A sets bad1 with a query to IS1−1 or pi(1, ·,−) then
B wins the XQI game with a tuple of the form (1,−, φpii , φpij , yi). Therefore,
Pr[E′2] ≤ AdvxqiΦ,t(B2), where B2 outputs a list of length 2q2em.
Flag bad′2 is set with probability at most
(q1+q
φ
1 )qem
2n−(q1+
∑
φ q
φ
1 )
(when it is set via a call to
DS1 or its inverse); it can be set via a call to IS1 or its inverse with probabil-
ity
(q1+q
φ
1 )qem
2n . This situation is described in Section 4.3 as an inconsistency
between ListP and List$ or Listφ and List$. It can be set in one of 16 different
ways. Collisions between DS1 and IS1, DS1
−1 and IS1−1, DS1 and IS1−1, or
DS1
−1 and IS1 can all set bad2 and each is counted twice, depending on the
order of the queries. This gives 8 ways to set bad2, however the query to DS1
can arise through a query by A or through φpi, which gives 16 ways. In each
case, we use a birthday-bound style argument, noting that each pair (x, a)
has at most a 1
2n−(q1+
∑
φ q
φ
1 )
chance of setting bad′2; applying the union bound
and recalling that qem is the total number of queries made to RK-Enc and
RK-Dec (and thus to IS and IS1
−1) by A (and similarly for q1 and qφ1 ) gives
the claimed probability.
Flag bad3 is set if two queries to either IS1 or its inverse result in the same value
being either input to or output from IS1 or its inverse. This situation is de-
scribed in Section 4.3 as an inconsistency between List$ and List$. We will
use A that sets bad3 to create an adversary B3 against the XCF game. The
adversary B3 runs A and then outputs List = {(φpii , φpij , xi ⊕ xj) : 1 ≤ i < j ≤
qem}∪{(φpii , φpij , yi⊕yj) : 1 ≤ i < j ≤ qem}. If A sets bad3 as a result of a query
to IS1, then B3 wins the XCF game with a tuple of the form (φpii , φpij , xi ⊕ xj)
and if A sets bad3 as a result a query to IS1−1, then B3 wins the XCF game
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with a tuple of the form (φpii , φ
pi
j , yi⊕ yj). Thus Pr[bad3] ≤ AdvxcfΦ,t(B3), where
B3 outputs a list of length at most q2em.
Flag bad4 is set with probability at most
q2em
2
1
2n using similar reasoning as in the
setting of bad2. This situation is described in Section 4.3 as an inconsistency
between List$ and List$.
As we have that
AdvrkccaEMpi [1,1],Φ,t(A) ≤Pr[E′1 ∨ E′2 ∨ bad′2] + 2 Pr[bad3 ∨ bad4]
+ AdvcfΦ,t(B4) +
q2em
2n
,
we may conclude that
AdvrkccaEMpi [1,1],Φ,t(A) ≤AdvoupΦ,t (B1) + AdvxqiΦ,t(B2) +
qem(q1 +
∑
φ q
φ
1 )
2n − (q1 +
∑
φ q
φ
1 )
+ 2
(
AdvxcfΦ,t(B3) +
q2em
2n+1
)
+ AdvcfΦ,t(B4) +
q2em
2n
,
where B1 outputs a list of length 2q1qem, B2 a list of length 2q2em, B3 a list of length
q2em, and B4 a list of length at most q2em. 
4.4 The RKCPA security of EMpi[1, 1, 1]
The theorem established in the previous section does not encompass the Φ⊕ set as
this set is not xor claw-free. In this section, we investigate whether an extra round
can boost RKA security to the Φ⊕ set.
For two-round EM constructions, up to relabelling there are 5 simple key schedules:
[1, 1, 1], [1, 1, 2], [1, 2, 1], [1, 2, 2], and [1, 2, 3]. It is easy to see that offset-switching
attacks can be used to attack the Φ⊕-RKCPA security of all but the first of these.
In the following sections we study the Φ⊕-RKA security of the only remaining con-
struction, EMpi[1, 1, 1].
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4.4.1 Weakening the conditions
We start by following a similar proof strategy to that given for EMpi[1, 1] and identify
a set of restrictions which are strong enough to enable a security proof, yet weak
enough to encompass the Φ⊕ set. These conditions decouple the queries made to the
permutation oracle and allow us to simulate the P2 oracle forgetfully in a reduction.
Starting from the environment
pi(i, x, σ), P2(P1(x⊕ φpi(k))⊕ φpi(k))⊕ φpi(k) ,
we simulate the P2 oracle forgetfully and move to a setting with oracles
pi(i, x, σ), $(P1(x⊕ φpi(k))⊕ φpi(k))⊕ φpi(k) ≡ pi(i, x, σ), $() .
From here it is straightforward to reach the ideal game pi(i, x, σ), iE(φpi(k), x) via an
application of the RF/RP switching lemma [32] and the claw-freeness property as
in the analysis of EMpi[1, 1].
We now analyse the probability that the second environment simulates the first one
in an inconsistent way. We look at inconsistencies which arise due to oracles being
queried on the same inputs and derive conditions that preclude these from occurring.
4.4.1.1 First-order output unpredictability (OUP1)
The first place such an inconsistency might arise is when A makes an explicit pi
query (2, a,+) that matches a query made to $, i.e. P1(x⊕ φpi(k))⊕ φpi(k) = a for
some (φpi, x) queried to $. We now address this event, giving a slight strengthening
of the condition as we will be using it later.
Let t ≥ 1. The advantage of an adversary A against the first-order output unpre-
dictability (OUP1) of an RKD set Φ with access to t ideal permutations is defined
via
Advoup1Φ,t (A) = Pr[∃ (i, σ, φpi, x, c) ∈ List :
Pσi (φ
pi(k)⊕ x)⊕ φpi(k) = c : List ←$ Api] .
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Oracle pi, the probability space, and List are defined analogously to the previous
definitions. Note that in the RKCPA setting we do not need to consider inconsis-
tencies resulting from inputs to P−11 through RK-Enc queries, and thus only need
to consider (i, σ) = (1,+) above.
4.4.1.2 First-order claw-freeness (CF1)
Inconsistencies may also arise as a result of two RK-Enc queries. As $ is forgetful,
a consistent simulation requires that no two RK-Enc queries query $ at the same
point. This leads to the following modification of claw-freeness.
Let t ≥ 1. The advantage of an adversary A against the first-order claw-freeness
(CF1) of an RKD set Φ with access to t ideal permutations is defined via
Advcf1Φ,t(A) = Pr[∃ (i, σ, φpi1 , x1, φpi2 , x2) ∈ List :
Pσi (φ
pi
1 (k)⊕ x1)⊕ φpi1 (k) = Pσi (φpi2 (k)⊕ x2)⊕ φpi2 (k) ∧ φpi1 6= φpi2 :
List ←$ Api] .
4.4.1.3 First-order query independence (QI1)
We now look at inconsistencies in the simulation due to a mismatch in an RKD query
to pi and a query to $ made via the RK-Enc oracle. Since only the second function
is forgetfully simulated, we require independence of queries for P2 only. Once again,
in the RKCPA setting, restricting the definition to (i, σ) = (1,+) suffices.
Let t ≥ 2. The advantage of an adversary A against the first-order query inde-
pendence (QI1) of an RKD set Φ with access to t ideal permutations is defined
via
Advqi1Φ,t(A) = Pr[∃(i, σ, φpi1 , x1, φpi2 ) ∈ List :
(2,Pσi (φ
pi
1 (k)⊕ x1)⊕ φpi1 (k),±) ∈ Qry[φpi2 (k)] : List ←$ Api] ,
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where, as before,
Qry[φpi(k)] = {(i, x, σ) : (i, x, σ) queried to pi by φpi(k)} ,
Qry[φpi(k)] = Qry[φpi(k)] ∪ {(i, pi(i, x, σ),−σ) : (i, x, σ) ∈ Qry[φpi(k)]} .
4.4.2 Sufficiency of the conditions
The new set of conditions identified above allow us to use a similar proof strategy
to that of Theorem 4.1 and establish the following result.
Theorem 4.2 (Φ-RKCPA security of EMpi[1, 1, 1]). Let Φ be an RKD set. Then for
any adversary A against the Φ-RKCPA security of EMpi[1, 1, 1] with parameters as
defined before there are B1a, B1b, B2a, B2b, B3, and B4 such that
AdvrkcpaEMpi [1,1,1],Φ,2(A) ≤Advoup1Φ,2 (B1a) + AdvoupΦ,2 (B1b)
+ Advqi1Φ,2(B2a) + AdvxqiΦ,2(B2b)
+ 2Advcf1Φ,2(B3) + AdvcfΦ,2(B4)
+
qem(q2 +
∑
φ q
φ
2 )
2n − (q2 +
∑
φ q
φ
2 )
+
2q2em
2n
,
where B1a and B1b output lists of length q2qem, B2a and B2b lists of length q2em, B3 a
list of length q2em, and B4 a list of length at most q2em.
The proof follows a similar pattern to the proof of Theorem 4.1 and again pro-
ceeds through four stages. In the first, A interacts with the public permutations
and their inverses, plus the forward direction of the 2-round Even–Mansour scheme
instantiated with the same permutations:
pi(i, x, σ), P2(P1(φ
pi(k)⊕ x)⊕ φpi(k))⊕ φpi(k) .
We then consider an environment in which P2 is replaced by $, a forgetful random
oracle, for queries made to the Even–Mansour scheme:
pi(i, x, σ), $(P1(φ
pi(k)⊕ x)⊕ φpi(k))⊕ φpi(k),
and from here we consider a keyed random function:
pi(i, x, σ), iF(φpi(k), x) .
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Finally, we transition to a game in which iF is replaced by an ideal cipher iE:
pi(i, x, σ), iE(φpi(k), x) .
We will now argue that the above changes alter A’s winning probabilities negligibly
and bound A’s winning probability in terms of the conditions on Φ described in
Sections 4.3.1 and 4.4.1.
The first transition is analysed via a series of games, given in Figures 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7.
These games include two intermediate transitions: in the first, P2 is replaced with
Q (a random permutation, chosen independently of pi) for queries arising through
RK-Enc or RK-Dec; in the second, Q is replaced with $ (a forgetful random
oracle). We identify the points at which these two intermediate transitions lead to
inconsistencies, by setting bad flags. As before, let Si denote the event where the
adversary outputs 1 in game i.
Game i:
k ←$ K
b′ ←$ ARK-Enc,pi
Return b′
RK-Enc(φpi, x):
k′ ← φpi(k)
z1 ← S1(k′ ⊕ x)
Return k′ ⊕ IS2(k′ ⊕ z1)
pi(2, a,+):
Return DS2(a)
pi(1, a,+):
Return S1(a)
S1(a):
If S1[a] 6=⊥
Return S1[a]
b ←$ {0, 1}n \ Rng(S1)
S1[a]← b; S−11 [b]← a
Rng(S1)← Rng(S1) ∪ {b}
Dom(S1)← Dom(S1) ∪ {a}
Return S1[a]
Figure 4.5: Procedures common to all games in the proof of Theorem 4.2. Oracles
pi(i, ·,−), Si−1, and DS2−1 are defined in a similar way to their corre-
sponding forward oracles.
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Game 1:
DS2(a):
If D2[a] 6=⊥ Return D2[a]
If I2[a] 6=⊥
Return I2[a]
b ←$ {0, 1}n \ Rng(DS2)
If b ∈ Rng(IS2)
b ←$ {0, 1}n \ Rng(DS2, IS2)
D2[a]← b; D−12 [b]← a
Rng(DS2)← Rng(DS2) ∪ {b}
Dom(DS2)← Dom(DS2) ∪ {a}
Return D2[a]
IS2(a):
If I2[a] 6=⊥
Return I2[a]
If D2[a] 6=⊥
Return D2[a]
b ←$ {0, 1}n
If b ∈ Rng(IS2)
b ←$ {0, 1}n \ Rng(IS2)
If b ∈ Rng(DS2)
b ←$ {0, 1}n \ Rng(DS2, IS2)
I2[a]← b; I2−1[b]← a
Rng(IS2)← Rng(IS2) ∪ {b}
Dom(IS2)← Dom(IS2) ∪ {a}
Return I2[a]
Game 2 Game 3:
DS2(a):
If D2[a] 6=⊥ Return D2[a]
If I2[a] 6=⊥
bad1 ← true; Return I2[a]
b ←$ {0, 1}n \ Rng(DS2)
If b ∈ Rng(IS2)
bad2 ← true
b ←$ {0, 1}n \ Rng(DS2, IS2)
D2[a]← b; D−12 [b]← a
Rng(DS2)← Rng(DS2) ∪ {b}
Dom(DS2)← Dom(DS2) ∪ {a}
Return D2[a]
IS2(a):
If I2[a] 6=⊥
Return I2[a]
If D2[a] 6=⊥
bad1 ← true; Return D2[a]
b ←$ {0, 1}n
If b ∈ Rng(IS2)
b ←$ {0, 1}n \ Rng(IS2)
If b ∈ Rng(DS2)
bad2 ← true
b ←$ {0, 1}n \ Rng(DS2, IS2)
I2[a]← b; I2−1[b]← a
Rng(IS2)← Rng(IS2) ∪ {b}
Dom(IS2)← Dom(IS2) ∪ {a}
Return I2[a]
Figure 4.6: Games 1 to 3 in the proof of Theorem 4.2. Oracles pi(i, ·,−), Si−1,
and DS2
−1 are defined in a similar way to their corresponding forward
oracles. Boxed statements are included in Game 2 and are omitted from
Game 3.
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Game 4 Game 5:
DS2(a):
If D2[a] 6=⊥ Return D2[a]
If I2[a] 6=⊥
bad1 ← true
b ←$ {0, 1}n \ Rng(DS2)
If b ∈ Rng(IS2)
bad2 ← true
D2[a]← b; D−12 [b]← a
Rng(DS2)← Rng(DS2) ∪ {b}
Dom(DS2)← Dom(DS2) ∪ {a}
Return D2[a]
IS2(a):
If I2[a] 6=⊥
bad3 ← true; Return I2[a]
If D2[a] 6=⊥
bad1 ← true
b ←$ {0, 1}n
If b ∈ Rng(IS2)
bad4 ← true
b ←$ {0, 1}n \ Rng(IS2)
If b ∈ Rng(DS2)
bad2 ← true
I2[a]← b; I2−1[b]← a
Rng(IS2)← Rng(IS2) ∪ {b}
Dom(IS2)← Dom(IS2) ∪ {a}
Return I2[a]
Figure 4.7: Games 4 and 5 in the proof of Theorem 4.2. Oracles pi(i, ·,−), Si−1,
and DS2
−1 are defined in a similar way to their corresponding forward
oracles. Boxed statements are included in Game 4 and are omitted from
Game 5.
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Game 0 is the RKA game augmented with a public permutation oracle (as described
in Section 2.3.2), conditioned on b = 1. In this game, the adversary interacts
with an oracle realising the public permutations pi and the forward direction
of the Even–Mansour construction instantiated with pi.
Game 1 is only syntactically different from Game 0. The queries to pi are split
into three groups. The first group is those made to pi(1, ·, ·), either by the
adversary, by an RKD function, or as the result of an RK-Enc query; these
are answered by the sampling algorithms S1 and S1
−1. The second group of
queries consists of those made directly to pi(2, ·, ·), either by the adversary
or by an RKD function, which are answered by the sampling algorithms DS2
and DS2
−1. The third group of queries are those queries to pi(2, ·,+) which
are made indirectly, through queries made to RK-Enc; these queries are are
answered by IS2. The oracles DS2 and IS2 maintain consistent lists D2 and I2.
As this is a purely syntactic change, Pr[S0] = Pr[S1].
Game 2 sets bad1 either if DS2 is queried on a point already defined in I2 or if IS2
is queried on a point already defined in D2 (and similarly for DS2
−1). This
occurs either because A queries pi(2, ·, ·) directly at a point that is also queried
to pi(2, ·, ·) through an indirect RK-Enc query, or because an RKD function
queries pi(2, ·, ·) at a point that is also queried to pi(2, ·, ·) through an RK-Enc
query (and similarly for DS2
−1). We will later bound the probability of this
event in terms of the output unpredictability, first-order output unpredictabil-
ity, xor query independence and first-order query independence of Φ. Game 2
sets bad2 if the value chosen at random for DS2(a) is already defined in range
of IS2, or vice versa (and similarly for the inverse queries and the domain of
IS1). This is necessary because in Game 1, for both DS2 and IS2, b may be
sampled from {0, 1}n \ Rng(DS2, IS2) whereas our objective in Game 3 is to
ensure that responses from DS2 are independent of responses from IS2. The
code of S1 and is unchanged and will remain so throughout this proof. The
outputs of DS2 and IS2 remain consistent and Pr[S1] = Pr[S2].
Game 3 omits the boxed statements in Game 2 and so is identical to Game 2 unless
one of bad1 or bad2 is set. In this game, the oracles DS2 and IS2 check consis-
tency with their own lists, but may become inconsistent with each other. It
is possible for bad1 to be set in two possible ways: event E1 is the event an
adversary directly queries DS2 (or DS2
−1) at a point coinciding with a point
106
4.4 The RKCPA security of EMpi[1, 1, 1]
queried to (or output from) IS2 via a query to RK-Enc; event E2 is the event
an RKD function queries DS2 (or DS2
−1) at a point coinciding with a point
queried to (or output from) IS2 from a query to RK-Enc. We will analyse
each of the ways that bad1 can be set below. Similarly, bad2 can be set either
because of a query to DS2 from A, a query to DS2 from φpi, or from a query
to IS2 due to a query to RK-Enc (or similarly for the corresponding inverse
oracles); we consider all cases simultaneously below. In Game 3, the responses
to RK-Enc queries are completely decoupled from the responses to pi queries,
so we can consider that RK-Enc uses Q to respond to queries and pi uses P.
We have that Pr[S2] ≤ Pr[S3] + Pr[E1 ∨ E2 ∨ bad2].
Game 4 sets bad3 if two distinct queries to RK-Enc result in the same value being
queried to IS2. As A makes no queries to RK-Dec, we only need to consider
the possibility that bad3 is set as a result of a query to RK-Enc. Game 4
chooses the response to IS2 uniformly from {0, 1}n and sets bad4 if this value
is already in Rng(IS2). Game 4 is equivalent to Game 3 and, in particular,
Pr[S3] = Pr[S4].
Game 5 omits the boxed statements from Game 4 and so is identical to Game 4 unless
bad3 or bad4 is set. Let E
′
1, E
′
2, bad
′
2 represent events in Game 5 corresponding
to events E1, E2, bad2 in Game 4, then Pr[E1 ∨ E2 ∨ bad2] ≤ Pr[E′1 ∨ E′2 ∨
bad′2] + 2 Pr[bad3 ∨ bad4] In this game, calls to pi(2, ·,+) through RK-Enc
(which are answered by IS1) are answered by a forgetful random oracle and so
the ciphertexts are uniform and independent of the key and the plaintexts.
In Game 5, the adversary interacts with
pi(i, x, σ), $(P1(φ
pi(k)⊕ x)⊕ φpi(k))⊕ φpi(k) .
During the next transition to
pi(i, x, σ), iF(φP,P
−1
(k), x) ,
inconsistencies only arise if the adversary makes queries (φpi1 , x1) 6= (φpi2 , x2), but
where (φpi1 (k), x1) = (φ
pi
2 (k), x2). If an adversary A makes such a query, we can
construct an adversary B4 which wins the CF game with a list of length at most q
2
em
2
as follows: B4 runs A and outputs List = {(φpii , φpij ) : 1 ≤ i < j ≤ qem}.
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Considering the final transition, we switch from a random function to a random
permutation (for each φpi); the probability of an inconsistency arising in this step is
bounded by q
2
em
2n [32].
Therefore we have that
AdvrkcpaEMpi [1,1,1],Φ,t(A) ≤Pr[E′1 ∨ E′2 ∨ bad′2] + 2 Pr[bad3 ∨ bad4]
+ AdvcfΦ,t(B4) +
q2em
2n
.
It remains to bound the probability that bad events occur in Game 5.
Event E′1 occurs when the adversary directly queries pi(2, ·, ·) at a point that is
also queried as a result of a query to RK-Enc. Although A makes no IS2−1
queries, it is possible to trigger E′1 with a query to DS2
−1. We will use A to
create adversaries B1a and B1b against the OUP1 and OUP games respectively,
both with lists of length q2qem. The adversary B1a runs A and then outputs
List = {(1,+, φpii , xi, aj) : 1 ≤ i ≤ qem, 1 ≤ j ≤ q2}. The adversary B1b runs A
and then outputs List = {(φpii , yi ⊕ bj) : 1 ≤ i ≤ qem, 1 ≤ j ≤ q2}. If A can set
bad by querying the permutation at a point that is also queried as a result of a
query to RK-Enc, then either B1a wins the OUP1 game or B1b wins the OUP
game. We therefore conclude that Pr[E′1] ≤ Advoup1Φ,t (B1a) + AdvoupΦ,t (B1b),
where B1a and B1b both output a list of length q2qem.
Event E′2 occurs when an RKD function queries the P2 at a point that is also
queried as a result of a query to RK-Enc. We will use A to create ad-
versaries B2a and B2b against the QI1 and XQI games respectively, both
with lists of length q2em. The adversary B2a runs A and outputs List =
{(1,+, φpii , xi, φpij ) : 1 ≤ i, j ≤ qem}; the adversary B2b runs A and outputs
List = {(2,−, φpii , φpij , yi) : 1 ≤ i, j ≤ qem}. If A can set bad by causing an RKD
function to query the permutation at a point that is also queried as a result of
a query to RK-Enc, then either B2a wins the QI1 game or B2b wins the XQI
game. Although A makes no IS2−1 queries, it is possible to trigger E′2 with
a query to DS2
−1 and so we must include tuples of the form (2,−, φpii , φpij , yi).
Therefore we can conclude that Pr[E′2] ≤ Advqi1Φ,t(B2a) + AdvxqiΦ,t(B2b), where
B2a and B2bboth output lists of length q2em.
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Flag bad′2 is set with probability at most
qem(q2+
∑
φ q
φ
2 )
2n−(q2+
∑
φ q
φ
2 )
. It can be set in one of 8
different ways (this differs from the proof of Theorem 4.1, as this theorem only
considers CPA adversaries, so A cannot use RK-Dec to set bad′2). Collisions
between DS2 and IS2 or DS1
−1 and IS2 can set bad2; both of these cases are
counted four times, depending on the order of the queries and whether the DS2
query was triggered by A or by φpi. In each case, we use a birthday-bound
style argument, noting that a pair (x, a) has at most a 1
2n−(q1+
∑
φ q
φ
1 )
chance
of setting bad′2. Applying the union bound and recalling that q2 is the total
number of queries made to pi(2, ·, ·) by A gives the claimed probability.
Flag bad3 is set when two queries to RK-Enc result in the P2 being queried at the
same point. We will use A to create an adversary B3 against the CF1 property
of Φ. The adversary B3 runs A and then outputs List = {(1,+, φpii , xi, φpij , xj) :
1 ≤ i < j ≤ qem}. Note that, as A makes no RK-Dec queries, they are unable
to set bad3 with an RK-Dec query. If this were not the case, we would require
that Φ is XCF (the XCF adversary would use tuples of the form (φpi, y ⊕ b)).
Thus Pr[bad3] ≤ Advcf1Φ,t(B3), where B3 outputs a list of length qem(qem−1)2 .
Flag bad4 is set with probability at most
q2em
2
1
2n using similar reasoning as in the
setting of bad2.
As we have that
AdvrkcpaEMpi [1,1,1],Φ,t(A) ≤Pr[E′1 ∨ E′2 ∨ bad′2] + 2 Pr[bad3 ∨ bad4]
+ AdvcfΦ,t(B4) +
q2em
2n
,+
q2em
2n
,
we may conclude that
AdvrkcpaEMpi [1,1,1],Φ,t ≤Advoup1Φ,t (B1a) + AdvoupΦ,t (B1b)
+ Advqi1Φ,t(B2a) + AdvxqiΦ,t(B2b)
+
qem(q2 +
∑
φ q
φ
2 )
2n − (q2 +
∑
φ q
φ
2 )
+ 2
(
Advcf1Φ,t(B3) +
q2em
2n+1
)
+ AdvcfΦ,t(B4) +
q2em
2n
,
where B1a and B1b output lists of length q2qem, B2a and B2b lists of length q2em, B3
a list of length q2em, and B4 a list of length at most q2em. 
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4.4.3 Φ⊕-RKA Security
We now show that the restrictions identified above are weak enough so that the
offset RKD set Φ⊕ can be shown to satisfy them. We start by showing that for
oracle-independent sets, Φ is output unpredictable and claw-free if and only if it is
first-order output unpredictable and first-order claw-free.
Proposition 4.3 (OUP ∧CF ⇐⇒ OUP1 ∧CF1). Let Φ be an oracle-independent
RKD set and let t ≥ 1. Then for any adversary A against the OUP game outputting
a list of size ` and placing qi permutation queries with index i, there is an adversary
B1 outputting a list of size ` and placing qi + δ1i` permutation queries with index i
such that
AdvoupΦ,t (A) ≤ Advoup1Φ,t (B1) .
Additionally, for an adversary A against the CF game with the same parameters
as the previous adversary, there is an adversary B2 outputting a list of size ` and
placing qi permutation queries with index i, such that
AdvcfΦ,t(A) ≤ Advcf1Φ,t(B2) .
Moreover, for any adversary A against OUP1 with parameters as before, there is an
adversary B1 against OUP outputting a list of size ` · qpi = `
∑
i qi, where it places
qi permutation queries with index i such that
Advoup1Φ,t (A) ≤ AdvoupΦ,t (B1) +
`(1 + qpi)
2n − ` .
Finally, for any adversary A against CF1 with parameters as before, there are ad-
versaries B1 and B2, where B1 is as in the previous case, and B2 outputs a list of
size ` and makes qi permutation queries with index i such that
Advcf1Φ,t(A) ≤ AdvoupΦ,t (B1) + 2 ·AdvcfΦ,t(B2) +
`
2n − ` +
`
2n − 2` .
For the first inequality, given A against OUP outputting List of size `, algorithm B1
against OUP1 runs A, simulates its pi queries using its own pi oracle, and constructs
a new list List′ consisting of tuples (1,+, φ, 0,P1(c) ⊕ c) for each (φ, c) ∈ List. Now
if List contains an entry (φ, c) such that φ(k) = c, then the corresponding entry
(1,+, φ, 0, c′) on List′ would satisfy P1(φ(k)⊕ 0)⊕ φ(k) = c′. Note that List′ is also
of size `, but B1 places ` extra queries to P1.
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For the second inequality, given A’s output List of size `, algorithm B2 runs A, simu-
lates its pi queries using its own pi oracle, and constructs a new list List′ consisting of
tuples of the form (1,+, φ1, 0, φ2, 0) for each (φ1, φ2) ∈ List. If List contains an entry
(φ1, φ2) such that φ1(k) = φ2(k), then the corresponding entry (1,+, φ1, 0, φ2, 0) on
List′ would satisfy P1(φ1(k)⊕ 0)⊕ φ1(k) = P1(φ2(k)⊕ 0)⊕ φ2(k). The size of List′
is also ` and B2 places the same number of queries to P±i as A.
For the the third inequality, let us consider a modified OUP1 game where the pi oracle
used in the winning condition is replaced with an independent random permutation
pi′. Since the outputs of pi′ are independent of A’s view, each entry in A’s list wins
the game with probability at most 1/(2n − ` + 1), and hence A’s advantage is at
most `/(2n − `). Furthermore, these two games are identical unless A’s list of pi
queries (i, a, b), where either b = pi(i, a,+) or a = pi(i, b,−), together with pi′ list
of queries (i, a′, b′), where b′ = pi(i, a′,+) or a′ = pi(i, b′,−) contradict the required
permutivity of pi(i, ·, ·). For this it is sufficient to bound the probability that there
are two entries with matching first or second entries. There are two possibilities.
Firstly, an input to pi′ may match an input or output to pi. We can reduce this to
output unpredictability. Given A, algorithm B1 runs A and handles its pi queries
using its own pi oracle. Note that this simulation is perfect. Algorithm B1 keeps
track of A’s queries to pi via Listpi containing entries (i, a, b). When A outputs List
containing entries (i, σ, φ, x, c), algorithm B1 returns a list containing (φ, a⊕ x) and
(φ, b ⊕ x) for (i, ∗, φ, x, ∗) ∈ List and (i, a, ∗), (i, ∗, b) ∈ Listpi for all i. Thus B1 wins
the OUP game with a list of size at most 2
∑
i `iqi, where `i is the size of entries in
List with index i. (With more careful counting the factor 2 can be avoided.)
Secondly, an output of pi′ may match an input or output to pi. Here we cannot
reduce to output unpredictability as pi′ is not available to B1. But this is not
needed: pi′ is independent of A’s view and the probability of this event is bounded
by
∑
i(`iqi)/(2
n −min(`i, qi)).
The inequality follows by noting that
∑
i(`iqi) ≤ `qpi and max(`,min(`i, qi)) ≤ `.
To prove the final inequality, again we consider a modified game where the win-
ning condition is performed with respect to an independent permutation pi′. The
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change in A’s success probability can be bounded as in the previous case down to
output unpredictability. We modify this game further, by considering a game whose
winning requirement is changed to that of the CF game: given a list of entries
(i, σ, φ1, x1, φ2, x2) check if φ1(k) = φ2(k) for some entry on the list. The outputs of
these two games are identical unless one of the following takes place. (1) The second
game outputs false and the third outputs true. In this, case we can construct an
adversary which wins the CF game which simply outputs all pairs (φ1, φ2) in A’s list.
(2) The second game outputs true and the third outputs false. In this case, there are
two sub-possibilities: (2.1) The adversary wins with a pair (i, σ, φ1, x1, φ2, x2) such
that φ1(x1) ⊕ x1 = φ2(x2) ⊕ x2 (but of course φ1(k) 6= φ2(k)). This cannot be the
case as pi′ is a permutation. (2.2) Adversary A wins with a pair (i, σ, φ1, x1, φ2, x2)
such that φ1(x1)⊕ x1 6= φ2(x2)⊕ x1. As before since pi′ is independent of A’s view,
the probability of this event is at most `/(2n− 2`), since each entry places 2 queries
to pi. Finally note that the final game is identical to the CF game (and oracle pi′ is
not used by the game).
Bellare and Kohno [27] show that the RKD set Φ⊕ is output unpredictable with
advantage `/2n for any adversary outputting a list of size `, and claw-free with
advantage 0. The above proposition allow us to conclude that this set is also first-
order output unpredictable and first-order claw-free.
Corollary 4.4. Let t ≥ 1 and suppose Φ⊕ is defined with respect to a key space of
size 2n. Then for any A outputting a list of at most ` ≤ 2n/4 and making at most
q1 queries to its P1 oracle,
Advoup1
Φ⊕,t(A) ≤
`(q1 + 1)
2n−1
and Advcf1Φ⊕,t(A) ≤
`(q1 + 2)
2n−1
.
This corollary, together with Theorem 4.2, allows us to establish that EMpi[1, 1, 1] is
Φ⊕-RKCPA secure.
Corollary 4.5. For an adversary A against the Φ⊕-RKCPA security of EMpi[1, 1, 1]
that makes at most qpi queries to its pi oracle (of which qi are to pi(i, ·, ·)) and at
most qem queries to its RK-Enc oracle, with q2, qem < 2
n/2
Advrkcpa
EMpi [1,1,1],Φ⊕,2 ≤
2qem(q2 + qem)(q1 + 3)
2n
+
q2qem
2n − q2 .
Via a direct analysis (but at the expense of modularity) the cubic bound above can
be tightened to a quadratic one.
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4.4.4 A Φ⊕-RKCCA attack on EMpi[1, 1, 1]
The above result raises the question of whether the security proof can be extended
to the CCA setting. Adapting an attack due to Andreeva et al. [9] on the indif-
ferentiability of the two-round EM construction to the RKA setting, we show that
EMpi[1, 1, 1] is not Φ⊕-RKCCA secure. The adversary is shown below, where x
denotes x ⊕ 1n, and (slightly abusing notation) ∆ ∈ {0, 1}n denotes the function
k 7→ k ⊕∆. RK-Enc and RK-Dec are as defined in Section 2.3.2.
ARK-Enc,RK-Dec,pi:
Query RK-Enc(0n, 0n); Get y0
Query RK-Enc(1n, 1n); Get y1
Query RK-Dec(1n, y0); Get x
Query RK-Enc(0n, x); Get y2
Return (y2 = y1)
When interacting with oracles implementing the EM construction, we show that
A returns true with probability 1. We have that y0 = P2(P1(k) ⊕ k) ⊕ k and
y1 = P2(P1(k)⊕ k)⊕ k. Now x is calculated as
y0 = P2(P1(k)⊕ k)⊕ k ⊕ 1n ⊕k−→ P2(P1(k)⊕ k)
P−12−→ P1(k)⊕ k
⊕k−→ P1(k)
P−11−→ P−11 (P1(k))
⊕k−→ P−11 (P1(k))⊕ k = x .
Variable y2 is calculated as
x = P−11 (P1(k))⊕ k ⊕ 1n ⊕k−→ P−11 (P1(k))
P1−→ P1(k)
⊕k−→ P1(k)⊕ k
P2−→ P2(P1(k)⊕ k)
⊕k−→ P2(P1(k)⊕ k)⊕ k .
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Hence y2 = P2(P1(k) ⊕ k) ⊕ k = y1. On the other hand, when the adversary is
interacting with the ideal cipher, for the equality to hold we need to have that
Ek(Dk(Ek(0))) = Ek(1) i.e., Dk(Ek(0)) = Dk(Ek(1)).
The latter equality however holds with negligible probability. This attack also ap-
plies if the round permutations are identical, i.e., when P2 = P1.
Note that in the CCA setting we would need to simulate both permutations P1 and
P2 forgetfully as forward and backward outputs need to look random. To do this we
would have to re-introduce the xor claw-free condition in order to rule out collisions
on P1, which in turn excludes the Φ
⊕ set.
It is instructive to check where the above sequence of queries triggers collisions in the
second permutation, irrespectively of how P1 is simulated. Let z = P1(k)⊕k. During
the first and second RK-Enc queries, P2 is queried on points z and z, respectively.
During the decryption query, P−12 is queried on P2(z), which is equivalent to P2
being queried on z. This is a P2 collision. Note also that in the third RK-Enc
query a second collision occurs as P2 is queried on z.
4.5 The RKCCA security of EMpi[1, 1, 1, 1]
Building on the results of the previous sections, we set out to find a key schedule for
the iterated Even–Mansour construction that provides Φ⊕-RKCCA security. Our
previous results show that at least three rounds are necessary. We start by showing
that of the fourteen possible simple key schedules for three-round EM, all but one
fall prey to Φ⊕-RKCCA attacks. We then show that the remaining EMpi[1, 1, 1, 1]
construction does indeed provide Φ⊕-RKCCA security.
4.5.1 Attacking EMpi[κ] for κ 6= [1, 1, 1, 1]
Up to relabelling, there are 14 possible key schedules for the three-round Even–
Mansour schemes. Of these, 9 are susceptible to offset-switching attacks; these are
key schedules where a key appears only in the first or last rounds and nowhere
114
4.5 The RKCCA security of EMpi[1, 1, 1, 1]
ARK-Enc,RK-Dec,pi:
Query RK-Enc(00, 0n); Get y0
Query RK-Enc(10, 1n); Get y1
Query RK-Dec(10, y0); Get x
Query RK-Enc(00, x); Get y2
Return (y2 = y1)
ARK-Enc,RK-Dec,pi:
Query RK-Enc(00, 0n); Get y0
Query RK-Enc(10, 1n); Get y1
Query RK-Dec(10, y0); Get x
Query RK-Enc(00, x); Get y2
Return (y2 = y1)
ARK-Enc,RK-Dec,pi:
Query RK-Enc(00, 0n); Get y0
Query RK-Enc(10, 1n); Get y1
Query RK-Dec(10, y0); Get x
Query RK-Enc(00, x); Get y2
Return (y2 = y1)
Figure 4.8: Adversaries attacking EMpi[1, 1, 2, 1] (top left), EMpi[1, 1, 2, 2] (top right),
and EMpi[1, 2, 1, 2] (bottom). Here, c0c1 ∈ {0, 1}2 denotes the RKD
function (k1, k2) 7→ (k1 ⊕ cn1 , k2 ⊕ cn2 ).
else such as [1, 2, 2, 2], [1, 2, 2, 3], or [1, 2, 2, 1] and this rules out 9 key schedules.
Another 4 can be attacked using Andreeva et al.’s attack [9]; these are [1, 1, 2, 1],
[1, 2, 1, 1], [1, 1, 2, 2], and [1, 2, 1, 2] schedules. We give three attacks in Figure 4.8
where c0c1 ∈ {0, 1}2 denotes the RKD function (k1, k2) 7→ (k1 ⊕ cn1 , k2 ⊕ cn2 ).
The analysis of the success probabilities of these adversaries are similar to that for
the attack in Section 4.4.4 and hence is omitted.
These attacks give a generic 4-query related-key distinguisher for reduced-round
LED (8 out of 32 rounds for LED-64 and 16 out of 48 for LED-128). However, our
results in the following section support the designers’ claim that LED-64 provides
good related-key attack security despite the simple key schedule.
4.5.2 The security of EMpi[1, 1, 1, 1]
We now study the only remaining construction, EMpi[1, 1, 1, 1]; we identify conditions
under which it provides Φ-RKCCA security, examine its Φ⊕-RKA security, and
briefly discuss the impact of permutation reuse on this construction.
115
4.5 The RKCCA security of EMpi[1, 1, 1, 1]
4.5.2.1 Sufficient conditions for RKCCA security
We now show that EMpi[1, 1, 1, 1], achieves Φ-RKCCA security for sets Φ satisfy-
ing the conditions described in Sections 4.3.1 and 4.4.1. As before we motivate a
number of restrictions on Φ by considering a simulation strategy and analysing the
inconsistencies that could arise. The adversary in the Φ-RKCCA game with respect
to the construction has access to pi and the oracles
P3(P2(P1(x⊕ φpi(k))⊕ φpi(k))⊕ φpi(k))⊕ φPi(k) ,
P−11 (P
−1
2 (P
−1
3 (y ⊕ φpi(k))⊕ φpi(k))⊕ φpi(k))⊕ φpi(k) .
Once again we aim to simulate the above two oracles by returning uniformly random
values. There are at least two way to perform this:
(a) Simulate the outer permutations (i.e. the P3 oracle in RK-Enc and the P
−1
1
oracle in RK-Dec) forgetfully.
(b) Simulate the middle oracles P2 and P
−1
2 forgetfully. This ensures that the
inputs to the P±1 and P
±
3 are randomised, so their outputs are also random.
The first approach, in some sense the more natural one, does not work. This is
because P1 (respectively P3) also appear as the first-round permutation in RK-Enc
(respectively RK-Dec). An adversary which performs an offset switch can trigger
collisions in these oracles without being detected. We therefore adopt the second
simulation strategy and, for a forgetful oracle $, consider
P3($(P1(x⊕ φpi(k))⊕ φpi(k))⊕ φpi(k))⊕ φpi(k) ,
P−11 ($(P
−1
3 (y ⊕ φpi(k))⊕ φpi(k))⊕ φpi(k))⊕ φpi(k) .
We now consider inconsistencies, starting with a query collision between pi (from
a query of A) and $ arising from either the forward or backwards direction. Here
we rely on first-order output unpredictability, but note that (i, σ) = (1,+) and
(i, σ) = (3,−) will be critically relied on. Collisions arising between an RKD query
to pi and a $ query in either direction can be ruled out down to first-order query in-
dependence; once again (i, σ) ∈ {(1,+), (3,−)} will be used. Finally, the probability
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that a collision occurs as a result of two queries to $ and/or $−1 can be bounded
by the first-order claw freeness property. As before, inconsistencies also arise due to
collisions between the outputs of oracle queries; the probability of this occurring can
be bounded information-theoretically. Note that here we also rely on independence
of queries to the second permutation, but both cases (i, σ) ∈ {(1,+), (3,−)} in the
definition will be relied on. We now formally prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4.6 (Φ-RKCCA security of EMpi[1, 1, 1, 1]). Let Φ be an RKD set. Then
for any adversary A against the Φ-RKCCA security of EMpi[1, 1, 1, 1] with parameters
as before, we have adversaries B1, B2, B3, and B4 such that
AdvrkccaEMpi [1,1,1,1],Φ,3 ≤Advoup1Φ,3 (B1) + Advqi1Φ,3(B2)
+ 2Advcf1Φ,3(B3) + AdvcfΦ,3(B4)
+
2q2em
2n
+
2qem(q2 +
∑
φ q
φ
2 )
2n − (q2 +
∑
φ q
φ
2 )
,
where B1 outputs a list of length 2q2qem, B2 a list of length 2q2em, B3 a list of length
q2em, and B4 a list of length at most q2em.
The proof follows a similar pattern to the proof of Theorems 4.1 and 4.2; again we
proceed through four stages. In the first, A interacts with the public permutations
and their inverses, plus the 3-round Even–Mansour scheme (and its inverse, omitted
here for conciseness) instantiated with the same permutations:
pi(i, x, σ), P3(P2(P1(φ
pi(k)⊕ x)⊕ φpi(k))⊕ φpi(k))⊕ φpi(k) .
We then consider an environment in which P2 is replaced by $, a forgetful random
oracle, for queries made to the Even–Mansour scheme:
pi(i, x, σ), P3($(P1(φ
pi(k)⊕ x)⊕ φpi(k))⊕ φpi(k))⊕ φpi(k)
and from here we consider a keyed random function:
pi(i, x, σ), iF(φpi(k), x) .
Finally, we transition to a game in which iF is replaced by an ideal cipher (iE, iD):
pi(i, x, σ), iE(φpi(k), x) .
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Game i:
k ←$ K
b′ ←$ ARK-Enc,RK-Dec,pi
Return b′
RK-Enc(φpi, x):
k′ ← φpi(k)
z1 ← S1(k′ ⊕ x)
z2 ← IS2(k′ ⊕ z1)
Return k′ ⊕ S3(k′ ⊕ z2)
pi(1, a,+):
Return S1(a)
pi(2, a,+):
Return DS2(a)
pi(3, a,+):
Return S3(a)
S1(a):
If S1[a] 6=⊥
Return S1[a]
b ←$ {0, 1}n \ Rng(S1)
S1[a]← b; S−11 [b]← a
Rng(S1)← Rng(S1) ∪ {b}
Dom(S1)← Dom(S1) ∪ {a}
Return S1[a]
S3(a):
If S3[a] 6=⊥
Return S3[a]
b ←$ {0, 1}n \ Rng(S3)
S3[a]← b; S−13 [b]← a
Rng(S3)← Rng(S3) ∪ {b}
Dom(S3)← Dom(S3) ∪ {a}
Return S3[a]
Figure 4.9: Procedures common to all games in the proof of Theorem 4.6. Oracles
RK-Dec, pi(i, ·,−), Si−1, DS2−1, and IS2−1 are defined in a similar way
to their corresponding forward oracles.
We will now argue that the above changes alter A’s winning probabilities negligibly
and bound A’s winning probability in terms of the conditions on Φ introduced in
Sections 4.3.1 and 4.4.1.
The first transition is analysed via a series of games, given in Figures 4.9, 4.10,
and 4.11. These games include two intermediate transitions: in the first, P2 is
replaced with Q (a random permutation, chosen independently of pi) for queries
arising through RK-Enc or RK-Dec; in the second, Q is replaced with $ (a forgetful
random oracle). We identify the points at which these two intermediate transitions
lead to inconsistencies, by setting bad flags.
We omit a specification of the inverse oracles for conciseness; they are defined analo-
gously to their respective forward oracles. As before, the event where the adversary
outputs 1 in game i is denoted by Si.
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Game 1:
DS2(a):
If D2[a] 6=⊥ Return D2[a]
If I2[a] 6=⊥
Return I2[a]
b ←$ {0, 1}n \ Rng(DS2)
If b ∈ Rng(IS2)
b ←$ {0, 1}n \ Rng(DS2, IS2)
D2[a]← b; D−12 [b]← a
Rng(DS2)← Rng(DS2) ∪ {b}
Dom(DS2)← Dom(DS2) ∪ {a}
Return D2[a]
IS2(a):
If I2[a] 6=⊥
Return I2[a]
If D2[a] 6=⊥
Return D2[a]
b ←$ {0, 1}n
If b ∈ Rng(IS2)
b ←$ {0, 1}n \ Rng(IS2)
If b ∈ Rng(DS2)
b ←$ {0, 1}n \ Rng(DS2, IS2)
I2[a]← b; I2−1[b]← a
Rng(IS2)← Rng(IS2) ∪ {b}
Dom(IS2)← Dom(IS2) ∪ {a}
Return I2[a]
Game 2 Game 3:
DS2(a):
If D2[a] 6=⊥ Return D2[a]
If I2[a] 6=⊥
bad1 ← true; Return I2[a]
b ←$ {0, 1}n \ Rng(DS2)
If b ∈ Rng(IS2)
bad2 ← true
b ←$ {0, 1}n \ Rng(DS2, IS2)
D2[a]← b; D−12 [b]← a
Rng(DS2)← Rng(DS2) ∪ {b}
Dom(DS2)← Dom(DS2) ∪ {a}
Return D2[a]
IS2(a):
If I2[a] 6=⊥
Return I2[a]
If D2[a] 6=⊥
bad1 ← true; Return D2[a]
b ←$ {0, 1}n
If b ∈ Rng(IS2)
b ←$ {0, 1}n \ Rng(IS2)
If b ∈ Rng(DS2)
bad2 ← true
b ←$ {0, 1}n \ Rng(DS2, IS2)
I2[a]← b; I2−1[b]← a
Rng(IS2)← Rng(IS2) ∪ {b}
Dom(IS2)← Dom(IS2) ∪ {a}
Return I2[a]
Figure 4.10: Games 1 to 3 in the proof of Theorem 4.6. Oracles pi(i, ·,−), Si−1,
DS2
−1, and IS2−1 are defined in a similar way to their corresponding
forward oracles. Boxed statements are included in Game 2 and are
omitted from Game 3.
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Game 4 Game 5:
DS2(a):
If D2[a] 6=⊥ Return D2[a]
If I2[a] 6=⊥
bad1 ← true
b ←$ {0, 1}n \ Rng(DS2)
If b ∈ Rng(IS2)
bad2 ← true
D2[a]← b; D−12 [b]← a
Rng(DS2)← Rng(DS2) ∪ {b}
Dom(DS2)← Dom(DS2) ∪ {a}
Return D2[a]
IS2(a):
If I2[a] 6=⊥
bad3 ← true; Return I2[a]
If D2[a] 6=⊥
bad1 ← true
b ←$ {0, 1}n
If b ∈ Rng(IS2)
bad4 ← true
b ←$ {0, 1}n \ Rng(IS2)
If b ∈ Rng(DS2)
bad2 ← true
I2[a]← b; I2−1[b]← a
Rng(IS2)← Rng(IS2) ∪ {b}
Dom(IS2)← Dom(IS2) ∪ {a}
Return I2[a]
Figure 4.11: Games 4 and 5 in the proof of Theorem 4.6. Oracles pi(i, ·,−), Si−1,
DS2
−1, and IS2−1 are defined in a similar way to their corresponding
forward oracles. Boxed statements are included in Game 4 and are
omitted from Game 5.
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Game 0 is the RKA game augmented with a public permutation oracle (as described
in Section 2.3.2), conditioned on b = 1. In this game, the adversary interacts
with an oracle realising the public permutations pi and the Even–Mansour
construction instantiated with pi.
Game 1 is only syntactically different from Game 0. Sampling algorithms S1 and S3
are introduced to respond to queries made to pi(1, ·,+) and pi(3, ·,+). Queries
to pi(2, ·,+) are split into two groups: those made directly to pi, either by
the adversary or by an RKD function, which are answered by the sampling
algorithm DS2 and those made indirectly (through queries made to RK-Enc),
which are answered by IS2. Appropriate inverse sampling algorithms are also
introduced. The oracles DS2 and IS2 maintain consistent lists, D2 and I2. The
lists used by inverse oracles are identical to the lists used by the corresponding
forward oracles. As this is a purely syntactic change, Pr[S0] = Pr[S1].
Game 2 sets bad1 either if DS2 is queried on a point already defined in I2 or if
IS2 is queried on a point already defined in D2 (and similarly for the inverse
oracles). This occurs either because A queries pi(2, ·, ·) directly at a point
that is also queried to pi(2, ·, ·) through an indirect RK-Enc query, or because
an RKD function queries pi(2, ·, ·) at a point that is also queried to pi(2, ·, ·)
through an RK-Enc query (and similarly for the inverse oracles). We will
later bound the probability of this event in terms of the first-order output
unpredictability and first-order query independence of Φ. Game 2 sets bad2
if the value chosen at random for IS2(a) is already defined in range of DS2,
or vice versa (and similarly for the inverse queries and the domain of IS2 or
DS2). This is necessary because in Game 1, for both DS2 and IS2, b is sampled
from {0, 1}n \Rng(DS2, IS2) whereas our objective in Game 3 is to ensure that
responses from DS2 are independent of responses from IS2. The code of S1
and S3 remains unchanged throughout this proof. The outputs of DS2 and IS2
remain consistent and Pr[S1] = Pr[S2].
Game 3 omits the boxed statements in Game 2 and so is identical to Game 2 unless
one of bad1 or bad2 is set. In this game, the oracles DS2 and IS2 check consis-
tency with their own lists, but may become inconsistent with each other. It
is possible for bad1 to be set in two possible ways: event E1 is the event an
adversary directly queries DS2 at a point coinciding with a point queried to IS2
from a query to RK-Enc (or comparable conditions resulting from queries to
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inverse oracles); event E2 is the event an RKD function queries DS2 at a point
coinciding with a point queried to IS2 from a query to RK-Enc (or comparable
conditions resulting from queries to inverse oracles). We will analyse each of
the ways that bad1 can be set below. Similarly, bad2 can be set either because
of a query to DS2 from A, a query to DS2 from φpi, or from a query to IS2 due
to a query to RK-Enc (or similarly for the corresponding inverse oracles); we
consider all cases simultaneously below. In Game 3, the responses to RK-Enc
queries are completely decoupled from the responses to pi queries, so we can
consider that RK-Enc uses Q to respond to queries and pi uses P2. We have
that Pr[S2] ≤ Pr[S3] + Pr[E1 ∨ E2 ∨ bad2].
Game 4 sets bad3 if two distinct queries to RK-Enc result in the same value being
queried to IS2. The flag bad3 can be set on a query to RK-Enc or RK-Dec;
these cases are dealt considered when we analyse the probability of setting bad
events below. Game 4 chooses the response to IS2 uniformly from {0, 1}n and
sets bad4 if this value is already in Rng(IS2). Game 4 is equivalent to Game 3
and, in particular, Pr[S3] = Pr[S4].
Game 5 omits the boxed statements from Game 4 and so is identical to Game 4 unless
bad3 or bad4 is set. Let E
′
1, E
′
2, bad
′
2 represent events in Game 5 corresponding
to events E1, E2, bad2 in Game 4, then Pr[E1∨E2∨bad2] ≤ Pr[E′1∨E′2∨bad′2]+
2 Pr[bad3 ∨ bad4] In this game, calls to pi(2, ·, ·) through RK-Enc (RK-Dec),
which are answered by IS2 (IS2
−1) are answered by a forgetful random oracle
and so the ciphertexts (plaintexts) are uniform and independent of the key
and the plaintext (ciphertexts).
In Game 5, the adversary interacts with
pi(i, x, σ), P3($(P1(φ
pi(k)⊕ x)⊕ φpi(k))⊕ φpi(k))⊕ φpi(k) .
During the next transition to
pi(i, x, σ), iF(φP,P
−1
(k), x) ,
inconsistencies only arise if the adversary makes queries (φpi1 , x1) 6= (φpi2 , x2), but
where (φpi1 (k), x1) = (φ
pi
2 (k), x2). If an adversary A makes such a query, we can
construct an adversary B4 which wins the CF game with a list of length at most q
2
em
2
as follows: B4 runs A and outputs List = {(φpii , φpij ) : 1 ≤ i < j ≤ qem}.
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Considering the final transition, we switch from a random function to a random
permutation (for each φpi); the probability of an inconsistency arising in this step is
bounded by q
2
em
2n [32].
Therefore we have that
AdvrkccaEMpi [1,1,1,1],Φ,t(A) ≤Pr[E′1 ∨ E′2 ∨ bad′2] + 2 Pr[bad3 ∨ bad4]
+ AdvcfΦ,t(B4) +
q2em
2n
.
It remains to bound the probability that bad events occur in Game 5.
Event E′1 occurs when the adversary directly queries pi(2, ·, ·) at a point that is
also queried as a result of a query to RK-Enc. We will use A to create
an adversary B1 against the OUP1 game with a list of length 2q2qem. The
adversary B1 runs A and then outputs List = {(1,+, φpii , xi, aj) : 1 ≤ i ≤
qem, 1 ≤ j ≤ q2} ∪ {(3,−, φpii , yi, bj) : 1 ≤ i ≤ qem, 1 ≤ j ≤ q2}. If A sets bad1
with an RK-Enc or DS2 query, then B1 wins the OUP1 game with a tuple
of the form (1,+, φpii , xi, aj) and if A sets bad1 with a query to RK-Dec or
DS2
−1 then B wins the OUP1 game with a tuple of the form (3,−, φpii , yi, bj).
We therefore conclude that Pr[E′1] ≤ Advoup1Φ,t (B1), where B1 outputs a list of
length 2q2qem.
Event E′2 occurs when an RKD function queries the pi(2, ·, ·) at a point that is also
queried as a result of a query to RK-Enc. We will use A to create an adversary
B2 against the QI1 game with a list of length 2q2em. The adversary B2 runs A
and outputs List = {(1,+, φpii , xi, φpij ) : 1 ≤ i, j ≤ qem}∪{(3,−, φpii , yi, φpij ) : 1 ≤
i, j ≤ qem}. If A can set bad by causing an RKD function to query the permu-
tation at a point that is also queried as a result of a query to RK-Enc, then the
adversary B2 will win the QI1 game with a tuple of a form (1,+, φpii , xi, φpij )
and if A sets bad1 with a query to IS2−1 or pi(1, ·,−) then B wins the QI1
game with a tuple of the form (3,−, φpii , yi, φpij ). Therefore we can conclude
that Pr[E′2] ≤ Advqi1Φ,t(B2), where B2 outputs a list of length 2q2em.
Flag bad′2 is set with probability at most
qem(q2+
∑
φ q
φ
2 )
2n−(q2+
∑
φ q
φ
2 )
. It can be set in one of
16 different ways. Collisions between DS2 and IS2, DS2
−1 and IS2−1, DS2
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and IS2
−1, or DS2−1 and IS2 can all set bad2 and we count each case twice,
depending on which query set bad2. This gives 8 ways to set bad2, however
the query to DS2 can arise through a query by A or through φpi, which gives
16 ways. In each case, we use a birthday-bound style argument, noting that
each pair (x, a) has at most a 1
2n−(q1+
∑
φ q
φ
1 )
chance of setting bad′2; applying
the union bound and recalling that qem is the total number of queries made
to RK-Enc and RK-Dec (and thus to IS and IS2
−1) by A (and similarly for
q1 and q
φ
1 ) gives the claimed probability.
Flag bad3 is set when two queries to RK-Enc result in the P2 being queried at the
same point. We will use A to create an adversary B3 against the CF1 property
of Φ. The adversary B3 runs A and then outputs List = {(1,+, φpii , xi, φpij , xj) :
1 ≤ i < j ≤ qem} ∪ {(3,−, φpii , yi, φpij , yj) : 1 ≤ i < j ≤ qem} If A sets
bad3 with query to IS2, then B3 wins the CF1 game with a tuple of the form
(1,+, φpii , xi, φ
pi
j , xj) and if A sets bad3 with query to IS2−1, then B3 wins the
CF1 game with a tuple of the form (3,−, φpii , yi, φpij , yj). Thus Pr[bad3] ≤
Advcf1Φ,t(B3), where B3 outputs a list of length at most q2em.
Flag bad4 is set with probability at most
q2em
2
1
2n using similar reasoning as in the
setting of bad2.
As we have that
AdvrkccaEMpi [1,1,1,1],Φ,t(A) ≤Pr[E′1 ∨ E′2 ∨ bad′2] + 2 Pr[bad3 ∨ bad4]
+ AdvcfΦ,t(B4) +
q2em
2n
,
we may conclude that
AdvrkccaEMpi [1,1,1,1],Φ,t ≤Advoup1Φ,t (B1) + Advqi1Φ,t(B2) + 2
qem(q2 +
∑
φ q
φ
2 )
2n − (q2 +
∑
φ q
φ
2 )
+ 2
(
Advcf1Φ,t(B3) +
q2em
2n+1
)
+ AdvcfΦ,t(B4) +
q2em
2n
,
where B1 outputs a list of length 2q2qem, B2 a list of length 2q2em, B3 a list of length
q2em, and B4 a list of length at most q2em. 
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4.5.2.2 Φ⊕-RKA security
Corollary 4.4 together with Theorem 4.6 allow us to establish that the three-round
single-key Even–Mansour construction with independent round permutations is Φ⊕-
RKCCA secure:
Corollary 4.7. For an adversary A (with parameters defined as before and ` ≤
2n/4) against the Φ⊕-RKCCA security of EMpi[1, 1, 1, 1], we have that
AdvrkccaEMpi [1,1,1,1],Φ⊕,3 ≤
4qem(q2 + qem)(q1 + q3 + 3)
2n
+
2qemq2
2n − q2 .
Once again, via a direct analysis (but at the expense of modularity) the cubic bound
above can be tightened to a quadratic one.
4.6 Discussion
In this chapter, we have given three strong, positive results about the security of
Even–Mansour ciphers under related key attacks. It is interesting to consider the
open questions which remain and possible future directions for research in this area.
An obvious open question is whether similar results can be obtained for other block
cipher design strategies. Barbosa and Farshim have given a positive answer in the
case of Feistel networks, but the answer is not known for Lai–Massey ciphers, Misty-
like ciphers or other generalisations of Feistel ciphers.
A second question is whether the results in this chapter can be generalised to cover
modifications to the Even–Mansour scheme. Dunkelman, Keller, and Shamir [98]
consider several variants of the Even–Mansour scheme, including addition and invo-
lution Even–Mansour ciphers (where the xors are replaced with modular additions
or the random permutations are replaced with random involutions, respectively). It
appears straightforward to apply the techniques used in this chapter to obtain results
about these schemes, although we have not worked through the precise details.
Another possible variant of the Even–Mansour scheme is one in which the same
permutation is reused across the rounds. If the same permutation is used in the first
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and third rounds, a similar proof strategy applies as these oracles would be faithfully
simulated in the reduction. The proof, however, does not immediately apply if the
same permutation is used in all rounds as a forgetful simulation of the middle oracle
introduces inconsistencies across the rounds.
Without going into the details, a proof can be obtained by introducing a new CF-
type assumption which requires that it is infeasible to find (φ1, x1, φ2, x2) such that
φ2(k)⊕x2 = P±(x1⊕φ1(k))⊕φ1(k); this condition would ensure that inconsistencies
resulting from a P query in the first or thirds rounds and a $ query happen with
low probability. Following the proof of Proposition 4.3, we can also reduce this
new property to standard OUP and CF notions: starting from the above winning
condition, first consider the game where the winning condition uses an independent
permutation (this change reduces to OUP), then consider the winning condition
φ1(k) = φ2(k) (an adversary winning this game wins the CF game), finally if an
adversary wins the second game but not the third, then they have found a solution to
φ1(k)⊕φ2(k) = x⊕R where R is the random output of the independent permutation,
which happens with probability at most `/(2n − 2`) as x, φ1(k), and φ2(k) are
independent of R. We remark that Biryukov and Wagner [49] describe slide attacks
which can be applied to this construction, giving an upper bound on its security.
A further potential research direction to examine is the effect of more complex
key schedules on our results. For example, it would be interesting to ask whether
security under the wider range of RKD functions considered in this chapter can be
established for schemes using the key schedules that Cogliati and Seurin [78] study.
A final open question is how to use these results when designing concrete proposals
for block ciphers. We have shown that the three round Even–Mansour construction
is sufficient for a wide range of uses, however the vast majority of schemes use many
more rounds than this. The optimal trade off between the number of rounds and the
complexity of the round functions, for given performance requirements, is not clear.
An interesting question is therefore whether using ‘stronger’ round functions could
significantly reduce the number of rounds required. AES2 [60] uses this idea: it has
only two rounds, but the round functions are full applications of AES using publicly
known keys. We remark that Dinur et al. [96] have cryptanalysed this proposal (in
the single-key model and not contradicting our bounds).
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The CLRW2 tweakable block cipher
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Tweakable block ciphers are flexible primitives, which are being adopted as useful
components from which to build efficient cryptographic schemes. In this chapter, we
study Landecker et al.’s tweakable block cipher construction, CLRW2, and identify an
error in the reduction given for this scheme. Fortunately, the issue can be resolved
and a new bound for the security of CLRW2 is given. Additionally we identify a
potential limitation of this proof technique when looking to extend the scheme to
provide asymptotic security.
The work described in this chapter is available at [223].
5.1 Introduction
Several recent proposals for symmetric encryption primitives, particularly AEAD
schemes, feature tweakable block ciphers as part of their design. As discussed in
Section 2.2.5, a tweakable block cipher is a block cipher that admits an additional
public input (the ‘tweak’ ) to introduce extra variability at the message-block level.
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In their seminal paper on tweakable block ciphers, Liskov et al. [186, 187] describe
the syntax and security requirements for tweakable block ciphers and describe sev-
eral methods for building tweakable block ciphers from conventional block ciphers.
There are a few dedicated designs for tweakable block ciphers [248, 87], however
most research effort has focused on designing conventional block ciphers along with
methods for transforming them into tweakable block ciphers (e.g. [238, 149]).
Many block-cipher-based encryption and authentication schemes are secure up to the
birthday bound, i.e. provided that fewer than 2
n
2 queries are made, where n is the
width of the block cipher (in bits). Beyond this point, one would expect the input
to the block cipher to be repeated and for this to perhaps leak some information
or simplify forgery attempts (as described in, for example, [23, 28, 30]). However
for some applications, security beyond the birthday bound may be desirable, for
example if large amounts of data are to be encrypted and the use of a block cipher
with a larger block size is undesirable. Several works have studied the security of
schemes beyond the birthday bound (e.g. [145, 151]); one related question is how to
achieve beyond-birthday-bound security for tweakable block ciphers.
Minematsu [200] suggests a method to build a 2n-bit tweakable block cipher that
provides O(2n+m2 ) security from an n-bit block cipher, where m is the size of the
tweak. This scheme has a Luby–Rackoff or Feistel structure, but has the disadvan-
tage of only supporting short tweaks and requiring per-invocation rekeying of the
block cipher which makes changing the tweak computationally expensive.
Landecker et al. [176] continue the study of tweakable block ciphers that remain
secure beyond the birthday bound. They specify CLRW2, a tweakable block cipher
construction (based on two copies of LRW2 [186]) which remains secure up to ap-
proximately 2
2n
3 queries; they also study the security of TBC-MAC (an analogue of
CBC-MAC defined in terms of tweakable block ciphers). CLRW2 allows arbitrarily
long tweaks and does not require excessive rekeying of the block cipher.
Lampe and Seurin [175] extend the CLRW2 construction and consider longer chains
of the LRW2 construction and are able to show (asymptotically in the number
of rounds, using a coupling argument) that this provides greater security further
beyond the birthday bound than the CLRW2 construction. Their bounds agree
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with Landecker et al.’s bound for two rounds against non-adaptive chosen-plaintext
attacks. They extend this result, additionally giving a weaker bound under chosen-
ciphertext attacks. They conjecture that their non-adaptive chosen-plaintext bound
also holds for chosen-ciphertext attacks.
Each of the constructions described above comes with a security proof. Recently,
flaws have been found in the proofs given for two high-profile ciphers: GCM [148]
and XCB [71]. In order for security proofs to provide meaningful guarantees and
for the community to have faith in the proofs given for schemes, it is important
that they are correct and any errors are removed. The factor lost by correcting the
bound for CLRW2 is significantly smaller than for these schemes, however it remains
important that any errors in a security reduction are removed.
Contributions
In this chapter, we provide a detailed analysis of the proof given for CLRW2 [176].
We identify an error in the proof and are able to resolve it, giving more accurate
bounds for the security offered by this construction. We also describe a potential
limitation of this proof technique, which prevents it from being used to extend these
results asymptotically.
Landecker et al. have independently identified and corrected the error in their
proof [177, 252]; they correct the proof using a neat coupling argument which results
in a tighter bound than is obtained in this chapter.
5.2 Preliminaries
This section contains a brief description of the CLRW2 scheme (further details are
given in [176]) and some new notation used throughout this chapter.
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X ⊕ Ek1 ⊕ ⊕ Ek2 ⊕
hH1 hH2
Y
T
Figure 5.1: The CLRW2 tweakable block cipher construction.
5.2.1 Description of CLRW2
The scheme proposed by Landecker et al. [176] combines an ε-AXU hash function
and a block cipher. The ciphertext Y is computed from plaintext X using key
k = (k1, H1, k2, H2) and tweak T as follows:
Y = Ek2 (Ek1(X ⊕ hH1(T))⊕ hH1(T)⊕ hH2(T))⊕ hH2(T) .
This construction is illustrated in Figure 5.1. The intuition behind the security of
CLRW2 is that an adversary can only obtain a birthday-bound style advantage by
causing the input to both block ciphers to be repeated.
5.2.2 Notation
We largely follow the notation used by Landecker et al. [176] to avoid introducing
confusion. Throughout we will use X and T to denote plaintext and tweak inputs to
a tweakable block cipher respectively; Y will denote the output ciphertext. Queries
made by an adversary and the value of random variables related to those queries are
be indexed by a counter i.
When using a random permutation (in place of a block cipher), we will lazily sam-
ple the random permutations instead of defining all pairs of input and output up
front. When referring to the domain and range of a permutation pi : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}n, we will use Domfull(pi) and Rngfull(pi) to denote the set {0, 1}n in order to
make clear the context that this set relates to. When lazy-sampling a permutation
pi : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n we will use the sets Domlazy(pi) ⊆ Domfull(pi) = {0, 1}n and
Rnglazy(pi) ⊆ Rngfull(pi) = {0, 1}n to keep track of which values have been defined in
130
5.3 Proof summary
the domain and range (respectively) of pi. We will often drop the subscript for the
sets Domlazy(pi) and Rnglazy(pi) provided that the meaning is clear. The ‘lazy’ sets
have an implicit query index because they are only defined relative to the previous
queries and random choices within them.
We reiterate that for CLRW2, a tweakable block cipher key includes two keys for
the underlying block cipher and two keys for the universal hash function family, i.e.
k = (k1, H1, k2, H2). For simplicity and clarity, we abbreviate hHj to hj .
5.3 Proof summary
In this section, we give a brief overview of Landecker et al.’s proof below but refer
to the original paper [176] for the full details. The reduction given by Landecker
et al. relies on the SPRP security of the block cipher and the universality of the
hash function family to show that CLRW2 realises a strong tweakable block cipher
(i.e. the TSPRP notion described in Section 2.2.5). The proof proceeds through a
series of games in which the adversary interacts with a tweakable block cipher oracle,
but not the individual component parts of the construction (the block ciphers and
universal hash functions).
5.3.1 Partitioning the output set
Landecker et al. partition {0, 1}n (corresponding to points in the range of the tweak-
able block cipher) into four sets. The first step of the proof is to replace the block
ciphers with permutations (chosen uniformly at random). The definition of the sets
used to partition {0, 1}n depends on the particular tweak value used in a query and
the sets Rnglazy(pii); these sets therefore have an implicit query index.
Informally, we define Yi to be the set of possible output values from an ideal tweak-
able block cipher, given the responses to previous queries and recalling that each
TE(k, T, ·) is a permutation. That is, we set Yi = {Yj : j < i and Tj = Ti} and
Yi = {0, 1}n \ Yi.
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⊕h1(T) ⊕h1(T)⊕ h2(T) ⊕h2(T)
X L Z M Ypi1 pi2
S3 ∪ S4
S2
S1
Old
New
Old
New
Figure 5.2: A graphical representation of the sets Si. The domain and range of
each permutation are divided into two sets: the input/output pairs that
are ‘Old’ (in Dom(pij) and Rng(pij)), shown above the dashed line; and
the points that are ‘New’ (in Dom(pij) and Rng(pij)), shown below the
dashed line. For a query with L /∈ Dom(pi1), any value corresponding to
a black box in the above diagram is impossible.
The set {0, 1}n is then further partitioned as follows:
S1 = {Y ∈ Yi : Y ⊕ h2(T) /∈ Rng(pi2)} ,
S2 = {Y ∈ Yi : Y ⊕ h2(T) ∈ Rng(pi2) and
pi−12 (Y ⊕ h2(T))⊕ h1(T)⊕ h2(T) /∈ Rng(pi1)} ,
S3 = {Y ∈ Yi : Y ⊕ h2(T) ∈ Rng(pi2) and
pi−12 (Y ⊕ h2(T))⊕ h1(T)⊕ h2(T) ∈ Rng(pi1)} ,
S4 = {Y ∈ Yi} .
These sets are shown graphically in Figure 5.2. ‘Old’ values are those in Domlazy(pi)
and Rnglazy(pi); the behaviour of pi on ‘New’ values has not yet been defined.
That is, S1 is the set of output values corresponding to undefined outputs from pi2.
The elements of S2 correspond to defined outputs from pi2 with undefined outputs
from pi1. The set S3 contains output values for which the inputs and outputs to both
block ciphers are defined. Finally, S4 = Yi is the set of values that are not possible
for either an ideal tweakable block cipher or the CLRW2 construction; responding
to a (non-repeated, non-redundant) query with an element of this set would violate
the requirement that each TE(k, T, ·) is a permutation.
At a first glance, S3 appears to be the difference between CLRW2 and an ideal
tweakable block cipher: elements in S4 are not possible in either case; elements in
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TE(k, T,X):
i← i+ 1; Xi ← X; Ti ← T
L ← X ⊕ h1(T)
Z ← Ek1(L)
M ← Z ⊕ h1(T)⊕ h2(T)
Y ← Ek2(M)⊕ h2(T)
Return Y
Figure 5.3: The TE oracle in Game 0 for the proof of Theorem 5.3.
S1 and S2 are possible in both cases; elements in S3 are not excluded from the
output of an ideal tweakable block cipher but are impossible in the case that L is
‘New’ when CLRW2 is used.
This informal summary does not give the full detail—if the situation were this simple,
the original proof would be correct. Additionally, it is necessary to ensure that the
probability of each element appearing as the output from the tweakable block cipher
(or its inverse) is approximately equal in both the real and ideal cases.
We use pTBC(Y) to denote the probability that Y is the output of the ideal tweakable
block cipher and pG3(Y) for the probability that Y is the output of the intermediate
cipher defined in Game 3 of the proof; these probabilities are both conditioned on
all previous queries and responses. Note that pTBC(Y) = pTBC(Y
′) and pG3(Y) =
pG3(Y
′) if Y and Y ′ are in the same set Si.
5.3.2 Structure of the games
The proof given by Landecker et al. considers an adversary interacting with the
TSPRP game defined in Section 2.2.5; a series of eight games is then defined in
which the TE oracle is modified.
Figure 5.3 defines TE so that it realises the CLRW2 scheme. In Game 1, the block
cipher is replaced with a random permutation, which is lazily sampled. The security
of this scheme relies on the assumption that the block cipher used to instantiate
the scheme is a strong pseudorandom permutation and an adversary’s advantage in
distinguishing between Game 0 and Game 1 is bounded above by 2AdvsprpE (A).
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The behaviour of TE is further changed in the following games. There are two cases
considered for each query, as pi1 is lazily sampled: either pi1(L) is already defined or
L is a fresh value.
Games 2 and 3 modify TE in the case that pi1(L) is already defined. In both games,
the ciphertext is chosen uniformly at random (from the set of possible outputs Yi)
and the value of pi1(L) is defined in such a way that it remains consistent with this
choice of ciphertext. If the definition of pi1(L) contradicts the permutivity of pi2, one
of bad1 and bad2 is set to true. In Game 2, Y is redefined when a bad event occurs;
this is not the case in Game 3.
The probability of these bad events occurring bounds the distinguishing advantage
between Games 1 and 3. The analysis of these games ensures that queries which
cause both (lazily sampled) permutations to be queried at a defined value are rare
and do not significantly distort the distribution of output values from that of an
ideal tweakable block cipher.
Games 4 through to 7 modify TE when pi1(L) has not been defined; no changes
are made to the code that is executed when pi1(L) is already defined. It is in these
games that we have identified the problem with the proof. The objective of these
changes is to show that the ciphertext can be chosen uniformly from Yi without the
probability distribution differing significantly from ideal. The main idea is to sample
the ciphertext uniformly from one of the Si for each query (using a biased coin to
decide which Si) and then to show that the resulting ciphertext distribution is close
to uniform on Yi (as would be the case for an ideal tweakable block cipher).
Again, bad flags are set to true if the permutivity of pi1 or pi2 is contradicted; the
probability of these bad events occurring bounds the distinguishing advantage be-
tween Games 4 and 7. The analysis of these games leads to the same conclusion as
the previous games, in the case that pi1(L) has not already been defined.
Finally, in Game 8, the adversary can choose the Y values that are returned for each
query. The motivation for this step is that this makes it no harder for an adversary
to trigger any of the bad events, but makes it easier to reason about the probability
of bad events occurring.
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Landecker et al. conclude that the scheme remains secure up to approximately 2
2n
3
queries, at which point one would expect to have observed a bad event.
5.3.3 Games 4 and 5
The identified error is in the transition between Games 4 and 5, so it is useful to
have a detailed description of these games. The games, as defined by Landecker et
al., are given in Figures 5.4 and 5.5. Between these two games, the methods used to
sample V and Y (and in particular, the order in which they are sampled) changes;
the final joint distribution of V and Y should not change between these games, but
we will see that this is not achieved.
We briefly describe the sampling techniques used to choose Y in the different games.
In Game 3, Z is chosen uniformly at random from Dom(pi1) (as one would expect,
because pi1 is lazily sampled) and Y is defined to be consistent with this choice of Z.
In Game 4, an appropriately weighted coin is tossed and Y is chosen from either S1 or
S2 depending on the outcome; Z is then defined consistently, so that the distributions
of Z and Y are identical to the distribution in Game 3. In Game 5, Y is sampled
from Yi before the output of tossing the weighted coin is known. This introduces
the possibility that Y ∈ S3 (which is not possible in Game 4 if L /∈ Dom(pi1)); if Y
is chosen in S3, then bad is set and Y is resampled from either S1 or S2. Game 6 is
identical to Game 5, except that if Y ∈ S3 then it is not resampled.
Landecker et al. define ∆i =
∑
Y∈Si |pG3(Y)− pTBC(Y)|, the absolute magnitude of
the difference between the ideal probability that Y ∈ Si and the actual probability
realised when using CLRW2. They also define N = |Dom(pi1)|. The distributions of
ciphertext in Games 4, 5, and 6 are illustrated in Figures 5.6, 5.7, and 5.8.
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Game 4:
TE(T,X):
i← i+ 1; Xi ← X; Ti ← T
L ← X ⊕ h1(T)
If L ∈ Dom(pi1)
M ← pi1(L)⊕ h1(T)⊕ h2(T)
Y ←$ Yi
If M ∈ Dom(pi2)
bad1 ← true
If Y ⊕ h2(T) ∈ Rng(pi2)
bad2 ← true
pi2(M)← Y ⊕ h2(T)
Else
Vi ←$ ξ(|S2|/|Rng(pi1)|)
If Vi = 1
Y ←$ S2
If Vi = 0
Y ←$ S1
If Y ∈ S2
Z ← pi−12 (Y ⊕ h2(T))⊕ h1(T)⊕ h2(T)
If Y ∈ S1
Z ←$ Rng(pi1) \ (Dom(pi2)⊕ h2(T)⊕ h1(T))
pi2(Z ⊕ h1(T)⊕ h2(T))← Y ⊕ h2(T)
pi1(L)← Z
M ← pi1(L)⊕ h1(T)⊕ h2(T)
Return Y
Figure 5.4: Game 4 as defined by Landecker et al.
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Game 5 , Game 6:
TE(T,X):
i← i+ 1; Xi ← X; Ti ← T
L ← X ⊕ h1(T)
If L ∈ Dom(pi1)
M ← pi1(L)⊕ h1(T)⊕ h2(T)
Y ←$ Yi
If M ∈ Dom(pi2)
bad1 ← true
If Y ⊕ h2(T) ∈ Rng(pi2)
bad2 ← true
pi2(M)← Y ⊕ h2(T)
Else
Y ←$ Yi
If Y ∈ S1
Vi ← 0
If Y ∈ S2
Vi ← 1
If Y ∈ S3
bad3 ← true
Vi ←$ ξ(∆2/(∆1 + ∆2))
Z ← pi−12 (Y ⊕ h2(T))⊕ h1(T)⊕ h2(T)
// In Game 6, Vi =⊥.
If Vi = 1
Y ←$ S2
If Vi = 0
Y ←$ S1
If Y ∈ S2
Z ← pi−12 (Y ⊕ h2(T))⊕ h1(T)⊕ h2(T)
If Y ∈ S1
Z ←$ Rng(pi1) \ (Dom(pi2)⊕ h2(T)⊕ h1(T))
pi2(Z ⊕ h1(T)⊕ h2(T))← Y ⊕ h2(T)
pi1(L)← Z
M ← pi1(L)⊕ h1(T)⊕ h2(T)
Return Y
Figure 5.5: Games 5 and 6 as defined by Landecker et al. Boxed statements are
included in Game 5 and are omitted from Game 6.
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Figure 5.6: Ciphertext distribution in Game 4. The output of CLRW2 is denoted
by solid, black lines. The dashed line indicates the behaviour of an ideal
tweakable block cipher. The shaded areas correspond to ∆i.
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Figure 5.7: Ciphertext distribution in Game 5. The solid, grey line denotes the
distribution from which the output is initially sampled. The output is
resampled according to the bold arrows. The solid, black lines represent
the final distribution, which is identical to that of Game 4.
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Figure 5.8: Ciphertext distribution in Game 6. The solid, black line denotes the
distribution of outputs from CLRW2 in Game 6; this is the same as that
for an ideal tweakable block cipher. bad3 is set if the output is sampled
from the labelled region. The dashed line indicates the behaviour of
CLRW2 in previous games; Game 6 is identical to Game 5 unless bad3
is set to true.
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5.4 The flaw in the proof
In the proof of security given for CLRW2 [176], Landecker et al. assert that the
output distributions of Games 4 and 5 are identical. However, due to the way that Y
is resampled if it is drawn from S3 in Game 5, this is only the case if pG3(Y)−pTBC(Y)
is non-negative for Y ∈ S1∪S2. Unfortunately, it is possible for a series of queries to
result in pG3(Y)−pTBC(Y) being negative for all Y ∈ S1. This leads to a contradiction
of the claim that the output distributions of Games 4 and 5 are always identical. We
call the situation in which pG3(Y)− pTBC(Y) < 0 for some Y ∈ Si ∪ S2 an inversion.
In order to describe the problem and fix the proof, we redefine ∆i as
∆i =
∑
Y∈Si
pG3(Y)− pTBC(Y) ,
which lacks the modulus signs from Landecker et al.’s definition. It is worth noting
that |∆i| =
∑
Y∈Si |pG3(Y)− pTBC(Y)| for each i, because for a given set Sj pG3(Y)−
pTBC(Y) has the same sign for every Y in Sj . Using our definition, |∆j | corresponds
precisely with Landecker et al.’s definition of ∆j .
5.4.1 Flawed sampling methods
We briefly describe the differences between the sampling methods employed when L
is new in the relevant games. When Y is resampled in Game 5, the probability that
it is chosen in S2 is
|∆2|
|∆1|+|∆2| . This probability is used because if |∆1|+ |∆2| = |∆3|
then the distribution of Y does not change between Games 4 and 5. However, if
pG3(Y) − pTBC(Y) < 0 then |∆2| = |∆1| + |∆3|, so |∆1| + |∆2| > |∆3| and the
distribution of Y does change.
In fact, the difference between the distributions in Games 4 and 5 is exaggerated
by the method used by Landecker et al. to resample from S1 ∪ S2 if Y ∈ S3, as
illustrated in Figure 5.13. In the case that pG3(Y) − pTBC(Y) < 0 for Y ∈ S1, the
desired difference between the distributions in Game 4 and Game 5 for Y ∈ S1 is
−|∆1|, i.e. ∑
Y∈S1
pG3(Y) =
∑
Y∈S1
pTBC(Y)− |∆1| ,
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but using the sampling method described, this increases to |∆1| · |∆3||∆1|+|∆2| , so that∑
Y∈S1
pG3(Y) =
∑
Y∈S1
pTBC(Y) + |∆1| · |∆3||∆1|+ |∆2| .
Similarly, the difference for Y ∈ S2 is decreased from |∆2| to |∆2| · |∆3||∆1|+|∆2| .
5.4.2 Causing an inversion
The proof given by Landecker et al. [176] is correct provided no inversions occur.
We now describe how an adversary can, with high probability, cause an inversion.
First, recall that:
pTBC(Y) =
1
2n−|S4| for Y /∈ S4 ,
pG3(Y) =
N−|S2|
N|S1| for Y ∈ S1 ,
pG3(Y) =
1
N for Y ∈ S2 ,
where N = |Dom(pi1)|. Also, note that for Y ∈ S1, an inversion occurs if
1
2n − |S4| = pTBC(Y) > pG3(Y) =
N − |S2|
N|S1| .
We now consider the possibility of an inversion occurring for Y ∈ S1; in this case an
adversary can cause an inversion to occur with high probability.
Lemma 5.1. Suppose that the adversary asks a number of queries (with no restric-
tions on how X and T are chosen) so that |Dom(pi1)| = a and |Dom(pi2)| = b. If the
adversary uses a new tweak for the next query, L is new, and for every Z ∈ Rng(pi1)
we have that Z ⊕ h1(T)⊕ h2(T) ∈ Dom(pi2) then an inversion occurs.
Proof. In this case:
N = 2n − a, |S1| = 2n − b, |S2| = b, and |S3| = |S4| = 0 ,
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and the following statements are equivalent:
ab > 0 ,
22n − (a+ b)2n + ab > 22n − (a+ b)2n ,
(2n − a)(2n − b) > 2n(2n − a− b) ,
1
2n
>
2n − a− b
(2n − a)(2n − b) ,
1
2n − |S4| >
N − |S2|
N|S1| ,
pTBC(Y) > pG3(Y) ,
which is the condition for an inversion. 
This situation can occur and indeed it is easy for an adversary to force this event to
happen. If T1 6= T2 then an inversion occurs on the second query (where a = b = 1)
with probability 1 − ε ≈ 2n−12n (which is the probability that hj(T1) 6= hj(T2) when
T1 6= T2) provided that L ∈ Dom(pi1) for the second query.
It is also possible to show that inversions never occur for Y ∈ S2.
Lemma 5.2. For every Y ∈ S2 and every adversary A, pG3(Y)− pTBC(Y) ≥ 0.
Proof. In this case, we would require that
1
2n − |S4| = pTBC(Y) > pG3(Y) =
1
N
.
However, note that
2n − |S4| ≥ |S1|+ |S2| ≥ N ,
and so
1
2n − |S4| ≤
1
|S1|+ |S2| ≤
1
N
.
Therefore, for Y ∈ S2, there is no situation in which pTBC(Y) ≥ pG3(Y). 
5.5 A revised proof
The proof given by Landecker et al. can be fixed by modifying only Games 5 to
8; in doing so, we do not deviate from their proof strategy. This leads to the
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following theorem. We remark that Landecker et al. have independently identified
an alternative method to correct the error in their proof [177, 252], using a coupling
argument resulting in a tighter bound than is achieved here.
Theorem 5.3. Let A be an adversary asking a total of q queries to its oracles.
Consider the CLRW2 construction instantiated with an ε-AXU hash function. Let
εˆ = max{1/(2n−2q), ε}. Then there exists an adversary B using the same resources,
such that
AdvtsprpTBC (A) ≤ AdvsprpBC (B) +
8q3εˆ2
1− q3εˆ2 .
This should be contrasted with the original result, which concludes that there is an
adversary B against the SPRP security of E, such that:
AdvtsprpTBC (A) ≤ AdvsprpBC (B) +
6q3εˆ2
1− q3εˆ2 .
Proof. The idea of the proof is to leave Games 1 to 4 unchanged from Landecker
et al.’s description, but to sample Y in Game 5 in such a way as to ensure that the
distribution of ciphertexts in Games 4 and 5 remain identical, even in the presence
of inversions (and propagate this modification forward through the later games).
This requires us to reduce the probability of Y being sampled from S1 when ∆1 < 0
in Game 5; we do this na¨ıvely by tossing an appropriately weighted coin to decide
whether to resample Y from S2. We add conditional branches to differentiate between
the cases ∆1 ≥ 0 and ∆1 < 0; this is a simple approach, but appears to work well
and we lose only a small factor in the bound.
As before, the proof proceeds through 8 games; the revised versions of Games 5 to
8 are given in Figures 5.9, 5.10, and 5.11. We have only specified the encryption
algorithm for each of game; it is straightforward to derive the corresponding de-
cryption algorithms. The ciphertext distributions realised by each of these games
if an inversion occurs are graphically represented in Figures 5.12, 5.13, and 5.14; in
the absence of an inversion, the distributions are identical to those illustrated for
Landecker et al.’s original proof in Figures 5.6, 5.7, and 5.8.
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Game 5′ , Game 6′:
TE(T,X):
i← i+ 1; Xi ← X; Ti ← T
L ← X ⊕ h1(T)
If L ∈ Dom(pi1)
M ← pi1(L)⊕ h1(T)⊕ h2(T)
Y ←$ Yi
If M ∈ Dom(pi2)
bad1 ← true
If Y ⊕ h2(T) ∈ Rng(pi2)
bad2 ← true
pi2(M)← Y ⊕ h2(T)
Else Y ←$ Yi
If ∆1 ≥ 0
If Y ∈ S1
Vi ← 0
If Y ∈ S2
Vi ← 1
If Y ∈ S3
bad3 ← true
Vi ←$ ξ( |∆2||∆1|+|∆2|)
Z ← pi−12 (Y ⊕ h2(T))⊕ h1(T)⊕ h2(T)
If Vi = 1
Y ←$ S2
If Vi = 0
Y ←$ S1
If ∆1 < 0
If Y ∈ S3
bad3 ← true
Y ←$ S2
If Y ∈ S1
Vi ← 0
Ui ←$ ξ( |∆1|(2
n−|S4|)
|S1| )
If Ui = 1
bad4 ← true
Y ←$ S2
If Y ∈ S2
Vi ← 1
If Y ∈ S2
Z ← pi−12 (Y ⊕ h2(T))⊕ h2(T)⊕ h1(T)
Else If Y ∈ S1
Z ←$ Rng(pi1) \ (Dom(pi2)⊕ h2(T)⊕ h1(T)
pi2(Z ⊕ h1(T)⊕ h2(T))← Y ⊕ h2(T)
pi1(L)← Z
M ← pi1(L)⊕ h1(T)⊕ h2(T)
Return Y
Figure 5.9: Games 5′ and 6′ in the proof of Theorem 5.3. Boxed statements are
included in Game 5′ and are omitted from Game 6′. Note that in Game
6′ when ∆1 ≥ 0 and Y ∈ S3, Vi is not defined so neither of the following
conditional branches are executed. Between Game 4 and Game 5′, the
order in which Vi and Y are sampled is reversed. Game 5
′ is identical to
Game 5 and Game 6′ is identical to Game 6, except for the addition of
the conditional branch for the case where ∆1 < 0.
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Game 7′:
TE(T,X):
i← i+ 1; Xi ← X; Ti ← T
Y ←$ Yi
L ← X ⊕ h1(T)
If L ∈ Dom(pi1)
M ← pi1(L)⊕ h1(T)⊕ h2(T)
If M ∈ Dom(pi2)
bad1 ← true
If Y ⊕ h2(T) ∈ Rng(pi2)
bad2 ← true
pi2(M)← Y ⊕ h2(T)
Else
If Y ∈ S1
Vi ← 0
If ∆1 < 0
Ui ←$ ξ( |∆1|(2
n−|S4|)
|S1| )
If Ui = 1
bad4 ← true
If Y ∈ S2
Vi ← 1
If Y ∈ S3
bad3 ← true
Z ← pi−12 (Y ⊕ h2(T))⊕ h1(T)⊕ h2(T)
If Vi = 1
Z ← pi−12 (Y ⊕ h2(T))⊕ h2(T)⊕ h1(T)
If Vi = 0
Z ←$ Rng(pi1) \ (Dom(pi2)⊕ h2(T)⊕ h1(T))
pi2(Z ⊕ h1(T)⊕ h2(T))← Y ⊕ h2(T)
pi1(L)← Z
M ← pi1(L)⊕ h1(T)⊕ h2(T)
Return Y
Figure 5.10: Game 7′ in the proof of Theorem 5.3. The distributions of random
variables in Games 6′ and 7′ are identical, with Game 7′ simplifying
some of the program flow. Game 7′ is identical to Game 7, except for
the addition of the conditional branch for the case where ∆1 < 0.
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Game 8′:
TE(T,X, Y):
i← i+ 1; Xi ← X; Ti ← T
Yi ← Y
L ← X ⊕ h1(T)
If L ∈ Dom(pi1)
M ← pi1(L)⊕ h1(T)⊕ h2(T)
If M ∈ Dom(pi2)
bad1 ← true
If Y ⊕ h2(T) ∈ Rng(pi2)
bad2 ← true
pi2(M)← Y ⊕ h2(T)
Else
If Y ∈ S1
If ∆1 < 0
Ui ←$ ξ( |∆1|(2
n−|S4|)
|S1| )
If Ui = 1
bad4 ← true
Z ←$ Rng(pi1) \ (Dom(pi2)⊕ h2(T)⊕ h1(T)
pi2(Z ⊕ h1(T)⊕ h2(T))← Y ⊕ h2(T)
If Y ∈ S2
Z ← pi−12 (Y ⊕ h2(T))⊕ h1(T)⊕ h2(T)
If Y ∈ S3
bad3 ← true
Z ← pi−12 (Y ⊕ h2(T))⊕ h1(T)⊕ h2(T)
pi1(L)← Z
M ← pi1(L)⊕ h1(T)⊕ h2(T)
Return Y
Figure 5.11: Game 8′ in the proof of Theorem 5.3. This game gives the adversary
control over Y values, so the ‘bad flags’ can be set at least as easily as
they can in Game 7′. Game 8′ is identical to Game 8, except for the
addition of the conditional branch for the case where ∆1 < 0.
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y
1
2n−|S4|
N−|S2|
N|S1|
1
N
0
P
[Y
=
y
]
S1 S2 S3 S4
Figure 5.12: Ciphertext distribution in Game 4 when ∆1 ≤ 0. The output of
CLRW2 is denoted by solid, black lines. The dashed line indicates
the behaviour of an ideal tweakable block cipher. We do not need to
redefine Game 4 when ∆1 ≥ 0.
y
1
2n−|S4|
N−|S2|
N|S1|
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S1 S2 S3 S4
?
Figure 5.13: Ciphertext distribution in Game 5′ when ∆1 < 0. The solid, grey line
denotes the distribution from which the output is initially sampled; this
is the output distribution according to an ideal tweakable block cipher.
The output is resampled according to the bold arrows. The solid, black
lines represents the final distribution, which is identical to that of Game
4. The dashed lines labelled by ? indicate the incorrect probabilities
realised in Game 5 from Landecker et al.’s paper if ∆1 < 0.
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Figure 5.14: Ciphertext distribution in Game 6′, when ∆1 < 0. The solid, black line
denotes the distribution of CLRW2 in Game 6, which coincides with
the distribution of outputs from an ideal tweakable block cipher. bad3
and bad4 are set to true if the output is sampled from the respectively
labelled regions.
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It remains to bound the maximum distinguishing advantage available to an adversary
between each of these games. As Games 1 to 4 have not been modified, Landecker
et al.’s original analysis still applies for this part of the proof. Thus,
Pr
[AG1 → 1] ≤ Pr [AG4 → 1]+ Pr [AG4 : bad1 ∨ bad2] .
The distributions of all random variables in Games 4 and 5′ are identical, so
Pr
[AG4 → 1]+ Pr [AG4 : bad1 ∨ bad2] ≤ Pr [AG5′ → 1]+ Pr [AG5′ : bad1 ∨ bad2] .
Games 5′ and 6′ are identical unless either bad3 or bad4 gets set to true, meaning
that
Pr
[
AG5′ → 1
]
≤ Pr
[
AG6′ → 1
]
+ Pr
[
AG6′ : bad3 ∨ bad4
]
,
Pr
[
AG5′ : bad1 ∨ bad2
]
≤ Pr
[
AG6′ : (bad1 ∨ bad2)
]
+ Pr
[
AG6′ : (bad3 ∨ bad4)
]
.
The distributions of random variables in Games 6′ and 7′ are identical, with Game 7′
simplifying some of the program flow. Finally, Game 8′ gives the adversary control
over Y values, so the bad flags can be set at least as easily as they can in Game 7′.
Thus
Pr
[AG1 → 1] ≤Pr [AG8′ → 1]+ Pr [AG8′ : (bad1 ∨ bad2)]
+ 2 Pr
[
AG8′ : bad3 ∨ bad4
]
.
Noticing that bad1, bad2, and bad3 are set in identical conditions in our revised
games and Landecker et al.’s original games, we reuse their analysis:
Pr
[
AG8′ : bad1 ∨ bad2
]
≤ 2q
3εˆ2
1− q3εˆ2 and Pr
[
AG8′ : bad3
]
≤ 2q
3εˆ2
1− q3εˆ2 .
In order to bound the probability of an adversary setting bad4, we need to bound
|∆1| (2
n−|S4|)
|S1| in the case that ∆1 < 0. Lemma 5.4 gives us that
|∆1|(2
n − |S4|)
|S1| ≤
q3εˆ2
1− q3εˆ2 .
As the adversary in Game 8′ is interacting with an ideal tweakable block cipher, we
can conclude that:
Pr
[AG1 → 1] ≤ Pr [AiTBC → 1]+ 8q3εˆ2
1− q3εˆ2 .
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Thus, there is an adversary B against the SPRP security of E, such that:
AdvtsprpTBC (A) ≤ AdvsprpBC (B) +
8q3εˆ2
1− q3εˆ2 ,
as required. 
As mentioned above, bounding |∆1| (2
n−|S4|)
|S1| in the case that ∆1 < 0 bounds the
advantage an adversary gains when we change from Game 5′ to Game 6′.
Lemma 5.4. Using the notation of Theorem 5.3, if ∆1 < 0 then we have that
|∆1| · (2
n − |S4|)
|S1| ≤
q2
(2n − q)2 ≤
q3εˆ2
1− q3εˆ2 .
Proof. We can bound |∆1| in the case that ∆1 < 0 as follows. Begin by noting that:
N ≥ 2n − q, |S1| ≥ 2n − q, |S2| ≤ q, |S3| ≥ 0, and |S4| ≥ 0 .
It is straightforward to see that
|∆1| = |S1|
2n − |S4| −
N − |S2|
N
=
|S1|
2n − |S4| − 1 +
|S2|
N
=
|S1| − (2n − |S4|)
2n − |S4| +
|S2|
N
=
−|S2| − |S3|
2n − |S4| +
|S2|
N
.
Applying the bounds noted above, we can derive that
−|S2| − |S3|
2n − |S4| +
|S2|
N
≤ −|S2|+ |S3|
2n
+
|S2|
N
= |S2|
(
1
N
− 1
2n
)
− |S3|
2n
≤ |S2|
(
1
N
− 1
2n
)
≤ q
(
1
N
− 1
2n
)
≤ q
(
1
2n − q −
1
2n
)
=
q2
2n(2n − q) ,
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and hence that
|∆1| · (2
n − |S4|)
|S1| ≤
q2
2n(2n − q) ·
(2n − |S4|)
|S1|
≤ q
2
2n(2n − q) ·
2n
(2n − q)
=
q2
(2n − q)2 .
Finally, noting that 12n−q ≤ 12n−2q ≤ εˆ and that 1− q3εˆ2 ≤ 1, it can be seen that
q2
(2n − q)2 ≤ q
2εˆ2 ≤ q
3εˆ2
1− q3εˆ2 ,
as required. 
The first inequality in the statement of Lemma 5.4 is tight, in the sense that it is
possible for an adversary to ask a series of q queries and for
|∆1| · (2
n − |S4|)
|S1| =
q2
(2n − q)2 .
For this to occur we require that |S4| = |S3| = 0, |S2| = q, and N = 2n − q.
5.6 A limitation of this proof technique
A natural extension of the work of Landecker et al. [176] is to consider longer chains
of the LRW2 construction, as per Lampe and Seurin’s work [175]. The na¨ıve ap-
proach to proving results in this case (which we emphasise is not the approach taken
by Lampe and Seurin) would be to mimic Landecker et al.’s proof, increasing the
number of sets Si in order to describe where the last ‘fresh’ input to a permutation
occurs. This approach fundamentally depends on the ability to sample from a set
Rnglazy(pii)∩(Domlazy(pii+1)⊕hi(T)⊕hi+1(T)). If this set is ever empty, an adversary
may make a query that cannot be answered using this method and a different proof
technique is required.
We bound, by q < 2n−1, the number of queries that may be asked before the sampling
method described above fails. We emphasise that this does not constitute an error
in Landecker et al.’s proof and is not an issue in Lampe and Seurin’s work [175]; it
simply prevents the na¨ıve, asymptotic extension of Landecker et al.’s result.
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This bound is obtained as follows. First, note that for every j, |Domlazy(pij)| =
|Rnglazy(pij)| after every query. Also for every tweak, hj(T)⊕hj+1(T) defines a perfect
matching {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n (representing Rngfull(pij) and Domfull(pij+1)). Consider,
in parallel, all matchings (corresponding to all possible values of hj(T) ⊕ hj+1(T)).
In responding to a query, we remove (again from every matching) up to two edges:
one edge that matches the output of pij and one edge matching the input to pij+1.
For it to remain possible to respond to any later query, we must be able to sample
from the each of the sets Rnglazy(pij) ∩ (Domlazy(pij+1) ⊕ hj(T) ⊕ hj+1(T)). This
means that every matching must have at least one edge remaining. If there is a
matching with no remaining edges, then there is a value a for which one of the
Rnglazy(pij) ∩ (Domlazy(pij+1) ⊕ a is empty and thus, with this simulation strategy,
we cannot respond to every query made using a tweak for which a = hj(T)⊕hj+1(T).
We can guarantee that Rnglazy(pij)∩ (Domlazy(pij+1)⊕hj(T)⊕hj+1(T)) is not empty
for every i and j, provided that q < 2n−1. While it may remain possible to sample
from this set beyond this bound, it is not guaranteed and depends on both the
adversary’s queries and the random choices in the lazy sampling of the functions.
This does not cause a problem until n−1 block ciphers are chained together because
up to that point security is only provided for q < 2n−1. However if n−1 block ciphers
are chained together using the CLRW2 construction, then this issue can occur and
it may not be possible to respond to queries using this method.
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In this chapter, we study the security of two schemes that have been proposed for
standardisation. The first is a composition of Bernstein’s ChaCha20 and Poly1305
proposed as an authenticated encryption scheme for use in IETF protocols; the sec-
ond is an ultra-lightweight RFID authentication protocol proposed as part of ISO/IEC
29167. We conclude that the first is a secure authenticated encryption scheme, while
the second can be catastrophically broken by algebraic attacks.
The work described in this chapter on ChaCha20 and Poly1305 is available at [224].
The work described in this chapter on ISO/IEC 29167 is joint work with Carlos
Cid, Lo¨ıc Ferreira, and Matthew Robshaw; it appears as [74]. All experiments were
performed by the author.
6.1 Introduction
Cryptographic schemes typically enable a number of parties to achieve some security
objective: the classic example is two parties wanting to ensure confidentiality of their
messages. Although this example only includes two parties, the ecosystem within
which it exists consists of many users, possibly each with their own opinion on how
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to appropriately protect their data. Before they can communicate, they must first
agree the precise details of the schemes that they will use. This includes a number
of factors such as each party’s intended security objectives, a choice of schemes
claiming to achieve those objectives, and then parameters for those schemes.
In this situation, without some prior arrangement, it would be very unlikely that
two parties would happen to have both implemented a protocol that they could
use: in the extreme, they could find themselves agreeing on their security objec-
tives and the algorithms that they wish to use, but a different choice of parameters
(such as the choice of base-point on an elliptic curve) could leave them unable to
communicate. Implementing cryptosystems comes at a non-zero cost, so there is
merit in attempting to reduce the number of algorithms that must be implemented,
without significantly reducing the likelihood that any two members of a community
will be able to communicate. This is the objective of standardisation: defining a
(small) number of schemes in order that two parties using those schemes gain some
confidence that they will be able to interoperate successfully.
Because standardised schemes are likely to see widespread adoption, a critical fea-
ture of the standardisation process is that it must engender confidence in all parties.
NIST’s AES process is often given as an excellent example of how to standardise
cryptosystems: proposals from a large number of teams were publicly and compre-
hensively evaluated for several years, before an open and transparent decision was
reached. The SHA-3 process followed a similar formula. Unfortunately, this method
is very intensive, requiring many parties to propose schemes and study the proposals.
There is plenty of demand for standardisation, due to the numerous potential appli-
cations for cryptography. This leads to a few techniques seeing widespread adoption,
covering the majority of use cases. As an example, the original objective of the AES
process was to standardise a block cipher for protecting sensitive government in-
formation in the United States [212], but it has been widely reused in a range of
situations, in part because the process led to such trust in the algorithm.
For some applications, pre-existing standardised techniques are not appropriate:
heavily resource-constrained devices may not have the memory, processors, power,
or reliable randomness sources necessary to utilise these techniques; some environ-
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ments may require a large degree of parallelism, high throughput or low latency;
or there may be a desire to avoid dependence on a single scheme in case significant
crytanalytic progress requires a rapid transition to a stand-by scheme. In these sit-
uations, one could look to the output from projects such as eSTREAM to inform
the decision [214]: although the objective was not to standardise schemes, it enjoyed
involvement from a large group of academics, greatly expanded the understanding
of stream ciphers, and concluded with a portfolio of novel, but well-studied designs.
A final option, for when no existing standards or well-studied schemes meet the re-
quirements, is to specify a new scheme; as we will see, this approach is not without
its risks.
Contributions
In this chapter we discuss two cryptosystems, both proposed for standardisation.
The first is Langley’s novel combination [211] of Bernstein’s ChaCha20 stream ci-
pher [35] and Poly1305 universal-hash-based message authentication code [34]. This
combination was proposed for use in IETF protocols and has since been deployed as
part of TLS. ChaCha20 and Poly1305 are both established algorithms and we give
a security reduction demonstrating that this composition results in a secure authen-
ticated encryption scheme, requiring standard assumptions on the primitives. The
second scheme we consider is an RFID authentication protocol proposed as part
of ISO/IEC 29167 [140]. This is a novel construction targeting ultra-lightweight
devices; we demonstrate that it is insecure and can be catastrophically broken by
algebraic attacks.
6.2 The composition of ChaCha20 and Poly1305
There has recently been a proposal to the Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG)
of the Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) to consider a combination of ChaCha20
and Poly1305 for inclusion in future internet protocols [211]. This proposal has come
about, in part, due to concern over the reliance of existing IETF protocols on AES
and the risk that advances in the cryptanalysis of AES could leave users without a
good choice for a symmetric cryptographic primitive. A similar concern led to the
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SHA-3 competition: improvements in attacks against SHA-1 caused NIST to tran-
sition to the SHA-2 family of hash functions and begin considering the specification
of SHA-3. The SHA-3 competition aimed to identify an alternative hash function
that would ‘improve the robustness of NIST’s hash algorithm toolkit’ [213].
Additionally, although GCM enjoys enviable performance on platforms that offer
hardware acceleration for some of the component operations, it is less well suited
to more constrained devices [178]. As these devices become more widespread, it is
desirable to standardise a scheme that is better suited to this environment.
In this section, we give a reduction from the security of the proposed combination
of ChaCha20 and Poly1305 to the PRF security of the ChaCha20 block function.
Although both primitives are believed to be secure, it is possible to combine secure
primitives in a way that is insecure (as described in Section 2.2.8 and [29]); for this
reason, a security analysis of the combined scheme is important. The generic results
of Bellare and Namprempre [29] do not apply in this case; they rely on independent
keys being used in the component primitives.
The analysis presented in this section does not concern the security of the underlying
primitives and we will assume that the ChaCha20 block function behaves as a PRF.
The proof will also make use of the fact that Poly1305 is an ε-almost ∆ universal
hash function [262] where ∆ represents addition modulo 2128.
6.2.1 Notation
For brevity, the ChaCha20 block function will be denoted by CC, Poly1305 by
Poly, and the composition as defined in draft-irtf-cfrg-chacha20-poly1305-00 [211]
by CC&Poly. The key will be denoted by k and the initialisation vector (which must
be a per-message nonce) will be denoted by N. Associated data, plaintext, and
ciphertext will be denoted by A, P, and C respectively.
The ChaCha20 block function outputs blocks of keystream that are 512 bits wide,
so the plaintext and ciphertext will be encrypted and decrypted in blocks of 512
bits. These blocks of plaintext and ciphertext will be denoted Pi and Ci with
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P = P1|| . . . ||Pp and |Pi| = 512 bits, except perhaps for Pp which may be shorter
(similarly for C).
Poly1305 operates on 128-bit blocks, so each block of 512 bits is further divided into
128-bit blocks, however the results in this section do not require us to consider this
so we only parse strings into 512-bit blocks. When the strings A and C are zero
padded to fill 128-bit blocks this will be denoted A and C; padding is not required
in ChaCha20, so there can be no confusion about the block size (either for parsing
or padding). In the description of Poly1305, lenA,C will represent the 128-bit block
consisting of a 64-bit representation of the length of A in bytes, concatenated with
a 64-bit block corresponding to the length of C.
We use LA and LC to denote the maximum bit-lengths of associated data and
ciphertexts that may be sent using CC&Poly according to the specification. Addition
modulo 2128 will be denoted by +, with the corresponding subtraction operation
denoted by −.
6.2.2 Description of the algorithms
We now briefly describe the algorithms studied in this section. The internal details
of these algorithms are not relevant to this note and readers are referred to papers
such as [34] and [35] for further details.
6.2.2.1 ChaCha20
ChaCha20 is a stream cipher proposed by Bernstein [35], which is designed following
similar principles as Salsa20 [36] (an eSTREAM finalist). ChaCha20 generates a
keystream by applying the ChaCha20 block function to the key, nonce, and a block
counter, in a mode reminiscent of the counter mode of operation for block ciphers.
Plaintext is then encrypted using this keystream, with block i of the plaintext xored
with the output of the ChaCha20 block function, evaluated using block counter i.
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The syntax of the ChaCha20 block function is
CC : {0, 1}256 × {0, 1}32 × {0, 1}96 → {0, 1}512 .
That is, the ChaCha20 block function takes as input a 256-bit key, a 32-bit block
number, and a 96-bit nonce, and outputs 512 pseudorandom bits.
ChaCha20 is widely believed to be secure, for example it is recommended by the
European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) [115]. A
few papers have attacked reduced round versions for ChaCha20 (e.g. [13, 144, 250]),
however this analysis has not contradicted its PRF security.
6.2.2.2 Poly1305
Poly1305 is a polynomial-based universal hash function (as studied in Chapter 3),
also designed by Bernstein [34]. Some details were given in Sections 2.2.7 and 3.2.1.4;
we re-iterate the relevant facts here. The syntax of Poly1305 is
Poly : {0, 1}128 × {0, 1}? → {0, 1}128 ,
that is, Poly1305 takes as input a 128-bit key (which has some specific bits set to
zero) and a message of arbitrary length, outputting a 128-bit string as the message
digest. The output of Poly1305 is computed by evaluating a particular polynomial
in F2130−5 (as described in Section 3.2.1) and then truncating the output to 128
bits. The key used in Poly1305 has certain bits ‘clamped’ to zero for performance
reasons. The polynomial’s coefficients are determined by the message, with each
128-bit message block encoded to an integer modulo 2130 − 5.
Bernstein [34] shows that Poly1305 is ε-almost ∆ universal where ∆ represents
addition modulo 2128, ε = 8dL/16e
2106
and messages are at most L bytes long. Although
the universality of polynomial-evaluation-based hash functions is well established
(as described in Section 2.2.7), the disparity between the field used to evaluate the
polynomial and the group used for the encryption of the hash output means that
this result is not inherited from other polynomial-based schemes. The outcome
of this is that if the output of Poly1305 is encrypted by adding (modulo 2128) a
uniform random string then the resulting string is an information-theoretic message
157
6.2 The composition of ChaCha20 and Poly1305
authentication code (see [168] and [262]) and any adversary attempting to forge an
authentication tag succeeds with probability at most ε.
6.2.2.3 The composition
The composition defined in Section 2.8 of draft-irtf-cfrg-chacha20-poly1305 [211] has
three main parts, informally given below and more precisely described by E0k and
D0k of Figure 6.1:
Key derivation: A one-time Poly1305 key, r, and pseudo-one-time-pad, s, are
derived from k and N using the ChaCha20 block function with 0 as value of
the block counter.
Encryption: The plaintext is encrypted using ChaCha20, with block i of the plain-
text xored with the output of ChaCha20 block function on input (k, i,N).
Tag generation: Poly1305 is evaluated using the one time key r, which has certain
bits set to zero. The input to Poly1305 is a message consisting of: associ-
ated data (padded with zeros to the next 128-bit block boundary), ciphertext
(padded similarly), and a 128-bit block containing 64-bit representations of
the length (in bytes) of both the associated data and the ciphertext. The
pseudo-one-time-pad is then added (modulo 2128) to the resulting digest.
6.2.3 Security model
The objective of this section is to demonstrate that the combination of ChaCha20
and Poly1305 described above is a secure authenticated encryption scheme, in the
sense defined in Section 2.2.8. We will parametrise the adversary by the number of
queries that are made to an encryption oracle and a decryption oracle (qE and qD
queries respectively).
In this section, we use a slightly different definition of adversarial advantage than
the one introduced in Section 2.2.8:
AdvaeadCC&Poly =
∣∣∣Pr[ACC&Poly → 1]− Pr[A$,⊥ → 1]∣∣∣ ,
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where $ represents an oracle returning an appropriate number of random bits and ⊥
is an oracle that returns the distinguished value representing an invalid ciphertext
on every input. These two definitions are well-known to be equivalent; noting that
Pr[AEADAEAD,A ] = Pr[b = 1] Pr[AAEAD → 1] + Pr[b = 0] Pr[A$,⊥ → 0] ,
it is easy to see that∣∣∣2 Pr[AEADAEAD,A ]− 1∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣Pr[AAEAD → 1] + Pr[A$,⊥ → 0]− 1∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣Pr[AAEAD → 1] + (1− Pr[A$,⊥ → 1])− 1∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣Pr[AAEAD → 1]− Pr[A$,⊥ → 1]∣∣∣ .
The proof proceeds via a series of games such that the AE-Enc and AE-Dec oracles
in Game 0 realise CC&Poly and in Game 4 realise ($,⊥); the AE-Enc and AE-Dec
oracles in Game i are denoted Ei and Di respectively.
All adversaries considered in this section will be restricted to nonce-respecting ad-
versaries. This is common for nonce-based authenticated encryption schemes and
means that an adversary will never ask encryption queries (N,A, P) and (N,A′, P ′)
for (A,P) 6= (A′, P ′). There is no restriction on the adversary’s use of nonces
for decryption queries. Without loss of generality, we only consider repeat- and
redundancy-free adversaries (i.e. the input to an oracle is never repeated and the
output from an E query is never input to the D oracle, or vice versa).
6.2.4 Our result
It is assumed in this security analysis that no pair (k,N ′) is ever repeated, where N ′
is the 96-bit nonce that is input to the ChaCha20 block function; this assumption is
critical to the security of CC&Poly. The draft recognises that not all protocols will
use 96-bit nonces and ‘it is up to the protocol document to define how to transform the
protocol nonce into a 96-bit nonce’ [211, Sect. 2.8]; one suggestion is that prepending
a constant value could provide a way to expand a shorter nonce to 96 bits.
If an implementation permits both 96-bit nonces and shorter nonces and an adver-
sary is able to predict how a short nonce will be expanded to 96 bits (for example,
by guessing the value that will be prepended), then a nonce collision could be forced
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by querying the encryption oracle using a short N and a 96-bit N ′ which is the
expanded version of N.
The following theorem assumes that all nonces are 96 bits long and that no pair
(key,nonce) is ever repeated to the encryption oracle; the protocol specification
therefore must prevent nonce collisions of this form.
Theorem 6.1. For every adversary A against the AEAD security of CC&Poly,
there is an adversary B against the PRF security of the ChaCha20 block function,
such that
AdvaeadCC&Poly(A) ≤ AdvprfCC(B) + qD
8(dL/128e)
2106
,
where L = 128(dLA128e+d
LC
128e+1), A makes qE encryption queries and qD decryption
queries, and B makes at most (qE + qD) (dLC/512e+ 1) queries.
Proof. The proof of this theorem proceeds via a series of games, specified in Fig-
ures 6.1 and 6.2. Game 0 defines a combined IND$-CPA and INT-CTXT game,
with oracles that realise CC&Poly. The scheme specified in Game 4 clearly gives
no adversary any advantage in either of the IND$-CPA and INT-CTXT games: the
ciphertext blocks and tag are sampled independently of P and uniformly at ran-
dom from {0, 1}512 (as they would be if generated by $) and it is impossible for an
adversary to make a query to D4 that returns (N,A, P) 6=⊥.
The transitions between these games are justified as follows:
Games 0 and 1 If an adversary is able to distinguish between these two games,
then they can distinguish the ChaCha20 block function from a function chosen
uniformly at random from the set of all functions with domain {0, 1}128 and
range {0, 1}512. The advantage gained by an adversary in this transition is
therefore bounded above by AdvprfCC(B), where B is an adversary that makes
at most (qE + qD) (dLC/512e+ 1) queries to its oracle in the PRF game.
Games 1 and 2 These games are identical, on the condition that the inputs to urf
in Game 1 never repeat. The inputs to urf are all of the form (i||N); for each
query, N is constant, but i is never reused and no two encryption queries use
the same value for N (as A is nonce respecting and non-repeating), therefore
the random variables in Games 1 and 2 are identically distributed.
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Games 2 and 3 These games are identical unless an adversary submits (N,A,C, τ)
to their decryption oracle and D1 returns (N,A, P) 6=⊥. However, for each
query that an adversary makes, this happens with probability at most ε be-
cause A is non-redundant and Poly is ε-almost ∆ universal, using results from
[168], [34], and [262]. By a standard hybrid argument, the probability that an
adversary making at most qD queries to D successfully forges is at most εqD.
Games 3 and 4 The random variables in these games are sampled in different
orders, however the joint distributions are identical and therefore these games
are identical.
A standard game-hopping argument allows the probability Pr[AG(i−1) → 1] to be
bounded in terms of Pr[AGi → 1]:
Pr[AG0 → 1] ≤ Pr[AG1 → 1] + AdvprfCC(B) ,
Pr[AG1 → 1] = Pr[AG2 → 1] ,
Pr[AG2 → 1] ≤ Pr[AG3 → 1] + εqD ,
Pr[AG3 → 1] = Pr[AG4 → 1] = Pr[A$,⊥ → 1] ,
where B makes at most (qE + qD) (dLC/512e+ 1) queries.
Bernstein [34] demonstrates that Poly1305 is ε-almost ∆ universal for ε = 8dL/128e
2106
where L denotes the maximum bit length of messages and ∆ represents addition
modulo 2128. For CC&Poly, L = 128(dLA128e + d
LC
128e + 1) as A and C are padded to
128-bit blocks and an extra 128 bits are added to encode the length of additional
data and ciphertext.
Therefore it can be concluded that for every adversary A there is an adversary
B against the PRF security of the ChaCha20 block function that makes (qE +
qD) (dLC/512e+ 1) queries in the PRF game such that:
AdvaeadCC&Poly(A) ≤ AdvprfCC(B) + qD
8(dL/128e)
2106
.

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Game i:
k ←$ {0, 1}256
urf ←$ Func({0, 1}128, {0, 1}512)
b′ ←$ AEik ,Dik
Return b′
Game 0:
E0k(N,A, P)
r||s← trunc256(CCk(0||N))
For i = 1, . . . , p− 1:
Zi ← CCk(i||N)
Ci ← Zi ⊕ Pi
Z?p ← trunc|Pp|(CCk(p||N))
Cp ← Z?p ⊕ Pp
τ ← Polyr(A||C||lenA,C) + s
Return (N,A,C, τ)
D0k(N,A,C, τ)
r||s← trunc256(CCk(0||N))
τ ′ ← Polyr(A||C||lenA,C) + s
If τ 6= τ ′
Return ⊥
For i = 1, . . . , p− 1:
Zi ← CCk(i||N)
Pi ← Zi ⊕ Ci
Z?p ← trunc|Cp|(CCk(p||N))
Pp ← Z?p ⊕ Cp
Return (N,A, P)
Game 1:
E1k(N,A, P)
r||s← trunc256(urf(0||N))
For i = 1, . . . , p− 1:
Zi ← urf(i||N)
Ci ← Zi ⊕ Pi
Z?p ← trunc|Pp|(urf(p||N))
Cp ← Z?p ⊕ Pp
τ ← Polyr(A||C||lenA,C) + s
Return (N,A,C, τ)
D1k(N,A,C, τ)
r||s← trunc256(urf(0||N))
τ ′ ← Polyr(A||C||lenA,C) + s
If τ 6= τ ′
Return ⊥
For i = 1, . . . , p− 1:
Zi ← urf(i||N)
Pi ← Zi ⊕ Ci
Z?p ← trunc|Cp|(CCk(p||N))
Pp ← Z?p ⊕ Cp
Return (N,A, P)
Figure 6.1: Games 0 and 1 in the proof of Theorem 6.1.
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Game 2:
E2k(N,A, P)
r||s ←$ {0, 1}256
For i = 1, . . . , p− 1:
Zi ←$ {0, 1}512
Ci ← Zi ⊕ Pi
Z?p ←$ {0, 1}|Pp|
Cp ← Z?p ⊕ Pp
τ ← Polyr(A||C||lenA,C) + s
Return (N,A,C, τ)
D2k(N,A,C, τ)
r||s ←$ {0, 1}256
τ ′ ← Polyr(A||C||lenA,C) + s
If τ 6= τ ′
Return ⊥
For i = 1, . . . , p− 1:
Zi ←$ {0, 1}512
Pi ← Zi ⊕ Ci
Z?p ←$ {0, 1}|Cp|
Pp ← Z?p ⊕ Cp
Return (N,A, P)
Game 3:
E3k(N,A, P)
r||s ←$ {0, 1}256
For i = 1, . . . , p− 1:
Zi ←$ {0, 1}512
Ci ← Zi ⊕ Pi
Z?p ←$ {0, 1}|Pp|
Cp ← Z?p ⊕ Pp
τ ← Polyr(A||C||lenA,C) + s
Return (N,A,C, τ)
D3k(N,A,C, τ)
Return ⊥
Game 4:
E4k(N,A, P)
r||τ ←$ {0, 1}256
For i = 1, . . . , p− 1:
Ci ←$ {0, 1}512
Zi ← Ci ⊕ Pi
Cp ←$ {0, 1}|Pp|
Z?p ← Pp ⊕ Cp
s← τ − Polyr(A||C||lenA,C)
Return (N,A,C, τ)
D4k(N,A,C, τ)
Return ⊥
Figure 6.2: Games 2 to 4 in the proof of Theorem 6.1.
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6.3 Algebraic cryptanalysis and ISO/IEC 29167-15
The standardisation of cryptography for low-cost ultra-high frequency (UHF) RFID
tags has begun; these standards allow (tag, interrogator and mutual) authentication
and secure tag-interrogator communications to be securely implemented. Passive
UHF RFID tags pose some major challenges when deploying cryptography as they
are very limited in terms of the space available in silicon and the power available
for on-tag computation. By comparison the high frequency (HF) RFID tags found
in public transport ticketing and NFC applications are positively luxurious.
The standardisation group ISO/IEC SC31/WG7 is working on a set of cryptographic
suites to provide security to wireless devices including UHF RFID tags. These cryp-
tographic suites are presented as independent parts to a single standard ISO/IEC
29167. Within this multi-part standard, 29167-15 is based around very simple op-
erations and is intended to provide tag, interrogator, and mutual authentication.
The primary conclusion of this section is that ISO/IEC 29167-15 offers poor—in
fact non-existent—security. While the scheme in 29167-15 can be compromised in
many ways, we leverage algebraic cryptanalysis to provide an elegant and efficient
attack, recovering the entire key after eavesdropping just four authentications.
A secondary, but arguably more far-reaching conclusion, is a warning that technically
poor proposals can advance far into the standardisation process. There are many
existing sound (and standardised) cryptographic designs for both HF and UHF RFID
tags and it is hoped that this analysis deters standardisation bodies and product
developers from adopting schemes that have received little technical scrutiny.
6.3.1 The standardisation landscape for UHF RFID
To understand why the standardisation work examined in this section is underway,
it is necessary to understand the role of other standards in this field. The commands
that can be sent to a (standardised) UHF RFID tag are defined in two documents
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command RFU SenRep IncRepLen
length 8 2 1 1
value d5x 00b 0b/1b 0b/1b
CSI Length Message RN CRC
length 8 12 variable 16 16
value ? ? ? handle CRC-16
Table 6.1: The format of an Authenticate command in Gen2v2.
that have been published1 by EPCglobal, part of GS1. The dominant standard
covering all current large-scale deployments is known as Gen2v1 [103] and the final
update to this standard was published in 2008. In 2013 the Gen2v2 standard was
published [104], extending the functionality of Gen2v1. The most significant and
far-reaching additions are optional over-the-air commands that allow the deployment
of security functionality.
Gen2v2 defines the over-the-air commands for UHF RFID but this is all that it does.
For instance, a command authenticate is defined and this can be used to develop
a solution for tag, interrogator, or mutual authentication. However all the security
commands in Gen2v2, including authenticate, have been deliberately designed to
be flexible and crypto-agnostic; they are completely independent of any specific cryp-
tographic technology. As an example, the format of the authenticate command is
given in Table 6.1. The handle and CRC-16 are part of the communication protocol
while SenRep and IncRepLen are application options. The fields marked ? are the
most important for our purposes; their values are not defined by Gen2v2. The CSI
field identifies the cryptographic algorithm/protocol and the Length/Message fields
locate the cryptographic payload being carried by the command.
For the cryptographic technology itself we would likely turn to the usual sources.
NIST standardises cryptographic technologies such as the AES [208]. Other crypto-
graphic technologies have been standardised within ISO/IEC SC27 including some,
such as Present [59, 143] and cryptoGPS [123, 141], which are explicitly targeted at
constrained environments.
1The Gen2v1 specifications are also standardised within ISO/IEC 18000-63 with Gen2v2 stan-
dardisation underway as a revision.
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However there is an implementation gap between the over-the-air commands and the
cryptographic primitives. For example, the authenticate command says nothing
about how to achieve tag authentication using, say, a challenge-response authentica-
tion protocol and in particular does not specify which algorithms might be supported
on the tag or interrogator. Similarly, the AES standard (FIPS-197 [208]) does not
tell us how to use the AES block cipher to perform tag authentication; instead
FIPS-197 tells us how a 128-bit output is derived from a 128-bit input and a key.
It is the goal of the work in ISO/IEC SC31/WG7, therefore, to provide a mapping
between the cryptographic primitive and the generic over-the-air command; that is,
to fill in the information marked ? in the command above. This mapping is referred
to as a cryptographic suite and the ISO/IEC 29167 standard consists of several
parts, each describing a cryptographic suite and a solution. If one wishes to perform
tag authentication using AES-128 then ISO/IEC 29167-10 is the cryptographic suite
of interest. For tag authentication with Present-80, Grain-128a or cryptoGPS, parts
29167-11 [143], 29167-13 [139], and 29167-17 [141] are, respectively, the ones to use.
Many of the cryptographic suites in ISO/IEC 29167 are built on trusted or previously
standardised primitives. However some of the cryptographic suites, most notably
29167-15, have been built around new, immature, or weak proposals. Unfortunately,
the ISO/IEC voting structure is such that even a technically poor proposal can
advance far through the standardisation process. Indeed, the long-term outcome for
the final version of 29167-15 is not currently clear: one of the more likely outcomes
is that it becomes a technical specification. This would temporarily halt work on
the standard and provide the opportunity for public comment; after three years
technical standards are either abandoned or re-introduced to the standards process.
6.3.2 The first version of ISO/IEC 29167-15
One reason for the longevity of ISO/IEC 29167-15 is that patches have been ap-
plied throughout the voting process. All variants of ISO/IEC 29167-15 propose
mechanisms for tag, interrogator, and mutual authentication. These mechanisms
are simple and built around the supposed difficulty of analysing a combination of
bitwise xor and integer addition. The first proposals were even simpler; see Table 6.2.
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Interrogator (secret key PSK) Tag (secret key PSK)
Choose RnInt
RnInt−−−−−−−−→
RnTag←−−−−−−−− Choose RnTag
SK = PSK⊕ RnInt⊕ RnTag SK = PSK⊕ RnInt⊕ RnTag
Choose ChInt
A = SK⊕ ChInt A−−−−→
ChInt = SK⊕ A
RChInt = reverse(ChInt)
B←−−−− B = SK⊕ RChInt
T = SK⊕ B
reverse(T)
?
= ChInt
Table 6.2: The first version of the tag authentication scheme with the notation used
in the original document. All variables are 64 bits long.
There are many problems with the proposal in Table 6.2 but the most pressing is
that there is no security. The sole use of a single operator (in this case bitwise xor)
gives a differential attack. By eavesdropping an attacker recovers RnInt, RnTag, A,
and B. The adversary can then make a fake tag that fools a legitimate reader without
knowing the secret key PSK. The attack is outlined in Table 6.3 where we denote the
variables in a subsequent run of the protocol with *.
To confirm that the fake tag is always accepted as genuine we observe that
reverse(T*) = reverse(SK* ⊕ B⊕ reverse(X)⊕∆SK)
= reverse(SK⊕ B)⊕ X = reverse(SK⊕ (SK⊕ RChInt))⊕ X
= ChInt⊕ X = ChInt⊕∆A ⊕∆SK
= (SK⊕ A)⊕ (A⊕ A*)⊕ (SK⊕ SK*) = A* ⊕ SK* = ChInt* .
A tag can be cloned after eavesdropping one legitimate authentication.
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Interrogator (secret key PSK) Fake Tag
Choose RnInt*
RnInt*−−−−−−−−−→
RnTag*←−−−−−−−−− Choose RnTag*
SK* = PSK⊕ RnInt* ⊕ RnTag* SK* is unknown
∆I = RnInt⊕ RnInt*
∆T = RnTag⊕ RnTag*
Save ∆SK = ∆I ⊕∆T
Choose ChInt*
A* = SK* ⊕ ChInt* A
*
−−−−−→
A⊕ A* = ∆A
X = ∆A ⊕∆SK
B*←−−−−− B* = B⊕ reverse(X)⊕∆SK
T* = SK* ⊕ B*
reverse(T*)
?
= ChInt*
Table 6.3: Fooling a legitimate reader during tag authentication. The attacker has
eavesdropped on one run of the protocol in Table 6.2. The (changing)
parameters in this second run are indicated using *.
6.3.3 The working draft of ISO/IEC 29167-15
After this inauspicious start a variant was formally proposed as a working draft
(WD). The tag authentication protocol is illustrated in Table 6.4. Interrogator au-
thentication is provided by reversing the roles of the two participants while mutual
authentication is derived by interleaving two sessions that establish tag and inter-
rogator authentication.
We now show that the key can be recovered in a passive attack with high reliability.
Indeed, suppose an attacker intercepts SRN and SORN from a legitimate authentica-
tion session. We then have that
SRN⊕ SORN = (RN + 0x55 · · · 55)⊕ RN .
The least significant bit of SRN ⊕ SORN is always set to 1 and further analysis of
SRN⊕ SORN is easy to make.
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Interrogator (secret key PSK) Tag (secret key PSK)
Choose RN
SRN = RN⊕ PSK SRN−−−−−−→ RN = SRN⊕ PSK
A = RN + 0x55 · · · 55
B = SORN⊕ PSK SORN←−−−−−−− SORN = A⊕ PSK
B
?
= RN + 0x55 · · · 55
Table 6.4: The first formal proposal of the ISO/IEC 29167-15 tag authentication
scheme. For clarity the notation is slightly adapted from that used in
documentation. The shared secret key PSK and all intermediate values
are 64 bits long, ⊕ denotes bitwise xor, and + denotes integer addition
modulo 264.
For instance, the 232 values of RN for which RN ∧ 0x55 · · · 55 = 0x00 · · · 00 will give
SRN⊕SORN = 0x55 · · · 55 and so observations based on the distribution of SRN⊕SORN
can be used to recover RN and, via SRN, the shared secret key PSK.
For an alternative approach, we simplify the notation by setting Z = SRN ⊕ SORN,
R = RN, and C = 0x55 · · · 55 and so SRN⊕ SORN = Z = R⊕ (R + C). Considering this
equation bit-by-bit gives, for bit position j with j ≥ 0,
Zj = Rj ⊕ ((Rj + Cj + Tj−1) mod 2) = Cj ⊕ Tj−1 ,= Cj ⊕ Tj−1 ,
where Tj−1 denotes the carry given at bit j−1 generated within the integer addition
R + C. Setting T−1 = 0, the carry bit Tj for j ≥ 0 is computed as
Tj = maj(Rj , Cj , Tj−1) = (Rj ∧ Cj)⊕ (Rj ∧ Tj−1)⊕ (Cj ∧ Tj−1)
= (Rj ∧ (Cj ⊕ Tj−1))⊕ (Cj ∧ Tj−1) ,
where maj denotes the majority function. Hence, for j ≥ 0,
Zj+1 = Cj+1 ⊕ (Rj ∧ (Cj ⊕ Tj−1))⊕ (Cj ∧ Tj−1)
= Cj+1 ⊕ (Rj ∧ Sj)⊕ (Cj ∧ (Zj ⊕ Cj))
= Cj+1 ⊕ (Rj ∧ Sj)⊕ (Cj ∧ (Zj ⊕ 1)) .
This means that, for j ≥ 0, we have Rj ∧ Zj = Zj+1 ⊕ Cj+1 ⊕ (Cj ∧ (Zj ⊕ 1)), which
we write, setting Vj = Rj ∧ Zj , as
Vj = Zj+1 ⊕ Cj+1 ⊕ (Cj ∧ (Zj ⊕ 1)) for j ≥ 0 .
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Looking at the expression for Vj we see that it consists entirely of arguments from
Z, which is available to an eavesdropper, and C which is fixed and known. Thus if
Zj = 1 for bit j, which we expect half the time, then we can compute Rj directly
and the corresponding bit of the shared secret PSK is given by
PSKj = Rj ⊕ SRNj .
Each bit of PSKj , for 0 ≤ j ≤ 62 can be recovered and we expect to be able to
recover all but the most significant bit of PSKj with two intercepted authentications.
The work-effort is negligible. Note that this gives us two possible values for the
full 64-bit shared secret PSK. However these two keys are equivalent, that is they
behave identically in the authentication protocol, and so they can both be used to
impersonate a tag.
6.3.4 The first committee draft of ISO/IEC 29167-15
Early versions of ISO/IEC 29167-15 (several new work item proposals and a working
draft) were clearly weak and offered little promise. However, sufficiently many na-
tional bodies abstained or voted positively at each round of voting that the scheme
moved forward towards standardisation anyway. Once we arrive at a committee draft
(CD) the document should, in theory, be technically mature: subsequent stages of
the process, namely draft international standard (DIS) and final draft international
standard (FDIS), provide little opportunity for technical modification before pub-
lication. Yet as we will show in this section, even the latest versions of ISO/IEC
29167-15 are far from being technically mature and are, in fact, completely insecure.
To repair the weaknesses in the first formal submission to ISO/IEC WD 29167-15 a
patched version was briefly proposed; see Table 6.5.
6.3.4.1 Conventional observations
Again, we can immediately see that the least significant bit of SRNi ⊕ SORNi is
always set to 0. It is easy to find other faults and we simplify the notation by
setting R = RNi, C = 0x55 · · · 55, and S = SRNi, with SO = SORNi.
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Interrogator (secret key PSK) Tag (secret key PSK)
Choose RNi
SRNi = (RNi + C)⊕ PSK SRNi−−−−−−−→ RNi = (SRNi⊕ PSK)− C
SORNi⊕ RNi ?= PSK + C SORNi←−−−−−−−− SORNi = (PSK + C)⊕ RNi
Table 6.5: A ‘patched’ version of the ISO/IEC 29167-15 tag authentication scheme
from which the final committee draft version is derived. All variables are
64 bits long and C = 0x55 · · · 55.
This gives us S = (R + C)⊕ PSK and SO = (PSK + C)⊕ R, so
S⊕ PSK = ((PSK + C)⊕ SO) + C . (6.1)
We can use Equation 6.1 as a distinguisher to check if a possible value for the key
PSK is a correct candidate. This can be done in several ways, but we illustrate a
byte-by-byte approach, first considering the least significant byte of PSK.
Suppose p, s, so are the least significant bytes of PSK, S, and SO respectively. Then
any x satisfying s ⊕ x = ((x + 0x55) ⊕ so) + 0x55 is a good candidate for p. After
eight to sixteen runs, one value should be predicted with close to 100% reliability
and the least significant byte of the key is recovered. In parallel, we can process
other bytes of PSK in the same manner.
There is a slight complication due to the possibility of a carry from one byte to
another in the integer addition; at the same time the most significant bit of each
byte might also need some attention. However, closer analysis when using particular
values S and SO can be used to avoid significant carry propagation. This allows us to
filter incorrect values and the few key candidates that remain can be tested against
the tag to find the right one.
Passively eavesdropping on eight to sixteen authentication runs appears to be suf-
ficient to recover each byte of the key PSK with good reliability. The work effort is
negligible since all bytes can be treated in parallel.
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6.3.4.2 Algebraic cryptanalysis
The scheme in ISO/IEC 29167-15 uses a set of very simple operations and algebraic
cryptanalysis proves to be very effective.
Let n be the size of all variables in the protocol; in our case we have n = 64.
We will assume that an attacker can eavesdrop on k runs of a uni-directional (tag
or interrogator) authentication protocol. Since the mutual authentication protocol
consists of two interleaved runs of a uni-directional protocol, observing k runs of
the mutual authentication protocol will give identical results to 2k runs of the uni-
directional protocol. Without loss of generality we have implemented the attack on
the protocol for uni-directional (tag or interrogator) authentication.
Denote the value of SRNi on the tth run of the protocol by SRNit, similarly for SORNi
and RNi. We use variables pi, st i, rt i, sot i, at i, and bt i for 0 ≤ i < n and
0 ≤ t < k assuming that all strings are written using big-endian convention, i.e.
PSK = pn−1 . . . p1p0. The equations used to represent the scheme will be defined
over F2, using + to denote addition and ∗ to denote multiplication.
We represent the computation of SRNit as
st i = pi + rt i + at i + ci ,
for 0 ≤ i < n, 0 ≤ t < k, where at i is the carry bit during the modular addition of
RNit and C. This gives, for 0 ≤ i < n,
at 0 =0
at i =maj(rt (i−1), ci−1, at (i−1))
=rt (i−1) ∗ ci−1 + rt (i−1) ∗ at (i−1) + at (i−1) ∗ ci−1 .
Similarly the computation of SORNit can be represented (with the same indices) as
bt 0 =0 ,
sot i =pi + rt i + bt i + ci ,
bt i =pi−1 ∗ ci−1 + pi−1 ∗ bt (i−1) + bt (i−1) ∗ ci−1 ,
where the variable b denotes the carry bits.
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Finally, we define equations to represent the observed values of SRNit and SORNit
and the specified value of C; st i = SRNi
t
i, sot i = SORNi
t
i, and ci = Ci. Our system
is presented as polynomials over the finite field F2, i.e. all variables and coefficients
take values in {0, 1}. We therefore include the equations of the form x2 = x for
every variable x.
The complete set of equations can be summarised as follows:
st i = pi + rt i + at i + ci 0 ≤ i < n 0 ≤ t < k
at (i+1) = rt i ∗ ci + rt i ∗ at i + at i ∗ ci 0 ≤ i < n− 1 0 ≤ t < k
at 0 = 0 0 ≤ t < k
sot i = pi + rt i + bt i + ci 0 ≤ i < n 0 ≤ t < k
bt (i+1) = pi ∗ ci + pi ∗ bt i + bt i ∗ ci 0 ≤ i < n− 1 0 ≤ t < k
bt 0 = 0 0 ≤ t < k
st i = SRNi
t
i 0 ≤ i < n 0 ≤ t < k
sot i = SORNi
t
i 0 ≤ i < n 0 ≤ t < k
ci = Ci 0 ≤ i < n
x2 = x for all x .
This system of polynomial equations includes 5nk + 2n variables and 11nk + 3n
equations of degree at most two. Of course this system can be greatly simplified,
by substituting the variables that have a fixed value (e.g. ci, at 0, bt 0), as well as
the ones observed in the protocol runs (st i and sot i). This reduces the number of
variables to (3n − 2)k + n, and the number of equations to (7n − 4)k + n. For the
parameter values of relevance to ISO/IEC 29167-15, the entire system will consist
therefore of 444k + 64 equations in 190k + 64 variables, which can be constructed
for the very small values of k that are required to recover the key. We use Gro¨bner
bases algorithms to solve this system [77].
The average number of key bits recovered and the average time required to solve the
system of equations are given in the following table and illustrated in Figure 6.3.
Number of protocol runs (k) 1 2 3 4
Average number of key bits recovered 19.7 51.1 59.4 61.7
Average run time (s) 8 83 113 255
The attack was implemented on SageMathCloud [257] and timed using Python’s
timeit function; any set-up time is assumed to be pre-computed or amortised over
many protocol runs.
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Figure 6.3: Results from experiments against the first committee draft of ISO/IEC
29167-15. The number of protocol runs is given by k and each set of
experiments on k authentications was repeated 45 independent times.
The values (PSK, RNi1) were chosen randomly for each trial when k = 1. As the
number of protocol runs was increased PSK remains unchanged but fresh random
choices were used for RNi2, RNi3, and RNi4 as would be expected in a real-life im-
plementation.
Our experiments suggest that after witnessing four uni-directional runs of the pro-
tocol (or just two mutual authentication runs) the attacker would be able to recover
62 out of 64 bits of the secret key in around 84% of the time. While the entirety of
the key can often be recovered, we conjecture that the ‘missing’ bits that occur from
time-to-time are neutral bits; the values of these bits cannot be determined by that
particular instance of the equation system. This is a feature of many cryptanalytic
techniques and is often exhibited in the most significant bits of operations such as
integer addition. While it may be interesting to provide an exact explanation of this
phenomenon, it is not relevant to the essential message of our cryptanalysis.
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6.3.5 The final committee draft of ISO/IEC 29167-15
The fourth iteration to be described in this chapter is the final committee draft of
ISO/IEC 29167-15. The mutual authentication protocol is given in Table 6.6. As
in previous versions of the scheme, tag and interrogator authentication are derived
from the relevant halves of the full authentication protocol.
Several changes have been made to this latest proposal to complicate the task of
the cryptanalyst. The use of the (unknown) bitwise rotation seems to prevent the
attacker from aligning bits in the challenge and response in a trivial way. For
example a single bit change in the challenge will change the Hamming weight of the
candidate RNi derived by the tag; this would result in different rotation amounts
being used for the computation of the final response.
Despite these complications, it is straightforward to compromise the scheme. Our
initial analysis suggested that even with the rotation operation, the scheme can
be compromised using conventional cryptanalysis after intercepting around 32 uni-
directional authentication runs. However, as demonstrated in the previous section,
it is more elegant and efficient to use algebraic cryptanalysis against ISO/IEC 29167-
15 scheme. This technique allows us again to recover the shared secret key PSK after
eavesdropping on as few as four authentication runs.
6.3.5.1 Algebraic cryptanalysis of ISO/IEC 29167-15 final committee draft
As before, we need to set up a system of multivariate polynomial equations. The
system used to describe this latest scheme is similar to that of Section 6.3.4. However
it is helpful to introduce some additional variables to take account of the rotation:
mt i corresponds to PSK
′
i in the t
th protocol run and nt i corresponds to RNi
′
i in
the tth protocol run. In truth these variables have been introduced to improve the
exposition of the attack. It would be straightforward to work without them if there
were significant advantage in doing so.
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Interrogator Tag
(secret key PSK) (secret key PSK)
Choose RNi
SRNi = (RNi + C)⊕ PSK SRNi−−−−−−−→ RNi = (SRNi⊕ PSK)− C
wi = hw(RNi)
PSK′ = PSK≪ wi
RNi′ = RNi≪ wi
SORNi = (PSK′ + C)⊕ RNi′
Choose RNt
wi = hw(RNi)
SORNi←−−−−−−−−
SRNt
SRNt = (RNt + C)⊕ PSK
PSK′ = PSK≪ wi
RNi′ = RNi≪ wi
(SORNi⊕ RNi′) ?= (PSK′ + C)
tag authenticated
RNt = (SRNt⊕ PSK)− C
wt = hw(RNt)
PSK′ = PSK≪ wt
RNt′ = RNt≪ wt
SORNt = (PSK′ + C)⊕ RNt′ SORNt−−−−−−−−→ wt = hw(RNt)
PSK′ = PSK≪ wt
RNt′ = RNt≪ wt
(SORNt⊕ RNt′) ?= (PSK′ + C)
interrogator authenticated
Table 6.6: Mutual authentication, as specified in the latest version of ISO/IEC
29167-15. The Hamming weight of A is denoted hw(A) while A ≪ w
denotes the left bitwise rotation of A by w bits.
176
6.3 Algebraic cryptanalysis and ISO/IEC 29167-15
In this variant of the scheme we need to take account of the unknown rotation
amount. The simplest way to do this is to guess the rotation amount, and to solve
each set of equations that arise for each guess. To include this within the equation
system we introduce an array rot guess where rot guess[t] is a guess for the Hamming
weight of RNit.
The complete set of equations can be summarised as follows:
st i = pi + rt i + at i + ci 0 ≤ i < n 0 ≤ t < k
at (i+1) = rt i ∗ ci + rt i ∗ at i + at i ∗ ci 0 ≤ i < n− 1 0 ≤ t < k
at 0 = 0 0 ≤ t < k
mt i = p(i+rot guess[t]%n) 0 ≤ i < n 0 ≤ t < k
nt i = rt (i+rot guess[t]%n) 0 ≤ i < n 0 ≤ t < k
sot i = mt i + nt i + bt i + ci 0 ≤ i < n 0 ≤ t < k
bt (i+1) = mt i ∗ ci + mt i ∗ bt i + bt i ∗ ci 0 ≤ i < n− 1 0 ≤ t < k
bt 0 = 0 0 ≤ t < k
st i = SRNi
t
i 0 ≤ i < n 0 ≤ t < k
sot i = SORNi
t
i 0 ≤ i < n 0 ≤ t < k
ci = Ci 0 ≤ i < n
x2 = x ∀x
This system of equations includes 7nk + 2n variables and 15nk + 3n equations of
degree at most two. Again, this system can be greatly simplified by substituting
fixed/known value variables, as well as redundant ones, to a system with (3n−2)k+n
variables, and (7n − 4)k + n equations. For the parameter values of relevance to
ISO/IEC 29167-15, the entire system consists of 444k + 64 equations in 190k + 64
variables, which can be constructed for the small values of k that are required to
recover the key.
6.3.5.2 Guessing the rotation amount
The equation system depends on rot guess, an array of guesses for the Hamming
weight of RNi. We expect that a correct guess for the Hamming weight of RNi will
yield a system of equations that is easily solved to reveal many key bits.
The values RNi are random and so assuming that they are generated uniformly the
random variable hw(RNi) will be distributed according to a binomial distribution
with parameters (64, 12). It is therefore straightforward to compute the probability
that a randomly chosen RNi has a particular Hamming weight.
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Of particular relevance to our attack is the fact that a substantial fraction of all
possible RNi have a Hamming weight lying within a small range:
x 32 33 34 35 36
PrRNi [hw(RNi) = x] 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.06
This means that the probability hw(RNi) lies in the interval [32− δ, 32 + δ] is:
δ 0 1 2 3 4
PrRNi [hw(RNi) ∈ [32− δ, 32 + δ]] 0.10 0.29 0.46 0.62 0.74
Now assume an attacker eavesdrops on one uni-directional authentication session.
He could simply run the equation solving algorithm three times with the guesses of
31, 32, and 33 for the rotation amount. With a probability close to 30% one of these
guesses would be correct. Alternatively, he could elect to further try the values
28, 29, 30, 34, 35, and 36 which would require nine runs of the equation solving
algorithm. The probability that the eavesdropped session is covered by one of these
nine guesses is close to 74%. This has been confirmed by experiments.
It turns out that the Gro¨bner basis algorithm provides a good method to verify
whether the guessed rotation amount is correct. Empirically, it seems that selecting
the wrong rotation makes the system inconsistent, i.e. there will be no valid solution,
and this is quickly detected by the Gro¨bner basis algorithm. Of course it cannot be
ruled out that cases exist when an incorrect guess of rotation results in a system
for which solutions exist (corresponding to an incorrect key). However this does not
appear to be common; in over 20 experiments no false solutions were found for any
δ ≤ 5. Of course, even if they did occur, false alarms could easily be filtered out
using further intercepted authentication attempts or even a forgery attempt.
6.3.5.3 Results
The average number of key bits recovered and the average time required to solve the
system of equations are given in the following table and illustrated in Figure 6.4.
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Figure 6.4: Results of experiments against the final committee draft of ISO/IEC
29167-15. The number of protocol runs is given by k and 45 random
instances were generated. In each case, it is assumed that the rotation
amount was guessed correctly.
These results assume a correct guess for each of the hw(RNij), as discussed in the
previous section.
Number of protocol runs (k) 1 2 3 4
Average number of key bits recovered 21.3 51.4 60.6 63.2
Average run time (s) 10 53 87 193
Again, the attack was implemented on SageMathCloud [257] and timed using the
timeit function provided by Python; any set-up time is assumed to be pre-computed
or amortised over many protocol runs. The values (PSK, RNi1) were chosen randomly
for each trial when k = 1. As the number of protocol runs was increased PSK remains
unchanged but fresh random choices were used for RNi2, RNi3, and RNi4 as would
be expected in a real-life implementation.
179
6.3 Algebraic cryptanalysis and ISO/IEC 29167-15
Witnessing four uni-directional runs, or two mutual authentication runs, of the
scheme in Section 6.3.5 and guessing the rotation amount correctly gives a prob-
ability of approximately 85% for recovering all but two bits of the key. However
different attack strategies are possible.
Note that the attack using a single observed run is much faster than the attack with
four observed runs, although it would recover a smaller proportion of the secret key
bits. Moreover, as discussed above, when attempting to solve the resulting system
of equations it is straightforward to recognise when an incorrect rotation has been
guessed. Thus an efficient way to perform the full attack is as follows: we repeat
the single-observation attack (k = 1) several times for each run (1 ≤ t ≤ 4) of the
protocol with different guesses for hw(RNit). Once we have identified the correct
rotation for all four runs of the protocol we would then be able to apply the four-run
(k = 4) attack thereby recovering almost all bits of the key with high probability.
There are numerous possible trade-offs related to this strategy. For example, re-
peating the single run attack for guesses in the range [30, 34] gives a ∼ 46% chance
of finding the correct rotation. Doing this for eight observed protocol runs re-
quires us to run the single-round attack at most 40 times to have a probability of
∼ 54% to recover the correct rotations for four runs of the protocol. By combin-
ing this with a second phase that attacks four runs (k = 4) with correct rotation
amounts, all but two bits of the key will be recovered with probability approxi-
mately 0.54 × 0.85 ≈ 46%. This is expected to take around 10 minutes to run on
SageMathCloud.
Alternatively, the attacker could repeat the attack for each guess in the range [28, 36],
giving a 74% chance of guessing the rotation amounts correctly. Doing this for
six observed protocol runs requires us to run the single-round attack at most 54
times and would give a probability of ∼ 81% to recover the rotations for four runs
of the protocol. This attack would recover all except two bits of the key with
probability approximately 0.81× 0.85 ≈ 69% and take around 20 minutes to run on
SageMathCloud.
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6.3.6 Other insecure variants of ISO/IEC 29167-15
With the hope of discouraging further patches to ISO/IEC 29167-15, we pro-actively
anticipate some modifications that might be made with the hope of increasing secu-
rity. In this section, we show that none of the obvious variants provide a significantly
increased level of security.
One variant would be to increase the size of all parameters, using a secret key of
size n = 64 + n′ bits. The intention would be to increase the size of the equations
systems since algebraic cryptanalytic schemes do not scale well. However this is
particularly ineffective for the scheme of Table 6.5 since one can simply discard the
n′ high bits of the transmitted values and run precisely the same attack, recovering
many of the lower 64 bits. We could then guess the value of the carry bit aj 64 which
would allow the remaining bits to be attacked independently. We view this kind of
attack as ‘slicing’ the problem and we will return to this below.
We can apply a similar technique to remove any advantage from increased parame-
ters in the scheme of Table 6.6. The rotation r = hw(RNi) will, with high probability,
lie in an interval (n2 − δ, n2 + δ) for small δ. This means we can consider a subset
of equations consisting of SRNij0 . . . SRNi
j
s−1 and SORNi
j
r . . . SORNi
j
r+s−1 (and the cor-
responding pi, rj i, aj i, bj i, etc.) for some value of the rotation r. As before,
this attack requires us to guess the value of the rotations, and additionally we must
guess the value of bj r; this does not significantly affect the complexity of the attack.
(In this case we do not need to guess aj 0, however had we considered a subset of
equations not including SRNij0 we would have needed to guess another carry bit.)
Figure 6.5 illustrates the results of implementing this attack. From two runs of the
uni-directional authentication, the attacker guesses the values of four bits and, for
the correct rotation amount, the number of key bits recovered when using a single
16-bit or 24-bit ‘slice’. One strategy that may improve the efficiency of our attack
would be to first attack a small number of bits (via the slicing attack) for several
possible guessed values of hw(RNij). Then to carry out a full attack against all k
protocol runs (simultaneously) once the correct rotation values have been identified.
This way one could recover almost all the key bits without having to run the full
attack many times.
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Figure 6.5: Results of the ‘slicing’ attack applied against the final committee draft
of ISO/IEC 29167-15 with two runs of the uni-directional authentication
scheme. The values of four bits were guessed and the black dashed line
highlights this value. Dashed lines (green and yellow) show the maxi-
mum possible number of key bits that can be recovered, this restriction
being set by the size of the ‘slice’ (s).
An alternative modification to the protocol might be to change the value of the
constant C. We implemented an attack assuming that two runs of the uni-directional
authentication protocol were observed. We implemented a 16-bit ‘slicing’ attack and
repeated the whole set of experiments twice (using fresh random choices of PSK and
RNi) for each of 256 different values of C. The 256 C values were built up as a single
byte pattern repeated eight times. The number of key bits that were recovered in
our attacks for different C are illustrated in Figure 6.6.
Zero is the only value for C that leaked no key bits. However 064 is a particularly
bad choice for C since this makes SRNi = SORNi and forgeries are trivial; in this
case no key bits were recovered because if C is zero then the protocol transcript is
independent of the key. Every other choice of C leads to at least four key bits out of
16 being recovered. This suggests that changing the value of C is unlikely to improve
the security of the proposed protocol.
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Figure 6.6: Results of implementing the attack against variants of ISO/IEC 29167-
15 where the constant C moves through 256 possible values. Experiments
were run twice, each using two runs of the uni-directional authentication
scheme.
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6.3.7 Results and discussion
Through this section we have seen several incremental versions of the work in
ISO/IEC 29167-15 and observed that none offer any substantive security. We have
also seen that future versions, if based on identical principles, are unlikely to provide
additional security. These results are summarised here, with all attacks applicable
to passive adversaries; most results in this section have been implemented.
Version Net Result # Authentications
Table 6.2 Tag cloning 1
Table 6.4 Key recovery 2
Table 6.5 Key recovery 8–16
Table 6.5 Key recovery 4
Table 6.6 Key recovery 4
Although we have concentrated on uni-directional authentication, mutual authenti-
cation simply consists of two interleaved versions of a tag and interrogator authenti-
cation. This means that all of our attacks will also apply to mutual authentication,
but often with less effort since twice as much information is leaked during each
protocol run.
The scheme in ISO/IEC 29167-15 is intrinsically weak due to the simple operations
used by the tag and the interrogator; for all but the first variant the long term PSK
key can be recovered. For completeness, we note that the latest draft of ISO/IEC
WD 29167-15 also includes a method to provide a secure channel, but the encryption
method is wholly insecure.
The project editors for 29167-15 motivate their use of the simplest operations by
stating that this will result in a low-area solution. However this is misguided: the
bulk of the area for an implementation comes from the cryptographic state which
is governed by the size of the variables. So even though ISO/IEC 29167-15 uses
simple operations it doesn’t lead to a dramatic implementation advantage. More
importantly, there are already very good cryptographic solutions for UHF RFID
tags that provide good security; the AES is one option and those that prefer a bit
more implementation agility might find that Present [143] or Grain-128a [1] provide
different security/area/performance trade-offs.
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One goal of the work presented in this section was to demonstrate that ISO/IEC
29167-15 is broken and to emphasise the contributions that cryptographers can make
to a variety of ISO/IEC initiatives [93]. A second, more important, goal was to stress
that cryptography for RFID does not need to be bad cryptography. The state of
the art is such that well-studied standardised schemes are available and these can
be deployed in even the most demanding environments.
The code used to generate the data in this section can be found at
http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~ccid/publications/iso-iec-29167-15.htm.
6.4 Discussion
This chapter has shown two sides of the standardisation of cryptosystems. On
the one hand, we have ChaCha20 and Poly1305: they are mature, well-established
algorithms that have been combined into an AEAD construction in order to surface a
more appropriate interface and that construction is (now) accompanied by a security
proof. The other hand illustrates a much less optimistic picture: a novel construction
is rushed through standardisation with little analysis, heavily tweaked, and kept alive
by politics and voting patterns rather than technical merit. This pessimistic picture
is not unique to ISO/IEC 29167-15; it is reminiscent of PLAID [93] and the HB+
proposals [154] (where a string of attacks [120, 182, 97, 121] alternated with new
versions [12, 64, 203, 122]).
Many insecure RFID authentication protocols have been proposed. LMAP [218],
M2AP [219] and EMAP [220] all somewhat resemble ISO/IEC 29167-15 as they also
use integer additions, bitwise rotations, and exclusive-ors (ARX) for the basis of the
construction; they too have been broken [183, 133, 184].
These ARX designs can be a good basis from which to build a secure primitive: they
are (rightly) popular and featured prominently in the NIST SHA-3 initiative [213].
However these are typically multi-round algorithms, whereas the ultra-lightweight
RFID authentication protocols have perhaps achieved just a ‘single round’ of com-
putational complexity (if one can make the analogy). Fortunately, ChaCha20 is an
example of an ARX-based scheme that is currently believed to be secure and, as the
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analysis contained in this chapter demonstrates, the novel combination of ChaCha20
and Poly1305 is also secure.
It is reassuring that, of the two schemes analysed in this chapter, it is the combination
of ChaCha20 and Poly1305 that has seen widespread adoption. This perhaps reflects
the confidence provided by choosing established algorithms and explicitly requesting
a security analysis of the novel component, compared with the process of repeatedly
refining and tweaking a poor initial design.
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